In 2024, the U.S. Government introduced, and then quickly rescinded, a new policy to oversee Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential (PEPP). This research explores how biosafety practitioners interpreted and assessed the policy itself and discussed challenges to implementation. An inductive, grounded theory approach was used to identify key insights from qualitative data generated at a 2-day deliberative workshop with 45 biosafety officers, compliance professionals and researchers; analysis was supported using NVivo software. Participants described the policy’s ambiguous language, lack of actionable federal guidance, limited legal scope and unfunded administrative burdens as significant barriers to implementation. Although supportive of the policy’s goals, workshop participants stressed the need for more precise definitions, practical examples and practitioner-informed implementation strategies. The findings demonstrate that durable and effective biosafety and biosecurity oversight requires early, substantive engagement with those operationalizing policy.
