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The book concludes with the practical and theoretical implications of the study. The chapter shows that ZANU PF gained from a combined HIV/AIDS and migration exit premium of 5 percent in the 2000 and 2002 elections, 2 percent in the 2005 elections, 12 percent in the 2008 elections, and 4 percent in the 2013 elections. If not for voter exit, the opposition would have had more parliamentary seats and won the presidency in the disputed 2008 elections. This chapter also demonstrates that the theory of exit and party sustainability can be generalized to other states, including but not limited to Russia, Venezuela, and Syria—countries that have also experienced a mass exodus of citizens from authoritarian regimes. This chapter provides a brief comparison of the role of migrant voters in Ghana and the Gambia, where democracy struggled but ultimately thrived. I discuss the study’s policy implications, considering ongoing debates about the global immigration crisis.
This chapter analyzes the impact of remittances – the money migrants living abroad send to their family members in the home country – on the survival of authoritarian regimes, particularly in developing countries where poor economic and political conditions lead people to exit en masse. Immigrants have remitted over $500 billion in the last decade, with much of the money flowing from high-income to low- and middle-income countries. In 2018 alone, officially tracked remittances to low- and middle-income countries reached $529 billion. The actual amount is probably more because much money is channeled via unofficial routes. Ethnographic data from family interviews shows that senders can bargain for or against political participation with their receivers. Parents of young adults were likely to discourage them from engaging in politics, fearing for their lives. Receivers could also opt out of political engagement because they did not see the government playing an essential role in their economic lives. Remittances also cushioned the government from possible voter protests and welfare demands.
There are many explanations for the survival of long-serving political parties, from access to state wealth to the use of excessive violence. A yet unexplored reason, particularly for parties that have survived under extreme conditions, is voter exit. In Death, Diversion, and Departure, Chipo Dendere shows that voter exit creates new opportunities for authoritarian regime survival. With an empirical focus on Zimbabwe, Dendere centers two types of voter exit: death and migration. She shows how the exit of young, urban, and working professional voters because of mass death due to the AIDS pandemic and mass migration in the wake of economic decline has increased the resilience of a regime that may have otherwise lost power. With authoritarianism on the rise globally and many citizens considering leaving home, Death, Diversion, and Departure provides timely insights into the impact of voter exit.
Cross-border remittances from South Africa have played a central role in the food availability and well-being of migrant labour households in semi-arid Zimbabwe. However, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and containment measures introduced by both the South African and Zimbabwean governments hampered the cross-border remittance system and the movement of goods. This paper explores the food provisioning and availability impacts of the changes brought by the cocktail of policy measures on migrant sending households, and whether these households were able to find alternative food sources locally. The study highlights a precarious situation for affected households, which saw their main source of food provisioning curtailed. It argues that the situation was further aggravated by the risk associated with alternative remittance channels, and the non-availability of local alternatives for these households, which were excluded from accessing food parcels/aid by the criteria used to determine beneficiaries. The paper demonstrates the vulnerability of migrant labour households to economic and labour market changes.
This article provides a capabilities analysis of the financial behaviour of United Kingdom-based Zimbabwean senders of international remittances to Zimbabwe. It elaborates an expanded analytical framework of financial capability to investigate the effects of remitting on the financial capabilities of the senders of remittances. The data presented draw on the findings of a survey (n = 347) and semi-structured interviews (n = 23) conducted with Zimbabweans in the United Kingdom. The data reveal adverse effects of remitting on the respondents’ personal financial practices in respect of budgeting, saving and preparing for their retirement. It also shows the limits of FinTech services in transferring remittances and provides insights into how personal finance and -related capabilities constitute a social remittance. Overall, discourses on migration and development need to incorporate an expanded financial capabilities perspective to understand better how remittance fields are structured and to contribute to public policy reforms aiming to enhance the efficacy of remittances.
Financial platforms are the basic infrastructure of emerging digital platform economies. As instantiations of “infrastructural power,” they partake in processes of politico-economic subordination or the creation and reproduction of structural inequalities. These processes of subordination are depicted in terms of a prevailing global logic and directionality: from the Global North to Global South. Thus, while financial platforms are apprehended as vectors of financialization globally, they are reduced to processes of financial inclusion when referencing the so-called Global South. What is missed are the pragmatic practices of financial platforms, or how they function as sites of value production and conversion, and what is at stake for diverse actors. An examination of the consolidation of a new financial infrastructure based on digital platforms in sub-Saharan Africa illustrates this point. Financial infrastructures constituted by a nexus of mobile telecommunications operators, mobile money issuers, remittance and payment services providers, and commercial banks generate new value forms, strategies, and practices. By focusing on the latter, it is possible to better appreciate processes of both value subjugation and autonomization, evidence that the fault lines of value production generated by financial platforms are obscured by the Global North versus Global South frame.
Identifying the impact of remittances on household members remaining behind is difficult due to selection into migration. In this paper, we exploit an unexpected embargo on Qatar, the second major destination among Nepali migrants. Using longitudinal data on about 1,500 Nepali households with migrants prior to the embargo, we assess how this shock translates into changes in remittances and development outcomes. We find a 56% reduction in remittances for households with a migrant in Qatar. At least in the months immediately after the shock, such a fall in remittances does not seem to translate into recipient household's welfare. However, we cannot exclude that such effect might materialize in the medium run. That is particularly true for poor and credit-constrained households, especially vulnerable to the remittance windfall and lacking the ability to move their migrants or other household members to other destinations.
Egypt is the most populous state in the Arab world, with just over 100 million citizens residing in the country, and Egyptian nationals have long looked abroad for opportunities. This chapter examines the evolution of the country’s policies toward its diaspora and seeks to understand how the Egyptian government has attempted to protect, assist, and cultivate loyalty among its citizens abroad, as well as how it has sought to exert further control over this population. Beginning with targeted secondment policies that aimed to spread pan-Arabist ideology in the 1950s and 1960s, and broadening to mass labor exportation agreements directed primarily toward other Arab nations in the 1970s, Egypt sought to address demographic concerns of overpopulation and an overburdened and underfinanced public sector, and to reap the benefit of remittances as a major contribution to the country’s GDP. But the chapter also addresses Egypt’s failure to establish effective governance of, and engagement with, its diaspora. This includes the overlapping responsibilities of the numerous ministries in charge of emigration, an unwillingness to resolve domestic economic issues in order to prevent further brain drain and to incentivize the return of Egyptians abroad, and the state’s continued use of transnational repression toward its citizenry.
India has historically been the leading country of origin of international migrants, with an estimated 32 million overseas Indians in 2018, including 19 million Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) and 13 million Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). This chapter looks at how India initially adopted a policy of limited engagement with Indians abroad due to limited material capacities to support a large and diverse overseas community. In reaction to the emergence of an increasingly rich and influential Indian diaspora in the OECD countries, and as India’s own material capacities grew, the chapter then describes how the Government of India sought since the early 1990s to actively co-opt its community abroad by providing more consular services and by redesigning its diaspora policies and institutions. The chapter shows that the expansion of India’s consular support services has also been driven by the need to ensure stable remittances from low-skilled migrants. Also noted is how the Indian government has developed repressive tools against Indians abroad whom it considers to be a threat to its national sovereignty and integrity. This chapter concludes that, despite the design of new policies to engage nationals abroad, limited material resources devoted to these initiatives have in turn limited their implementation and success.
According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are approximately 6.5 million Turkish people living abroad. With national communities in more than seventy nations, the Turkish diaspora has a global reach. This chapter examines Türkiye’s relations with its national communities abroad. Over the decades, Türkiye reimagined its relationship with its citizens abroad, which in turn allowed national communities abroad to reimagine their home state. In the early years of labor migration, Türkiye focused on economic benefits such as remittances. Later on, Ankara noticed the public policy potential of national communities living abroad. With widening diplomatic support and an increase in selective cultural engagement, Türkiye expanded its reach to overseas communities. While diplomatic services benefited all, some forms of cultural support targeted conservative populations. Domestic security concerns also led to an interest in understanding the political leanings of the diaspora.
Overseas Pakistanis continue to grow in number, expanding the national community abroad. The three main challenges that exist for the Pakistani government in protecting its citizens abroad are interconnected and have to do with maintaining remittances, increasing educational opportunities, and potentially loosening visa restrictions that hamper the ability of Pakistanis to travel and interact with other countries economically. While the world has focused on security, mainly evaluating Pakistan from an Afghanistan-focused lens as US and NATO forces remained in the country till August 2021, Pakistanis have been busy seizing opportunities for themselves and their families, indicating a high level of agency. The Pakistani government is motivated by its diaspora’s agency and self-identity needs, and welcomes engagement. This movement has now resulted in remittances becoming Pakistan’s largest source of national foreign exchange. In order to maintain remittances, the Pakistani government’s activities are likely to intensify over time. As the Pakistani government engages with its citizens abroad, one of the most interesting revelations about this research is the lack of direct military involvement.
Challenging the myth of non-return, this chapter shows that, by the 1970s, many guest workers did want to return to Turkey. But instead of support, they encountered opposition from the Turkish government. In the 1970s, the link between return migration and financial investments dominated bilateral discussions between Turkey and West Germany. After the Oil Crisis, West Germany devised bilateral policies to promote remigration. Turkey, then mired in unemployment, hyperinflation, and debt, actively resisted those efforts. The Turkish government realized that guest workers played a significant role in mitigating the country’s economic crisis. To repay its foreign debt, Turkey needed guest workers’ remittance payments in high-performing Deutschmarks. If guest workers returned to Turkey, then that stream would dry up. Turkish officials thus strove to prevent mass return migration at all costs – even when it contradicted guest workers’ interests. These tensions also manifested in Turkey’s charging of exorbitant fees for citizens abroad who sought exemptions from mandatory military service, prompting young migrants to create an activist organization that critiqued this policy. The knowledge that they were unwanted in both countries widened the rift between the migrants and their home country, which disparaged them as “Germanized” yet relied on them as “remittance machines.”
The international migration literature has highlighted four key stylized facts from the perspective of the source country: (i) Migration rates are notably high, with some nations seeing over ten percent of their population living abroad. (ii) Certain developing countries have witnessed a significant exodus of skilled workers, commonly referred to as brain drain, spanning several decades. (iii) Migrants often maintain strong ties to their country of origin, evidenced by the substantial remittances they send back to their relatives. (iv) Migration is not necessarily permanent, as a considerable number of individuals return to their home country after a period spent abroad. In this paper, we present a theoretical model that endogenously explains these facts. Our model allows us to explore key issues in migration literature from a theoretical standpoint. We analyze the general equilibrium effects of migration, its long-term implications, and its welfare consequences. Additionally, we investigate whether the combined impact of return migration and remittances can counterbalance the effects of skilled migration. Finally, we evaluate the efficacy of policy interventions designed to mitigate the adverse effects of brain drain.
We are the first to study how the resources freed up when a child, child-in-law, or grandchild moves out of a household are reallocated, taking into account the age of the leaver. Using the 2011 and 2013 waves of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study, we document that, on average, the remaining household members save part of the resources freed up by the leaver and consume another part. Differentiating the leavers by age, we find that after the departure of a member of the younger generation aged 0–24, the remaining household members save the resources freed up by the leaver. However, if the leaver is above 24, they spend the freed-up resources. Our results are robust to the use of different specifications, estimation methods, and consumption aggregates. Finally, we observe that remittances directed toward non-resident offspring do not increase after the departure of a member of the younger generation.
This chapter presents a cutting-edge study of multidimensional poverty since it fully exploits highly granular data on expenditure (government programmes) matched with social development indicators. First, we explore how economic well-being and various socioeconomic rights, in Mexico, have benefited from domestic income and remittances of households located in the deciles 1 to 5 of the income distribution. Second, we analyse the degree of substitutability of remittances (or personal income in general) vis-à-vis spending on social programmes.
Platform economies are depicted as the foundation for a new era of economic production. This transpires through the incorporation of digital technologies and algorithmic operations into the heart of economic and financial practices. However, different assumptions are made about the effects of digital platforms depending on geographical location. While digital platforms are approached as inherent to processes of financialization globally, they are reduced to processes of financial inclusion when referencing the ‘Global South’. Analyses of financialization as a one-way-vector - Global North to Global South - overlook the variability, the limits, and responses to financialization. In contrast, a focus on market devices illustrates the specificities of value creation. An example of this is ‘the float’, a form of financial value generated by mobile telecommunication operators, mobile money issuers, and commercial banks in Africa. Through this lens, we see instances of both value subjugation and autonomization, evidence that the fault lines of value production generated by ambiguous market devices are obscured by the Global North/Global South frame.
In the last decade, remittances have become connected to financialization, expanding financial markets and deepening financial logics in what has been termed the financialization of remittances (FOR). In Nepal, where remittances are of key importance, this manifests itself in the country's development strategy through attempts to formalize remittances and promote financial inclusion, entrepreneurship, and financial infrastructure. This article focuses on the most salient manifestation of the FOR in Nepal: a large-scale financial literacy education (FLE) campaign for transnational families. To examine how this FOR-FLE complex works, we bring together insights on emotional governance with those on the creation of (gendered) financial subjectivities. Based on an analysis of FLE pedagogical material and interviews with FLE experts, we suggest that the FOR-FLE complex in Nepal mobilizes a pedagogy of fear and hope to discipline the financial behavior of transnational families, transforming them into self-governing miniature financial corporations. We also highlight the gender dimensions of this emotional regime, which creates terror and works to patronize, shame, and stigmatize nonmigrant women of transnational families, rendering them responsible for development, decreasing out-migration, and reducing the economy's import dependency.
This chapter examines the role of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in global migration governance and its implications for migrant workers’ rights and well-being. As global lead migration agency for the U.N. system, is well-positioned to influence whether and how States address the significant gaps in international migration law and institutions that enable the continued exploitation and abuse of migrant workers worldwide. This chapter explores IOM’s potential to advance migrant workers’ rights by examining an IOM initiative explicitly established to do so: IOM’s International Recruitment Integrity System’s (IRIS), which seeks to promote ethical cross-border recruitment. IOM’s approach tends to prioritize increasing labor migration to harness “the developmental potential of migration” – but too often at the cost of migrants’ rights. Moreover, IOM ultimately encourages further privatization of area of governance that experts—and, indeed, ethical recruiters themselves—believe requires, instead, strong state involvement in order to meaningfully advance migrant workers’ rights protection.
Greater labor migration can establish more channels for information flows, directly contributing to faster economic growth and improved innovation and work. It can also expand international remittances, which can be invested by recipient households in home countries in education, entrepreneurship, and improved and sustainable agricultural technologies. At the same time, however, increased emigration of medical professionals and technical workers from poor countries can reduce quality of local services, innovation, health status, and productivity. This analysis attempts to quantify the economic benefits and costs of permitting an immediate 10% increase in the bilateral migration of skilled workers (physicians, engineers or science, engineering, technology, and mathematics workers, and other persons with advanced educations) among the nations of the African Continental Free Trade Area and, more broadly, among 25 global regions. Economic benefits include higher migrant incomes abroad, welfare gains in destination countries associated with higher economic efficiency, spillover productivity gains, and an improved ability of the younger and more skilled working force to support the needs of the wider population, resulting in higher national production. Benefits in source countries include productivity enhancements from two sources: (a) greater access to knowledge associated with more bilateral trade and investment and (b) the ability of local households to invest remittances in productivity-enhancing activities. Welfare losses in source nations include static efficiency reductions and a worsened demographic support capability. In Africa, the benefit-cost ratios range from 3.7 to 6.9; in the global analysis, 17 to 38.
Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of Global Migrations presents an authoritative overview of the various continuities and changes in migration and globalization from the 1800s to the present day. Despite revolutionary changes in communication technologies, the growing accessibility of long-distance travel, and globalization across major economies, the rise of nation-states empowered immigration regulation and bureaucratic capacities for enforcement that curtailed migration. One major theme worldwide across the post-1800 centuries was the differentiation between “skilled” and “unskilled” workers, often considered through a racialized lens; it emerged as the primary divide between greater rights of immigration and citizenship for the former, and confinement to temporary or unauthorized migrant status for the latter. Through thirty-one chapters, this volume further evaluates the long global history of migration; and it shows that despite the increased disciplinary systems, the primacy of migration remains and continues to shape political, economic, and social landscapes around the world.