In an earlier note in this journal, I located a contradiction in On Liberty. On the one hand, Mill describes piecework as a self-regarding “private concern” between employees and employers, one that does not harm other workers. On the other, he says that the competitors in economic markets harm each other. But workers compete in the labor market, and Mill does not deny that for some workers to accept payment by the piece may set back the interests of others. Jonathan Riley’s recent reply fails to demonstrate that Mill does not contradict himself. Riley’s argument depends on showing that in On Liberty Mill is presupposing that employers are employing a very specific model of piecework, one which Riley claims is self-regarding. However, Riley fails to establish that Mill is making this presupposition. Moreover, an employer’s choice to adopt piecework would not be self-regarding even if they did employ Riley’s model.

Daniel Immerman has recently put forward a novel account of harm, the Worse than Nothing Account. We argue that this account faces fatal problems in cases in which an agent performs several simultaneous actions. We also argue that our criticism is considerably more powerful than another one that has recently been advanced.

Melina Constantine Bell (2021) argues that J. S. Mill's harm principle permits society to coercively interfere with the use of bigoted insults, since these insults are harmful on “a more expansive, modern, conception of harm.” According to Bell, these insults are harmful in virtue of their contributing to detrimental objective states like health problems. I argue that people with illiberal dispositions might have intense and sustained negative subjective reactions to behavior that the harm principle ought to protect, reactions intense enough to affect their health or other objective interests. Bell's way of thinking about harm therefore has illiberal implications. Yet I agree with her that bigoted insults should be regarded as harmful. I therefore propose an alternative way of understanding harm according to which subjective pain is a harm when it is intentionally caused.