What are the consequences of selective emigration from a closed regime? To answer this question, I focus on socialist East Germany and leverage an emigration reform in 1983 that led to the departure of about 65,200 citizens. Analyzing panel data on criminal activity in a difference-in-differences framework, I demonstrate that emigration can be a double-edged sword in contexts where it is restricted. Emigration after the reform had benefits in the short run and came with an initial decline in crime. However, it created new challenges for the regime as time passed. Although the number of ordinary crimes remained lower, border-related political crimes rose sharply in later years. Analysis of emigration-related petitioning links this result to a rise in demand for emigration after the initial emigration wave. These findings highlight the complexities of managing migration flows in autocracies and reveal a key repercussion of using emigration as a safety valve.

Autocrats frequently appeal to socially conservative values, but little is known about how or even whether such strategies are actually paying political dividends. To address important issues of causality, this study exploits Russian president Vladimir Putin’s 2020 bid to gain a popular mandate for contravening presidential term limits in part by bundling this constitutional change with a raft of amendments that would enshrine traditional morality (including heteronormativity and anti-secularism) in Russia’s basic law. Drawing on an original experiment-bearing survey of the Russian population, it finds that Putin’s appeal to these values generated substantial new support for Putin’s reform package, primarily from social conservatives who did not support him politically. These findings expand our understanding of authoritarian practices and policy making by revealing one way in which core political values are leveraged to facilitate autocracy-enabling institutional changes and potentially other ends that autocrats might pursue.

While deplatforming has become an increasingly common strategy to combat online harm and far-right extremism, its effects on the followers of extremist groups—who are key supporters and play a crucial role in spreading and sustaining these ideologies—remain underexplored. On August 10, 2018, Twitter (now X) deplatformed one such far-right extremist group, the Proud Boys, along with their affiliated accounts. Leveraging this intervention, our research addresses a key knowledge gap by examining the impact of deplatforming on the cohesion of extremist group followers. Specifically, we investigate whether deplatforming leads to fragmentation or reinforces unity among the group’s followers. We assess cohesion through three theoretical lenses: task commitment, social commitment, and sense of belonging. By analyzing over 12 million tweets from approximately nine thousand Proud Boys supporters between August 1, 2017, and September 1, 2019, we find that deplatforming had a limited effect on reducing group cohesion. Instead, it may have prompted followers to seek broader networks and external interactions, leaving overall cohesion largely intact. This study offers important insights into the resilience of online extremist communities and the limitations of deplatforming as a strategy to disrupt them. Understanding these dynamics is essential for developing more effective approaches to counter online extremism and promote safer digital spaces.

The Biden-Harris administration launched two important initiatives to expand public participation in the administrative state. These initiatives aimed to increase public engagement in developing federal regulations and reducing burdens in accessing public benefits. These two initiatives built on social science, especially political science. In this piece, I draw from my experience helping to lead the work to describe how political science research informed the design and implementation of both initiatives. I aim to open the “black box” of how federal policy makers use political science research. I also describe future research that could advance these initiatives. I conclude with a case study of such research, examining the barriers faced by food assistance applicants to sharing their experiences with government with a survey of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) applicants. The survey points to barriers government must overcome to expand participation among SNAP applicants and strategies policy makers might use to do so.

Animals routinely suffer violence by humans, especially during war, but it is unclear how much people in conflict environments express concern for animal welfare. Based on a 2,008-person survey in Ukraine in May 2024, we find that respondents are anthropocentric, prioritizing human over animal suffering; biocentric, regarding both as important; or, in a small minority, zoocentric, emphasizing animal over human suffering. Experimental priming on violence against animals during the Russia–Ukraine war has limited effect on changing attitudes toward animal welfare, but it does increase resource allocation to animal relief organizations. A war crimes punishment experiment also shows that while respondents sanction perpetrators of human suffering more severely than perpetrators of animal suffering, violence against animals is still strongly penalized, indicating appreciation for animal rights, justice, and accountability. We reflect on the implications of our findings for speciesist versus posthumanist understandings of suffering during war.

After the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU) issued new domestic rules across a variety of financial services. Different politics and policy-making processes generated regulatory incompatibilities, and conflicts emerged as each side insisted the other adapt to its approach. Yet our original data covering eleven sub-sectors show that in a predominant cluster of cases, the two jurisdictions had by 2020 made adjustments and adopted integrationist regulation, which fosters cross-jurisdictional interoperability for financial companies through harmonization (increasing similarity and compatibility) or deference (accepting the regulation of other jurisdictions). The pattern has broad and surprising implications for the future of global finance in an era of rising economic nationalism and populist politics. Why, then, did Washington and Brussels move beyond the standoffs? What accounts for the integrationist turn? Our novel explanation features a “mutual accommodation” causal mechanism driven by the development in both jurisdictions of “border-policing” capacities, builds on a new generation of IPE research that is attentive to complexity and temporal process in accounting for global governance outcomes, and provides a pathway for qualitative researchers seeking to balance many new methodological and transparency demands.

Over the past two decades, political science has produced varied examples of ethnographic approaches. These approaches have not only tackled epistemological dilemmas but also exposed a second methodological dimension of ethnographic practice that is not so systematically explored: the relationship of researchers to their research participants. In this article, we focus on this second dimension, using emblematic texts in political science, especially in comparative politics, to develop a fourfold typology of political ethnographies that takes into account the emotional dynamics between researchers and participants. We use this typology to analyze various gradations through which these emotional dynamics develop in fieldwork. Focusing on the navigation between distance and proximity that these dynamics entail, we propose the concept of “emotional proximity” to capture relations between the researcher and the participant. We investigate the validity of this novel typology by applying it to ethnographic studies of far-right actors. The political distance separating researchers and participants in these studies allows us to investigate the methodologies of disconnecting political from emotional dynamics across this fourfold schema of ethnographic varieties. We argue that the “infidelity” of emotional distance (instead of proximity) is not an objectivist epistemological necessity but a methodological tool that is indispensable to the practice of participant observation.

In communities throughout Latin America, criminal organizations provide basic order and security. While multidisciplinary research on criminal governance (CG) has illuminated its dynamics in hundreds of site-specific studies, its extent remains understudied. We exploit novel, nationally representative survey data, validated against a compendium of qualitative sources, to estimate CG prevalence in 18 countries, and explore its correlates at multiple levels. Overall, 14% of respondents reported that local criminal groups provide order and/or reduce crime, corresponding to some 77–101 million Latin Americans experiencing CG. Counterintuitively, CG is positively correlated with both respondents’ perceptions of state governance quality and objective measures of local state presence. These descriptive results are consistent with multiple causal pathways, including case-specific findings that state presence—rather than absence—drives criminal governance. We offer suggestions for both more precise data collection on CG itself and, given its pervasiveness, its inclusion in broader research on economic development, demography, and politics.

What is the nature of America’s liberal inheritance? These days, prominent political thinkers—pro-liberals, anti-liberals, and postliberals alike—seem to agree, following Louis Hartz, that American liberalism is individualist, Enlightenment liberalism grounded in Lockean teachings. This is a mistake. We would do better to understand American political thought as defined not just by Enlightenment liberalism but also by Exodus liberalism, the latter of which has been expressed primarily (though not exclusively) in African American political thought. It is in the complex interplay between these two liberal traditions that we can better understand the nature of, and the possibilities for, American liberalism and American politics. This essay tells part of the story of how political scientists came to neglect Exodus liberalism, then envisions a more comprehensive approach to American political thought—a desegregated American political thought.

In the age of post-neoliberal globalization, complex interdependence has resulted in the integration of many economies and the industries within them and led to varied national and subnational political and economic responses. These forces have enabled the rise of a new political economy that requires the contextualized comparative sector approach (CCSA). This article advances a research agenda that contends theoretical and empirical leverage for explaining heterogeneity and assessing generalizability is gained by taking contextualized comparisons to the sector level of analysis. The CCSA identifies the multidimensional effects of sectors, uncovering new sites of inquiry connected to sectoral structural attributes, context-specific sectoral organization of institutions, and social and political constructions of sectors. Sectors are thus contexts that are embedded in multilevel contexts involving state and nonstate actors alike. Scholarship on industrial policy, technology and innovation, environmental transition, and regulation and governance demonstrates the analytical power and theoretical value of combining contextualized comparisons and sectoral analysis, which have been overlooked by the overly macro- or micro-level studies dominant in international and comparative political economy. The various strategies of the approach and a stepwise discussion of a research design underscore the possibilities for theory development and testing, adjudication of competing explanations, and case-specific discoveries.

Since the inception of the United States, religion has long permeated its politics, so much so that racial construction cannot be fully understood without first dissecting America’s cosmological underpinnings. This article maps the founding of ethnic democracy within European modernity and its centrality to the development of the American nation-state. I contend that American ethnic democracy emerges when ethno-racial tyranny expresses itself as white supremacy that is built and sustained through a cosmological justification for its political existence. The political ramifications reveal an unfolding of transhistorical racial terror against the Black as a precondition for ethno-democratic continuity. Nevertheless, contestations against the US ethno-democratic state emerge via the heretical praxis of Black rebels who, through a commitment to subversive belief systems, struggle for Black freedom as a recovery of abolition–democracy.

This article proposes the creation of constituency juries to enhance accountability and check oligarchy in representative governments. Constituency juries would be made up of randomly selected citizens from an electoral constituency who exercise oversight over that constituency’s elected representative. Elected representatives would be required to give a regular account of their actions to the constituency jury, and the jury would have the power to sanction the representative. In addition to this general model of constituency juries, I offer a more specific institutional design that shows how the general model can be operationalized and realistically incorporated into existing representative governments. In contrast to lottocratic proposals that replace elections with sortition, constituency juries are a promising way to combine the two to address the oligarchic tendencies of elections in representative government.

Despite constituting around 16% of the world’s population, we know little about the extent to which political parties encourage people with disabilities to participate in political parties. This article aims to fill that gap by providing a comparative analysis of political parties in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The research develops a framework for assessing the accessibility of political parties. The research finds evidence of activity in a small number of parties but finds relatively little evidence to suggest that parties are prioritizing this issue, especially when compared with the participation of other social groups. The article argues that we need greater research into the relationship between disability and political parties, concluding with a future research agenda.

Calls to defund the police gained prominence with the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and take various forms. Depending on what will be defunded, the idea has attracted support from different parts of the political spectrum. The politicized nature of the debate often cuts short reflection on how best to assess proposals to defund the police. This article takes up that task. It begins by developing a typology of defund measures: abolitionist cuts, abolitionist reallocation, disaggregative cuts, and disaggregative reallocation. It then outlines a framework to evaluate policing and defund measures, drawing on criteria from the ethics of defensive force. Since policing relies on force, it faces a high justificatory bar and must satisfy the principles of just aim, proportionality, and necessity. The state should not fund unjustified forms of policing that violate those principles. Different violations, though, demand different policy responses.

In recent years, analysts have raised concerns about the threat misinformation poses to democracy, yet efforts to counter misinformation have been met with charges of bias and censorship, predominantly from the political right. This article asks who sets the terms of debate over misinformation: what it is, how much there is, whether it is a problem, and what to do about it. It frames the past decade’s controversies around misinformation as an implicit struggle for authority and offers a framework to interpret the arguments of the actors involved. It identifies three coalitions with distinct institutional and ideological profiles that have articulated consistent stances on misinformation. The analysis demonstrates how contestation among competing coalitions plays out in five distinct domains of misinformation: content, attribution, scale, consequences, and policy. Viewing the misinformation debate as part of broader political and cultural struggles within democracies at a time of low trust in institutions helps explain why (mis)information is so fiercely contested. The issue takes on outsize proportions because whoever prevails in shaping the discourse surrounding misinformation stands to gain authority over the rules governing the public sphere, with implications for the future of free speech and democratic participation.

Counterterrorism is both a reaction to and an anticipation of the activities of those who wield terror for political purposes. Counterterrorism pits itself against terrorism, aimed at ending or at least limiting its operations, spread, and damage. As Richard English has acknowledged, non-state terrorism has much less impact on the world than the counterterrorism it elicits. The vast powers at the disposal of states and their reactive tendency to military methods, such as after 9/11, make this entirely predictable. Fiona de Londras’ examination of transnational counterterrorism ably documents how states acting in concert have reshaped the world, particularly in the post 9/11 era. Guendalina Simoncini’s book on Tunisia clearly illustrates how counterterrorism can be used to enable the establishment of an authoritarian regime in Tunisia and the resultant disastrous consequences for that society.

In the early months of 2020, governments faced the rapid spread of COVID-19. To navigate the storm of conflicting information about the danger posed by this new disease, countries sought guidance about when and how to respond to it. We argue that the World Health Organization (WHO) played a central role in the diffusion of policies against COVID-19 by exercising leadership. We develop the concept of leadership as a diffusion mechanism to explain how the WHO influenced governments to close schools and workplaces and cancel public events within weeks, despite its lack of strong enforcement mechanisms. Results from five event-history models show the significance of the WHO’s pandemic declaration on March 11, 2020 that mobilized countries to adopt the measures recommended by the organization. However, that declaration did not affect the diffusion of policies that the WHO advised against adopting.

On what policy areas and with what strategies should businesses and their leaders be involved in political activity? Advocates of “stakeholder capitalism” endorse companies and their leaders taking stances on social, environmental, and economic issues that advance the interests of their communities, not just of their shareholders. We juxtapose this view with two alternatives: companies and their leaders should a) stay out of politics or b) advocate only for their narrow business interests. We survey the mass public and business leaders. The public has little appetite for corporate leader engagement. However, business leaders, especially Democratic ones, endorse more active engagement from their firms on most issues, though they favor their firm leaders engaging in behind-the-scenes strategies rather than those that mobilize employees or customers. We find there is an elite appetite for business leaders to move beyond particularistic lobbying and to influence broader economic and social policy.