We comment on the consequences of the target article for language evolution research. We propose that the default assumption should be that of language-readiness in extinct hominins, and the integration of different types of available evidence from multiple disciplines should be used to assess the likely extent of the realization of this readiness. The role of archaeological evidence should be reconsidered.

The article provides an important warning but its general conclusions should be nuanced: (i) When there is no evidence for it, we should depart from the hypothesis that a species lacks a particular cognitive capacity, and (ii) inferences from absence of evidence can be epistemically sound and scientifically strategic in cognitive and linguistic archaeology.

Stibbard-Hawkes presents a much-needed case for distinguishing between different types of evidence for cognition in past cultures. However, he does not outline an applicable approach for moving forward in making claims about the cognition of past cultures. We present an initial model for calibrating both absolute and comparative claims about past cultures' cognition and other traits.

Sports, team games, and physical skill competitions appear to be a human universal and may have been prevalent throughout the hominin lineage. These activities are cognitively complex and can be associated with a distinctive and symbolic material culture. Yet, many of the artifacts used by foraging groups for sports, team games, and athletic competitions often have a low preservation probability.

The target article rightly questions whether the archaeological record is useful for identifying sea changes in hominin cognitive abilities. This commentary suggests an alternative approach of synthesizing findings from primatology, evolutionary developmental biology, and paleoanthropology to formulate hypotheses about cognitive evolution in hominins that lived during the three million years that preceded the record of material culture (the Botanic Age).

Our commentary suggests that different materialities (fragile, enduring, and mixed) may influence cognitive evolution. Building on Stibbard-Hawkes, we propose that predictive brains minimise errors and seek information, actively structuring environments for epistemic benefits. This perspective complements Stibbard-Hawkes' view.

Stibbard-Hawkes's detailed demonstration that in the case of hunter-gatherer artifacts, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence must never be forgotten. The belief that there is a single coherent “human cognitive capacity” difference between modern humans and some unspecified earlier form should be rigorously re-examined.

Using Neanderthal symbolism, I extend on Stibbard-Hawkes to show that reconsidering the link between cognitive capacity and material culture extends beyond matters of preservation. A reconceptualization of behavioural modernity inclusive of both extant and extinct populations must begin with an honest theoretical separation of biological and behavioural modernity, which requires to critically engage with how we frame the underlying questions.

Innovations, such as symbolic artifacts, are a product of cognitive abilities but also of cultural context. Factors that may determine the emergence and retention of an innovation include the population's pre-existing cultural repertoire, exposure to relevant ways of thinking, and the invention's utility. Thus, we suggest that the production of symbolic artifacts is not guaranteed even in cognitively advanced societies.

While we are sympathetic with Stibbard-Hawkes’ approach, we disagree with the proposal to switch to a “cognitively modern” null for all Homo species. We argue in favor of a more evidence-driven approach, inspired by recent debates in comparative cognition. Ultimately, parsing the contributions of different genetic and extra-genetic factors in human evolution is more promising than setting a priori nulls.

Modern humans don't always leave cultural or technological evidence. Yet, Mbuti artifacts, like net-hunting tools and patterns, reveal their modern cognitive capacity. They create geometric and musical structures requiring specific working memory seen in modern Homo sapiens. Evidence from Blombos Cave suggests these skills existed 75,000 years ago, underscoring shared cognitive abilities among all modern human populations.

Many have interpreted symbolic material culture in the deep past as evidencing the origins sophisticated, modern cognition. Scholars from across the behavioural and cognitive sciences, including linguists, psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists, primatologists, archaeologists, and palaeoanthropologists have used such artefacts to assess the capacities of extinct human species, and to set benchmarks, milestones, or otherwise chart the course of human cognitive evolution. To better calibrate our expectations, the present paper instead explores the material culture of three contemporary African forager groups. Results show that, although these groups are unequivocally behaviourally modern, they would leave scant long-lasting evidence of symbolic behaviour. Artefact sets are typically small, perhaps as a consequence of residential mobility. When traded materials are excluded, few artefacts have components with moderate–to–strong taphonomic signatures. The present analyses show that artefact function influences preservation probability, such that utilitarian tools for the processing of materials and the preparation of food are disproportionately likely to contain archaeologically traceable components. There are substantial differences in material use among populations, which create important population-level variation in preservation probability, independent of cognitive differences. I discuss the factors – cultural, ecological, and practical – that influence material choice. In so doing, I highlight the difficulties of using past material culture as an evolutionary or cognitive yardstick.