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Newly trained and returning Australian soldiers undertook a reinforcement process after their arrival on the Continent in accordance with the British Army schooling system in France that trained troops in operating modern weapon systems. Contrary to popular belief, these schools and their associated processes and training pamphlets provided a robust and valuable education to Empire soldiers in preparing them for the rigours of combat. The training methodology was British Expeditionary Force (BEF) wide, and the development of Australian infantry can only be viewed in this context. The schooling system must be studied holistically as there was a disparate dissemination of doctrinal and training standards among the different British armies to which Australian infantry were allocated in 1917. An overview of the 1917 campaigns in which Australian infantry were involved provides further context. These campaigns show how army commanders had a very real influence on the application of the latest tactics and doctrine among their formations on the Western Front. Despite discrepancies, the overarching theme remains that the education methodology employed by the BEF comprised specificity in training and habituation and was a concept as old as the armies of Alexander the Great.
This chapter will focus on the platoon-level weapons systems utilised by Australian infantry on the Western Front from 1916–18. The introduction and use of these weapons occurred in concert with organisational and training developments that were concurrently occurring throughout the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). The weapon systems were in every sense the platoon-level tools of the trade during the Great War. Developments in their tactical application evolved significantly after the Somme campaign of 1916. In particular, the British and Imperial platoon weapons systems of 1916–18 comprised the rifle, bayonet, light machine-gun (LMG), grenade and grenade launcher. All of these weapons were used by the Australian infantry platoon and its subordinate elements, the section, in the last two years of the Great War. This chapter will focus on the technical detail associated with each system, and in particular the schooling systems in which Australian infantrymen learnt to operate and maintain their various weapons. This chapter will not discuss high-end weapons systems or combined arms operations – tanks, aircraft, artillery and the like – other than in the wider context of the development of infantry tactics.
The acquisition and procurement of major weapons systems is fraught with difficulties. They tend to be delivered late, over budget and unable to meet requirements. This Element provides an economic analysis of why this happens. Market structure, demand by the military and supply by the arms firms, shapes the conduct of the agents and generates the poor performance observed. The military are trying to counter an evolving threat, subject to a budget constraint, high R&D costs and new technologies. The interaction between a government made up of warring tribes and arms firms with considerable market and political power is further complicated by a set of what economists call 'principal-agent' problems, which are examined. While the poor performance has prompted many countries to propose reforms, the difficulty of the task and the institutional incentives faced by the actors mean that the reforms rarely solve the problem.
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