How has human culture become so complex? We argue that a key process is social tinkering: the gradual accumulation of ad hoc innovations to the social rules that coordinate behavior in response to immediate challenges. Momentary innovations provide precedents that can be reused, entrenched, adapted and recombined to handle future challenges. Interactions between these social rules create rich cultural systems (languages, ethics, political organization) of increasing complexity through processes of spontaneous order, not deliberate design. To explain the historical emergence of cumulative cultural complexity, we distinguish between six overlapping and interacting stages: (1) non-social tinkering to solve problems in the natural world; (2) learning and copying from the tinkering of others; (3) social tinkering involving jointly agreeing on momentary conventions to coordinate interactions, typically for mutual benefit; (4) creating communicative conventions (language) to support more complex social interactions; (5) social tinkering of linguistically-formulated cultural rules leading to laws, organizations, institutions, etc.; and (6) tinkering with linguistically-formulated non-social knowledge, allowing for the creation of science and technology. The rich interplay of innovation across the six stages is crucial for explaining increasing cultural and organizational complexity and our collective mastery of the natural world. Because social and non-social tinkering requires two different kinds of learning, this analysis has important implications for the understanding of human learning and cognition, including moral and evolutionary psychology, theory of mind, and the view of the child-as-scientist. Social tinkering also has substantial implications for current theories of cultural evolution.

We report on an experimental investigation of the emergence of Spontaneous Order, the idea that societies can co-ordinate, without government intervention, on a form of society that is good for its citizens, as described by Adam Smith. Our experimental design is based on a production game with a convex input provision possibility frontier, where subjects have to choose a point on this frontier. We start with a simple society consisting of just two people, two inputs, one final good and in which the production process exhibits returns to specialisation. We then study more complex societies by increasing the size of the society (groups of 6 and 9 subjects) and the number of inputs (6 and 9 inputs respectively), as well as the combinations of inputs that each subject can provide. This form of production can be characterised as a cooperative game, where the Nash equilibrium predicts that the optimal outcome is achieved when each member of this society specialises in the provision of a single input. Based on this framework, we investigate whether Spontaneous Order can emerge, without it being imposed by the government. We find strong evidence in favour of the emergence of Spontaneous Order, with communication being an important factor. Using text classification algorithms (Multinomial Naive Bayes) we quantitatively analyse the available chat data and we provide insight into the kind of communication that fosters specialisation in the absence of external involvement. We note that, while communication has been shown to foster coordination in other contexts (for example, in public goods games, market entry games and competitive coordination games) this contribution is in the context of a production game where specialisation is crucial.

Ideology can be understood as a type of cultural system, a set of interrelated meanings that are symbolically mediated through semiotic devices such as metaphors. Ideologies underlie social orders as well as help people make sense of their environment and decide on courses of action. While much has been said about ideology, little has been written on the sources of ideological change beyond pointing to ideological entrepreneurship. Even less has been written on the relationship between violent and disruptive social movements and ideology beyond pointing to the ideological motivations for the movements. We contend that extreme protests are often triggered by an ideological crisis, that is, an intolerable disconnection between the ideology adopted by some group and the current circumstances or, alternatively, an inability of their ideology to make sense of their current situation. Moreover, extreme protests are a form of ideological work, as they are often sources of ideological inspiration, development, and change.

Bart Wilson argues that property is based on custom, not rights. Wilson (2022) further argues for the primacy of property over property rights. Wilson's research, including the recent book, The Property Species: Mine, Yours, and the Human Mind (2020), is a significant and arguably pathbreaking contribution to the vast literature on property and property rights. It also falls into the trap of economic arguments that unnecessarily devalue legal rights. I ague that we can all agree that ideas about property are always important to understanding property rights but that property rights still rule. This is in part because those who have property typically care most about property rights. I also argue that Wilson's concept of property is too focused on private ownership, rather than shared ownership or even government ownership of property. I suggest that considering the idea of sharing and other legitimate forms of property ownership alongside private ownership would generalize Wilson's constructivist theory of property and improve our ability to explain the diversity of property rights.

This paper explores the potential for gains from trade between Austrian and behavioral economics, with a focus on how the two schools of thoughts can constructively critique each other. Among other things, the Austrian critique of behavioral economics would urge it to jettison its restrictive and axiomatic definition of rationality, and to treat humans as active agents rather than passive recipients of environmental and cognitive influences. Meanwhile, the behavioral critique of Austrian economics would push it to take more seriously the fundamental question of how individuals arrive at choices and to analyze how such choices can interact with ‘micro-institutional’ choice environments.

Although the architectonic of Plato’s best city is dazzling, some critics find its detailed prescriptions inimical to human freedom and well-being. Most notably, Karl Popper in The Open Society and its Enemies sees it as a proto-totalitarian recipe, choking all initiative and variety out of the citizenry. This essay does not directly respond to Popper’s critique but instead spotlights a strand in the dialogue that positions Plato as an advocate of regulatory relaxation and economic liberty to an extent otherwise unknown in the ancient world and by no means unopposed in ours. His contribution to liberal political economy thereby merits greater attention and respect.