Both corporate partners and musicians may have valid reasons for wanting to terminate a contract. Forcing them to uphold the contract curbs party agency. Relevant reasons may include the aim of avoiding undue investment in an artist who has proven to be commercially unviable, the wish to escape unfair situations in terms of rights transfer, or cases of (perceived) unfairness in terms of exploitation and/or remuneration. The excessive duration of a contract may in itself also give rise to problems. On a more general level, the exclusive nature of many music industry contracts sits uneasily with the vision of musicians as independent, creative actors. This chapter reviews how the selected substantive legal regimes affect parties’ possibility to terminate the contractual relationship. First, the chapter reviews potentially applicable limitations on contract duration, as well as grounds for termination on the basis of breach of contract. Taking a more practical view, the consequences of contract termination are then assessed in order to gauge whether these consequences may amount to switching costs that prevent the termination of contracts in practice.

This final chapter relates the Norwegian treason trials to comparable processes in both Eastern and Western Europe following the Second World War. In contextualising the Norwegian trials, the chapter looks in particular at events in Denmark, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Czech Lands, Poland, Italy and Hungary. In its analysis, the chapter identifies four key aspects of the Norwegian trials that help mark them out as distinctive within a wider European context: 1) the considerable planning capacities enjoyed by the exile government; 2) the relative absence of extrajudicial violence upon liberation; 3) the unparalleled scope of the trials; and 4) the strong focus placed by the Norwegian authorities on the trials’ legality. The more fundamental tensions and challenges that Norway experienced as a result of occupation and collaboration were shared across Europe, however.

Even if sovereign immunities fail to prevent holdout litigation before a domestic court, bondholder claims may still be effectively forestalled by the operation of collective action clauses. The limits of first-generation CACs have been partially overcome, and their use in sovereign bonds is now common in the United States and is mandatory in the Eurozone. This strengthened protection for debtor sovereigns is accompanied by the introduction of accountability mechanisms that guarantee fairness in the implementation of debt workout processes. This study has concluded that the development of CACs embodies a possible balance between bondholder protection and respect for debt restructuring by sovereigns. Although a more delicate question arises when a defaulting sovereign introduces a CAC mechanism by modifying the relevant domestic law governing sovereign debt instruments, such a measure may fall within the margin of discretion exercised by the debtor sovereign as the governance organ primarily responsible for addressing its sovereign default, provided that its accountability is duly discharged in and out of courts or tribunals.

Provisional measures and anti-dumping duties shall only be applied to products which enter for consumption after the time when the decision taken under paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 1 of Article 9, respectively, enters into force, subject to the exceptions set out in this Article.

In the previous chapter, I explained that we may need to reconsider familiar formulations of fundamental principles when we apply them in new contexts. In this chapter, I ask how we might even embark on such evaluations. A traditional and commendable scholarly reflex is that we must ‘ground’ our analysis in certain and self-evident bedrock. I will show the infeasibility of this search for secure moral foundations.

I suggest a non-foundational approach, using a coherentist method: we do the best we can do with the available clues and arguments. The clues include patterns of practice, normative arguments, and casuistically-tested considered judgments. We can work with ‘mid-level principles’ to carry out fruitful analytical and normative work.

The coherentist approach accepts that our principles are human constructs, that our starting points are contingent, and that we have no guarantees of ‘correctness’. Discussion of fundamental principles is not a matter of ethical computations; it is a conversation. It is a human conversation, a fallible conversation, and nonetheless an important conversation. I also argue that coherentism offers the best explanatory and justificatory account of the method used in most criminal law theory. In other words, it is the best theory of criminal law theory.