Much philosophical literature on sweatshop ethics assumes that the individual branded marketers that sell consumer goods either employ sweatshop workers or can strongly influence the conditions under which those workers labor. This oversimplification misidentifies the rationale for and details of the responsibilities of big buyers for the labor standards in their supply chains. Throughout this article, we illustrate how philosophers’ “vertical integration” and “control” assumptions distort our understanding of the internal dynamics within supply chains. Under the more realistic assumption that big buyers have “constrained influence” over labor conditions in their supply chains, we show that big buyers retain the responsibility to work toward social upgrading goals. However, fulfilling such a responsibility requires big buyers to collectively cede power to third parties in supply chains in formalized and accountable ways. Recent developments in transnational industrial agreements, such as the International Accord, are examples of this commitment.

What does decolonial justice require in response to the epistemic devastation of colonisation? Recent work proposes restoring lost epistemic status or compensating victims with epistemic goods. I argue that neither restitution nor compensation is a viable response to the destruction of Indigenous knowledge systems. Drawing on international law and reparations theory, I show that these frameworks neglect the role of proportionality as a normative constraint on adequate redress. Once this constraint is taken seriously, it becomes clear that the logic of repair is incompatible with the aims of decolonisation.

This article addresses and observes the crisis of Western democracy through the lens of the weakness of parties and party government, especially at the European Union (EU) level. Social stratification changes, global trends and ultimately the sustained economic crisis have placed political parties atthe national and the EU level under enormous strain. Moreover, demands posed by the crisis on national governments by the EU have generated conflicting interests of different member states. The resulting development of Horizontal Euroscepticism has made intergovernmental decision making, which has represented the backbone of the EU legitimacy up to now, extremely problematic and has posed the need for rethinking democracy in multi-level Europe, ultimately by strengthening supranational democracy through the creation of a form of party government at the EU level as well.

In their target article, Charity Hudley, Mallinson, and Bucholtz (2020) have raised several issues and suggestions relating to improving racial equality within the scientific field of linguistics. While accepting the general premises of the authors' original article, this response piece offers reasons and suggestions for expanding the scope of the authors' original aims to apply to a broader, global audience. Four main issues are raised as justification and also as measures for expanding the call to action. These are: (i) the fact that the Linguistic Society of America is the flagship linguistics organization not just for US linguists, but for linguists throughout the world; (ii) the global influence and, in association, the responsibility placed on US and North American linguists to serve as trailblazers in our field; (iii) the applicability of the authors' suggestions within different academic settings, and what can be learned from cross-fertilization of ideas across different communities; and (iv) the critical role of English as a vehicle for spreading not only knowledge about linguistics, but also harmful ideologies about race, class, and ethnicity.

In his new book Beyond the Law’s Reach? Shmuel Nili shows how affluent democracies have become entangled with violent autocratic regimes and brutal international cartels, and have thereby become complicit in serious global injustices. This essay asks who bears responsibility for this complicity. It argues that citizens of affluent democratic societies often share responsibility for their own government’s unjust entanglements and explores the conditions under which this holds true. It focuses in particular on the challenge posed by relatively “obscure” injustices, which even well-informed citizens cannot be expected to know about. In addressing these cases, this essay outlines a theory of civic obligation that can help explain when citizens have a duty to take action against government injustice and clarify how much they can be expected to know about their representatives’ wrongdoing.

In this paper, we detail and critique dominant narratives of war crime apologia. These narratives portray the circumstances of a war crime, the perpetrator’s character and motives, and the broader context in which the crime occurred, in ways that minimise or negate the perpetrator’s moral, and sometimes legal, blameworthiness. In section one, we identify and critique three broad categories: (1) individualising narratives (‘uncommon practice’), (2) excusatory narratives (‘essence of war’), and (3) justificatory narratives (‘tragic necessity’). Drawing on a range of real world examples, we outline the features of these narratives and the underlying theory of moral responsibility and blameworthiness on which they implicitly depend. In section two, we elucidate the role of these narratives in the promotion and perpetuation of socially, politically, and legally harmful attitudes towards war crimes. By advancing self-serving perpetrator-centric views about responsibility and blame, these narratives cultivate a cultural and legal toleration and, in some cases, celebration, of atrocity. They also perpetuate a distorted image of war itself, as a space that cannot accommodate moral and legal restraints. This image of war, we argue, weakens the post-Geneva consensus about the reach and limits of battlefield violence and makes the future commission of war crimes more likely. In conclusion, we consider how these narratives could be challenged within military institutions, and in the political and social realm.

The pursuit of social justice in penal matters has regained momentum in Anglo-American criminal law debates. Among the various areas of discussion, a contentious issue is whether the social hardships that contribute to much criminal offending should be considered in the adjudication of criminal responsibility. Against this backdrop, this paper defends the position that chronic – ie long-lasting and ongoing – situations of social adversity can, in principle, warrant consideration in determinations of guilt. It therefore advances a proposal for a situational partial excuse (SPE) applicable to cases where criminal conduct is precipitated by conditions of chronic social adversity that unfairly diminish a person’s opportunity to do otherwise. Importantly, the proposed excuse also accounts for the compounding role of both state and societal neglect in diminishing an individual’s opportunities and resources to avoid wrongdoing. To this end, the paper integrates normative analysis with modern empirical insights into the relationship between adverse social contexts and crime, including through mechanisms of traumatic stress. It then elaborates the theoretical and doctrinal foundations of the SPE, articulates its statutory and evidentiary requirements, and discusses its coherence with core sentencing considerations.

How should the responsibility for refugees be distributed among states? While scholars have proposed various sources of responsibility to make the distribution more equitable, they have not provided guidance on how to weigh each principle within a composite scheme. This is an important problem to resolve because the principles often implicate different actors, resulting in distinct distributions of responsibility. Moreover, states are particularly able to obfuscate their level of responsibility when multiple principles exist. To remedy this problem, I specify the range of possible solutions to the weighting problem, based on the principles of liability, community, and capacity. This argument identifies the relative importance of each principle based on the stated goals of a particular framework. These goals include whether the scheme is intended to operate under ideal or non-ideal assumptions, or if it intends to optimize state or refugee interests. By focusing on how to weigh various sources of responsibility, this paper paves the way for scholars to develop determinate schemes that can identify each state’s fair share in contexts where multiple principles apply.

A number of philosophers have recently argued that there is such a thing as ‘epistemic blame’: blame targeted at epistemic norm violations qua epistemic norm violations. However, Smartt (2024) and Matheson and Milam (2022) have recently provided several arguments in favour of thinking epistemic blame either doesn’t exist or is never justified. This paper argues that these challenges are unsuccessful and along the way evaluates the prospects for various accounts of epistemic blame. It also reflects on the dialectic between sceptics and realists about epistemic blame and what choice points are available for moving the debate forward.