This section draws on previous chapters to compare Zimbabwe to other resource-wealthy states in Southern Africa, particularly Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia. In all these states, resource sector policy has been essential to these states’ historical and institutional development. However, this chapter looks at how, even given many advantages and a level of development that was once ahead of these states regarding state capacity and democratization, Zimbabwe has fallen distinctly behind these other states. An overview of the resource sector shows that timing matters as other resource sectors are far more institutionalized than Zimbabwe and, while often leaving much to be desired, have not led to the same level of institutional and political decline. While these other states have had many of the same challenges and have had extreme difficulties, Zimbabwe has nonetheless been at the far end of the bell curve when it comes to resource curse dynamics.

This chapter introduces the central puzzle of this study: why, in contrast to other states in Southern Africa, have Zimbabwean democratic institutions stagnated or even declined since independence in 1980? To begin to answer this question, an overview of the resource sector in Zimbabwe, particularly the large diamond found in 2006, and the development of institutions since Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, is given. Furthermore, an institutional analysis, a brief overview of past studies, and a research design are outlined. In terms of case selection, Zimbabwe is placed in the overall population of cases when it comes to resource curse dynamics, and the concept of the “opaque” state is defined. Furthermore, Zimbabwe is defined in terms of democratization and state capacity, concepts that will be used throughout the study.

This chapter draws on past theories of ownership structure in the oil sector and applies them to the alluvial diamond sector in Zimbabwe. The alluvial diamond sector in Zimbabwe presents a natural experiment for understanding ownership structure in that the state and ruling party have been the same since 2006. Still, at least six different ownership regimes have been attempted. This chapter traces each of these and examines how the unpredictability of ownership in the diamond sector has often led to large-scale diamond smuggling and a regulatory framework reflective of political dynamics. The unpredictability of ownership has, in and of itself, caused difficulty in the Zimbabwean diamond sector and has reflected the unpredictability of state institutions. Thus, this chapter argues that past approaches that have been developed to examine the oil sector of states have some relevance for states that have a large amount of alluvial diamond wealth. However, the unique ability for a large amount of diamond wealth to be smuggled into a small space has made the significant increase in diamond wealth since 2006 a challenge for the formal economy and state capacity.

This chapter focuses on past literature on resource-wealthy countries and examines how alluvial diamond wealth may present unique challenges for states. State theory is discussed, and the “opaque” state concept is compared and contrasted with these. Then, an overview of different arguments that have been made to explain the relative decline of Zimbabwean institutions is given. Most of these can fall into three central categories: the psychology of leaders in ZANU-PF, the failure of economic policy, and external sanctions. The large diamond find in eastern Zimbabwe in 2006 is presented as a “critical juncture” for Zimbabwean institutions. Thus, this chapter places Zimbabwe in the overall population of cases when it comes to resource wealth and compares and contrasts how past approaches to resource politics, which have heavily focused on the oil sector, provide a roadmap for examining alluvial diamond wealth. However, this research must also be built upon as different resources, particularly a rapid increase in alluvial diamond wealth in the case of Zimbabwe, bring various challenges to state capacity and democratization.

The movement of tin frontiers across the globe both shapes and tells the tale of key vectors of capitalist imperialism across the world-system: expropriation, industrialization, decolonization. This chapter takes as its organizing principle the idea of the ‘mystery’ of the commodity and the ‘curse’ of tin. The literary and cinematic narratives examined reveal the capacity of tin texts to shape understandings of the socio-economic, gendered and racial inequalities in both peripheral and core territories. Whether in realist or irrealist representation, the mystery of the commodity of tin is frequently mobilized as plot hook, organising metaphor or structural principle. Whether in the tales of the tío or the memoirs of Cornish miners, in the realist films of Bolivia’s Ukamau group or Hammer’s schlock-visions of extraction in the British South West, we find instructive accounts of land expropriation, leeching of natural resources, ecologies of exhaustion and the broken bodies of the global working class.

Are civil conflicts driven by resource crises? Research suggests that the root of conflict, in part, is explained when analyzing how economic deprivation drives groups into turmoil. Resource ownership, especially when unevenly distributed, often leads to violence. Research remains divided, however, on which resources drive violence, and the precise mechanisms that are involved. While many scholars argue that inequality drives violence, there exist many other factors that can help to explain civil wars. Evidence in this chapter suggests that while oil dependence may trigger conflicts, the duration of conflict is heavily influenced by factors beyond resources alone. Contrarily, agricultural commodities lack significant ties to civil war onset or duration, challenging our understanding of deprivation on a country-specific basis. Conflict is inextricably tied to maintaining political order, which for resource-rich countries hinges on interacting factors that governance structures facilitate. Further analysis on these topics – like the greed, state capacity, and grievance frameworks – offers strong insights into why violence emerges, giving multiple avenues and case studies as evidence for explaining civil wars overall.

This concluding chapter summarizes the findings of this book, discusses their academic, policy, and normative implications, and proposes areas for future research. It briefly explains the political situation after separate independence, pointing out the contrast between the economic and diplomatic success of the three states and their persisting authoritarianism, which is a result of separate independence. It also makes suggestions for topics for future research, including the resource curse and colonial entities that never became independent.

This chapter documents the restrictive conditions under which leftwing, “Bolivarian” populism managed to destroy democracy in Latin America. Only Hugo Chavez of Venezuela (1999–2013), Evo Morales of Bolivia (2006–2019), and Rafael Correa of Ecuador (2007–2017) accomplished this feat because they benefited from the high instability plaguing their countries’ presidential systems and, at the same time, from the enormous hydrocarbon revenues provided by the global commodities boom. By distributing massive benefits to ample population sectors, they won overwhelming political support, which they leveraged for dismantling the remaining, already battered checks and balances. By contrast, presidents who did not benefit from such a huge windfall or who governed in countries not suffering from high institutional instability did not manage to still their power hunger and asphyxiate democracy. Instead, some of these leftwing populists suffered irregular evictions from office, whereas others managed to serve out their terms, but failed to perpetuate themselves in power and strangle democracy.

This opening chapter raises the research questions that motivate this book. It briefly introduces the state of mineral exploration in China and the ensuing impacts on the Chinese economy and society and pinpoints the puzzling existence of a contained resource curse in China. After critically reviewing the existing debate on the resource curse, it proposes an original theory about how mineral resources affect state–capital–labor relations, which can explain the empirical observations in China. This chapter lays out the roadmap of the whole book and explains the research methods and data sources for the empirical analysis in the following chapters.

Chapter 2 maps out major theories in peace and conflict studies dealing with the interaction between nature, war, and peace. While acknowledging that the field is characterised by a broad diversity of research traditions and methodological approaches, the aim of the chapter is to offer a review of the research that has had most influence on international policies and legal development. Although legal scholars often think of this literature as monolithic, what will emerge from this chapter is that there is a vivid debate on the linkages between environment and conflict, which is explained by the different underlying paradigms and concepts. It is important to pay attention to the contested nature of these analytical frameworks to better understand (and challenge) the approaches that emerged at the international level. The second part of the chapter introduces environmental justice as an alternative framework to move beyond certain problematic assumptions about environmental scarcity/abundance that have fed into international law. Environmental justice perspectives will be used in subsequent chapters to think about justice accordingly and beyond international law.

Africa has seen progress and setbacks with regard to the economic and socio-economic development after decolonization until ca. 2000. These are linked to historical and structural challenges, including the economic infrastructure the colonial powers left behind and the unfavourable geography of vast parts of the continent. In the post-colonial phase there has been much economic and trade dependence on the former colonial powers – giving rise to the dependency theory and the notion of neo-colonialism. There was often an unwillingness of the post-colonial leadership to set the course for the economies of their countries. And rentier states developed. Several initiatives – from Africa and beyond – have been proposed to deal with the economic misery, with those of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund being the dominant ones, pushing African initiatives aside.

This chapter is devoted to the special problems encountered by nations that are heavily dependent on a small group of commodities, or, in the extreme case, reliant on a single commodity (monoeconomies). We begin by discussing the measures of commodity dependence and definemonoeconomies in the process. We then turn to exploring the problems of export instability, fiscal extraction and exchange rate policies that often arise in commodity-dependent countries. We finally deal with Dutch disease and the resource curse, two ailments of particular significance to monoeconomies.

This chapter is devoted to one of the commodity groups, energy, and there are at least four reasons for affording a special prominence to this commodity group. The first is the heavy dominance of energy raw materials in the commodities universe. This is true both for trade and for the contribution they make to GDP. The second reason is that supply scarcities led to an extraordinary price increase for oil in the past 40 years, and its causes warrant an explanation. The third reason is that fundamental changes are occurring in oil and gas production technologies that promise to replace historical scarcity of supply and high prices with abundance. The fourth reason is the general perception that the energy system is going through a transition toward low carbon sources, due to technical advances in non-fossil energy alternatives as well as policy efforts to hinder climate change. The four reasons that make energy special also provide the structure of the chapter.