This chapter frames the debate between those who think that Kant’s philosophy of Right is in some way independent from his moral philosophy and those who do not in two ways. First, the chapter argues that Kant recognizes only two forms of practical reason, namely the pure practical reason of morality and the empirical practical reason of prudential self-love, and that if his philosophy of Right is not to be a version of Hobbesian prudence, it can only be a part of morality – namely, the coercively enforceable part. It argues further that the moral foundation of Kant’s philosophy of Right is the innate right to freedom, itself the correlative of our obligation always to treat humanity as an end and never merely as a means, since humanity is equivalent to the ability of each to set his or her own ends, that is, freedom. In the second part of the chapter, it is argued that the duties of individuals and rulers alike to both institute and maintain the civil condition, namely the state, make sense only as moral and indeed ethical duties, although not duties of virtue to promote self-perfection and the happiness of others.

When the men involved in the government of the states of Renaissance Italy explained the basis of the principles by which they argued that political life and the conduct of affairs were, or should be, shaped, “reason” and “experience” were what they most frequently cited, sometimes separately, often together. Government records are the main sources for this study. Preambles to legislation, the records of council proceedings, and diplomatic reports and instructions have proved the most fruitful major classes of material; papers concerning or advocating reforms have a particular interest. One crucial consideration that has always to be borne in mind is the question of whose opinions are being voiced, particularly for documents written by chancellors or secretaries on behalf of a prince or a committee, although the book is not so much a study of the political principles of individuals as of the climate of opinion.