According to a well-known aphorism attributed to Francis Bacon, knowledge is power. But what does it mean for knowledge to be power? This paper addresses the question not by offering a new theory of knowledge, but by examining how, and under what conditions, knowledge places an epistemic subject at an advantage over those who lack it. The account developed here does two things: first, it explicates the widely held intuition that possessing knowledge confers an empowering advantage; second, it explains why, in certain contexts, increased knowledge can paradoxically generate a sense of powerlessness. This account diverges from both causal and practicalist views of the power of knowledge: the former takes power to be a causal consequence of possessing knowledge, while the latter understands knowledge as inherently linked with the ability to perform potentially useful actions. In contrast, I argue that the power of knowledge is best understood as a probabilistic advantage, namely, an increase in the likelihood that an epistemic subject will be more successful in interacting with the outside world.
