Financial bailouts for ailing Eurozone countries face deep and widespread opposition among voters in donor countries, casting major doubts over the political feasibility of further assistance efforts. What is the nature of the opposition and under what conditions can governments obtain broader political support for funding such large‐scale, international transfers? This question is addressed by distinguishing theoretically between ‘fundamental’ and ‘contingent’ attitudes. Whereas the former entail complete rejection or embrace of a policy, the latter depend on the specific features of the policy and could shift if those features are altered. Combining unique data from an original survey in Germany – the largest donor country – together with an experiment that varies salient policy dimensions, the analysis indicates that less than a quarter of the public exhibits fundamental opposition to the bailouts. Testing a set of theories on contingent attitudes, particular sensitivity is found to the burden‐sharing and cost dimensions of the bailouts. The results imply that the choice of specific features of a rescue package has important consequences for building domestic support for international assistance efforts.

Can constitutional court decisions shape public opinion on a governmental policy? Previous studies have focused on the US Supreme Court, which enjoys a high degree of public support as the major resource of power for courts. In this study, we examine the extent to which courts can influence public opinion regarding a government bill at European courts. First, we argue that the public support for courts also allows them to move public opinion on policies into the direction of their decisions. This works in both directions: they can confer legitimacy to a policy that they support, but they can also de‐legitimize a policy that they oppose. Second, we argue that this mechanism strongly depends on the amount of support that a court receives. It only has an effect for courts that possess a higher institutional legitimacy and among the group of citizens trusting a court.

We test our arguments by combining a most different systems design for France and Germany with a survey priming experiment on a school security bill. France and Germany are selected for a most different systems design as they exhibit different institutional designs as well as different levels of support for the court at the aggregate level. The survey experiment is implemented within large national election surveys, the German Internet Panel and the French National Election Study. Both experiments contain more than 2,600 respondents each. Our survey experiment primes for decision outcomes and different institutions to understand whether there are differences between an institution supporting and opposing a policy and between a court and alternative institutions.

Our findings confirm that with higher public support, courts can move the opinion of citizens to both legitimize and de‐legitimize a policy. This effect can be found at the aggregate level for a court enjoying higher public support, but also at the individual level for respondents with higher trust in the court. Interestingly, courts can even move the opinion of citizens with strong prior attitudes in the opposite direction, if these citizens highly trust the court.

These findings have implications beyond the study itself. First, they confirm that the legitimacy‐conferring effect can also be observed for European courts, not only for the US Supreme Court. Second, they show that the relevance of a mechanism identified for a single case, like the US Supreme Court, might only hold for specific conditions. As public support for courts strongly varies across countries in Europe, we also expect the impact of any mechanism relying on public support to strongly vary, as we can observe in our own analysis.

Central theories of public policy imply that lobbying is demand‐driven, meaning highly responsive to the levels of access that political gatekeepers offer to interest organizations. Others stress drivers at the supply side, especially the severity of disturbances which affect an organization's constituency. We test these central arguments explaining lobbying activities in a comparative survey experiment conducted in 10 polities in Europe. Our treatments vary the severity of two types of external threats faced by interest organizations: (1) barriers that restrict their access to decision‐makers and (2) disturbances that compromise an organization's interests. We operationalize these threats at the demand and supply side of lobbying based on an (at that point) hypothetical second wave of COVID‐19. Our findings show that while severe access barriers trigger a flight response, whereby groups suspend their lobbying activities and divert to protest actions, higher disturbances mobilize groups into a fight mode, in which organizations spend more lobbying resources and intensify different outside lobbying activities. Our study serves novel causal evidence on the important dynamic relationship between policy disturbances, political access and lobbying strategies.

Experiments are taking on greater significance in political science. However, academic courses on methods at German higher education institutions rarely focus on experimental political science. This article presents a methodological course on experiments in political science at the University of Muenster based on the conveyed contents of the course. It analyses the course from the students’ and lecturers’ perspective. The article aims to provide an incentive for future courses on experimental political science.

One of the structural problems of introductory lectures is that students’ learning progress is primarily assessed by taking a final exam. Weekly preparation and reading are driven only by self-motivation. Can a student’s decision to complete her weekly assignments be influenced by a simple reminder? In a pre-registered experimental design, we test if personalised reminders from the instructor delivered via text messages contribute to learning outcomes. We assess formative learning via regular quizzes at the beginning of each class, and summative learning via grades in a final exam. We do not find statistically significant differences in learning outcomes, and discuss how design features potentially drive this result. In the conclusion, we stress the importance of experimental design in assessing innovative and new learning techniques.

Experimental methods are on the rise in Political Science, and we have a growing demand for teaching experimental methods within university courses. This article is an update on an article published in European Political Science (EPS) in 2012 titled ‘Teaching Experimental Political Science’. It presents an alternative teaching concept, where experiments are not just experienced but also designed by students. Consequently, this article argues that teaching experimental methods in Political Science should include students working on their own research projects.

Properties of the content of the clausal complement have long been assumed to distinguish factive predicates like know from nonfactive ones like think (Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1970, inter alia). There is, however, disagreement about which properties define factive predicates, as well as uncertainty about whether the content of the complement of particular predicates exhibits the properties attributed to the content of the complement of factive predicates. This has led to a lack of consensus about which predicates are factive, a troublesome situation given the central role that factivity plays in linguistic theorizing. This article reports six experiments designed to investigate two critical properties of the content of the complement of clause-embedding predicates, namely projection and entailment, with the goal of establishing whether these properties identify a class of factive predicates. We find that factive predicates are more heterogeneous than previously assumed and that there is little empirical support from these experiments for the assumed categorical distinction between factive and nonfactive predicates. We discuss implications of our results for formal analyses of presuppositions, one area where factivity has played a central role. We propose that projection is sensitive to meaning distinctions between clause-embedding predicates that are more fine-grained than factivity.

We experimentally study how individuals strategically disclose multidimensional information to a Naive Bayes algorithm trained to guess their characteristics. Subjects’ objective is to minimize the algorithm’s accuracy in guessing a target characteristic. We vary what participants know about the algorithm’s functioning and how obvious are the correlations between the target and other characteristics. Optimal disclosure strategies rely on subjects identifying whether the combination of their characteristics is common or not. Information about the algorithm functioning makes subjects identify correlations they otherwise do not see but also overthink. Overall, this information decreases the frequency of optimal disclosure strategies.

For more than 150 years, politicians, the federal government, and missionary churches misled Canadians about deaths, abuse, and the genocidal intent in residential schools for Indigenous children. More recently, the identification of suspected unmarked graves at former school sites has triggered a renewed spread of misinformation denying the harmful legacy of residential schools. To what extent does the Canadian public endorse residential school denialism? Can education counter this misinformation? In this study, we develop and test a scale for measuring residential school denialism. We find that nearly one in five non-Indigenous Canadians agree with denialist claims, while an equal share feel they do not know enough to offer an opinion. Denialist beliefs are more common among men, conservatives, those with anti-Indigenous attitudes, and white Canadians who strongly identify with their racial in-group. In an experiment, we also show that educational information reduces non-opinions and increases the likelihood of rejecting denialist arguments.

Following a 2018 FEC ruling, US congressional candidates are increasingly using campaign funds for childcare expenses incurred while campaigning. This policy has the potential to increase descriptive representation, but the policy’s viability is dependent on how voters react to candidates using campaign funds for childcare. Using a national survey experiment, we find that the framing around the use of this policy influences public opinion in meaningful ways. For Democratic respondents, positive framing treatments increase support for a hypothetical woman candidate, and candidate attack frames do not decrease candidate support. For Republican respondents, positive framing treatments do not increase candidate support, while candidate attack frames decrease candidate support. Regarding support for the policy of permitting the use of campaign funds for childcare, results were universally positive. Both positive and negative frames increased support for the policy. This research contributes to multiple literatures by evaluating the public opinion effects of candidates using campaign funds for childcare.

Recent debates over how to address racial injustice in the United States often center on two types of policies: redistributive measures that redress material inequities between groups and symbolic reforms that challenge dominant racial narratives. How do citizens evaluate these differing approaches to advancing racial justice? How do recent removals of Confederate symbols shape support for each of these policy types? In a survey of American adults, we find that support for redistributive and symbolic policies is positively correlated across partisan, racial, and regional lines. However, when pressed, respondents express a stronger preference for redistributive measures, often viewing symbolic reforms as insufficient or distracting. In an experimental framework, we find that informing respondents about recent Confederate statue removals does not significantly alter support for either policy type. Looking at qualitative reactions to the treatment, we identify a plausible explanation for this null finding: most respondents see the removals as a fight over history and less directly relevant to a broader racial justice policy agenda.

The partisan gap in economic perceptions flipped unusually dramatically after the 2024 U.S. presidential election: following the Republican victory, Democrats (Republicans) suddenly rated the economy much more negatively (positively). Was the resulting partisan difference a case of expressive responding, wherein surveys exaggerate partisan bias in measures of economic perceptions? In April 2025, I fielded a panel survey experiment that asked survey respondents to guess then-unpublished measures of economic growth, inflation, and unemployment in the current month or quarter (Prolific, N = 2,831). Randomly selected respondents were offered $2 per correct answer. Partisan bias did not shrink as a result, suggesting genuine differences in economic perceptions. Two measures of response effort (response time and looking up answers) increase, suggesting that misreporting does not fully explain the effects of pay-for-correct treatments.

We design an experiment to study the implications of introducing position uncertainty in a social dilemma where eight players decide to contribute to a public good sequentially. Contributions are significantly higher when players make sequential decisions to contribute or not, are uncertain about their position in the sequence, and observe a sample of their predecessors’ choices compared to the simultaneous-move game. Yet, contribution rates remain invariant to the number of agents sampled. Consequently, contributions don’t unravel even with position certainty, and there is no incremental benefit of introducing position uncertainty, contrary to the theoretical prediction. Furthermore, controlling for the sum of contributions observed, individuals contribute less the later in the sequence they are.

Affective polarization among citizens is often attributed to the harsh rhetoric and personal attacks that politicians direct at one another. However, the influence of elite rhetoric on affective polarization may work in both directions. We theorize that politicians can reduce affective polarization by making positive or respectful statements about their political opponents. A preregistered survey experiment with 2,000 citizens provides strong support for this expectation. Politicians’ congenial messages about their opponents significantly reduce affective polarization on two distinct measures. Specifically, the experimental treatments reduce citizens’ negative emotions toward outpartisans, as well as their desire to socially distance themselves from such outpartisans. The depolarizing effect of such messages does not depend on the political alignment of either the politician or the citizen, nor does it necessarily require high levels of political trust.

We present a method for narrowing nonparametric bounds on treatment effects by adjusting for potentially large numbers of covariates, using generalized random forests. In many experimental or quasi-experimental studies, outcomes of interest are only observed for subjects who select (or are selected) to engage in the activity generating the outcome. Outcome data are thus endogenously missing for units who do not engage, and random or conditionally random treatment assignment before such choices is insufficient to identify treatment effects. Nonparametric partial identification bounds address endogenous missingness without having to make disputable parametric assumptions. Basic bounding approaches often yield bounds that are wide and minimally informative. Our approach can tighten such bounds while permitting agnosticism about the data-generating process and honest inference. A simulation study and replication exercise demonstrate the benefits.

This article investigates how Black voters choose candidates in majority-Black congressional districts. Partisanship often drives Black vote choice, but the lack of competition in general elections reduces its relevance and highlights the importance of primary elections. Racial cues are also referenced in literature, but the electoral setting reduces the relevance of race. Majority-Black congressional districts are racially homogeneous, and all emerging candidates are Black. Race cannot be used to distinguish between candidates. Congressional primary elections are also considered low-information environments, and voters have limited knowledge about the emerging candidates. In these settings, Black voters turn to cues to choose candidates. Since partisan and racial cues are not viable options, I argue that Black voters seek cues that signal group consensus. I highlight the role of endorsements and public opinion data. I utilize a mixed methodological approach incorporating a randomized survey experiment and focus group discussions with Black primary voters. Results from both methods suggest consensus cues are essential. Experimental results found no significant difference between racial and partisan endorsements, but they found a positive and significant effect for high polling. Focus group respondents had sincere preferences but were willing to abandon them if they differed from the group consensus. They also pointed to the importance of the media. I conducted an exploratory analysis of my experimental results, and I found that those with higher levels of media attention are more likely to rely on consensus cues. These results provide important insight into Black vote choice in majority-Black congressional districts.

I experimentally investigate whether there is a gender difference in advice giving in a gender-neutral task with varying difficulty in which the incentives of the sender and the receiver are perfectly aligned. I find that women are more reluctant to give advice compared to men for difficult questions. The gender difference in advice giving cannot be explained by gender differences in performance. Self-confidence explains some of the gender gap, but not all. The gender gap disappears if advice becomes enforceable. Introducing a model of guilt and responsibility, I discuss possible underlying mechanisms that are consistent with the findings.