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Can deliberative mini‐publics contribute to deepening the democratic dimensions of electoral democracies? The question is framed in this article using a problem‐based approach to democratic theory–to count as democratic, political systems must accomplish three basic functions related to inclusion, communication and deliberation, and decision making. This approach is elaborated with an analysis of a real‐world case: a deliberative mini‐public with a citizens’ assembly design, focused on urban planning convened in Vancouver, Canada. This example was chosen because the context was one in which the city's legacy institutions of representative democracy had significant democratic deficits in all three areas, and the mini‐public was a direct response to these deficits. It was found that Vancouver's deliberative mini‐public helped policy makers, activists and affected residents move a stalemated planning process forward, and did do so in ways that improved the democratic performance of the political system. Depending on when and how they are sequenced into democratic processes, deliberative mini‐publics can supplement existing legacy institutions and practices to deepen their democratic performance.
This article makes three key contributions to debates surrounding the effectiveness of democratic innovation, deliberation and participation in representative political systems. In the first instance, it argues that more attention should be paid to the role that participation actually plays in governance. The literature on democratic institutional design often neglects concern about the effects of innovative institutional designs on more traditional representative fora, at the expense of concerns about their internal procedures. Second, the article argues that despite limitations, replicable systematic comparison of the effects of institutional design is both necessary and possible even at the level of national governance. A comparative analysis of 31 cases of National Public Policy Conferences (NPPCs) in Brazil is presented. Finally, the article shows that popular deliberative assemblies that vary in their familiarity and their policy area of interest, and that organise their structure and sequence deliberation in different ways can be associated with differential effects on both option analysis and option selection stages of the policy process, respectively.
This study examines the association between self-reported health and the propensity for supporting citizens’ initiatives in Finland. Democratic innovations such as the citizens’ initiative provide novel ways for citizens to express their preferences, but whether people in poor health make use of such possibilities remains unclear. The data come from the Finnish National Election Study (FNES2015), a cross-sectional representative sample of the Finnish population. The results suggest that self-reported health affects the propensity to sign citizens’ initiatives, but the effect depends on age since it mobilizes young citizens in poor health, whereas the impact on older generations is negligible.
Participatory innovations (PIs) have been introduced as one possible cure to democratic malaises. Empirical research on these mechanisms for citizen participation has, however, focused on their effects on individuals and policy outcomes, leaving aside their consequences for the wider public. This article fills part of the gap by examining the effect of PIs on perceived legitimacy. The article acknowledges that citizens value not only outcomes but also the inclusiveness of decision‐making processes, and defines procedural fairness and outcome satisfaction as the key evaluative criteria behind perceived legitimacy. Both total number and type of PIs are considered as possible factors shaping legitimacy evaluations. By analysing data from 9,022 citizens in 30 Finnish municipalities, the article reveals that introducing PIs is not a simple fix for legitimacy of local governments. The type of participation matters, with discursive participation generating the strongest effects on procedural fairness. However, attention should also be paid to citizens’ awareness of participation possibilities.
In the last decades deliberative mini-publics (DMPs) have gained significant attention as tools to reform and complement representative democracies, with many governments adopting them. Political representatives, though cautious about power dynamics, seem moderately supportive of extending these procedures. However, little is known about how this predisposition is affected by the institutional design of these procedures and how this might affect their adoption. This paper addresses this gap by presenting results from a conjoint experiment in France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Poland. The study, involving 716 representatives, examines how different attributes of deliberative procedures influence decisions to fund their adoption at the local and European levels. Findings show that the binding nature of DMPs is less important than composition characteristics, such as involving representatives in deliberations with citizens and organized civil society. Differences in preferences between local and European levels suggest awareness of challenges in scaling up DMPs.
‘Democratic innovations’, which enhance citizen participation in decision-making processes, have been proposed to address challenges faced by many democracies. Only recently has research studied these innovations’ legitimacy among the public, which is of importance if innovations are to be viable remedies for democracy’s problems. This paper advances this literature with survey experiments conducted in Ghana. Ghanaians ascribe higher legitimacy to citizen deliberative bodies (mini-publics), open participatory processes, and citizen-elite deliberation processes relative to the status quo. These processes generate more legitimacy among those who do not favor the process outcome. Ghanaians were most favorable towards citizen-elite deliberation, viewing it as more fair, democratic, and likely to ameliorate partisan tensions. I suggest that this is because citizen-elite deliberation is most consistent with Ghanaian understandings of democratic accountability. This highlights the importance of context in shaping democratic reforms’ legitimacy, with implications for theory and reform design.
Democratic innovations (DIs), such as deliberative mini-publics and referenda, are gaining traction in Europe, but their legitimacy depends on public support and their ability to address democratic discontent. While prior research focuses on individual-level drivers, structural conditions remain understudied. This study uniquely integrates the regional economic context into the analysis, combining survey data (N = 16,000) with economic indicators from ninety-one regions in thirteen European countries. Findings show that DIs receive slightly more support in poorer regions. Additionally, in these regions, economic hardship fuels demand for DIs by amplifying economic deprivation and political disaffection (‘enraged’ mechanism), whereas in wealthier regions, political interest is the key driver of public support for DIs (‘engaged’ mechanism). By incorporating economic conditions into the study of DIs, this research refines two key theories of DI support and offers a more nuanced understanding of when and why citizens support institutional change, thereby informing more context-sensitive participatory policies.
In this article, we examine the determinants of citizens’ democratic preferences in federal states with politically significant national or linguistic diversity. Using original survey data from Belgium, Canada and Switzerland, we test whether members of national or linguistic minorities prefer different (electoral, direct or deliberative) forms of decision-making than majority members – since some give advantage to them more than others. While we find effects of citizens’ objective and subjective minority-majority position on their democratic preferences, individual-level predictors such as satisfaction with the current functioning of democracy, economic well-being and political ideology remain at least as strong predictors. These findings enrich the literatures on democratic fatigue, reform and innovation by showing that even in states with significant national-linguistic diversity, democratic preferences seem to transcend communities, indicating room for cross-group consensus. Yet, since group-level factors have some relevance, democratic reforms need to pay attention to them to be inclusive of all societal segments.
While normative theories of participatory democracy and practical experiences of participatory research share a common democratic commitment, the two fields have emerged and to date exist in isolation from each other. This article bridges this divide and asks what participatory democracy and participatory research can learn from one another. It argues that participatory democracy can learn how to realize its own democratic ideals within its research practice and participatory research can deepen its normative commitment by connecting its practices to a larger participatory vision. The article illustrates this by engaging with three examples in which participatory democracy researchers conduct participatory research projects. It finally reflects critically on how the shared participatory commitments of both fields can be realized within the neoliberal university embedded in competitive market economies.
Canada is regarded as an early adopter of democratic innovations, including the high-profile BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform. To what extent has Canada maintained this trajectory? We examine this in the context of breadth and depth by examining trends in adoption over time across Canada and case-level adoption according to the dimensions of influence and temporality. While case studies of Canadian democratic innovations exist, these do not provide analytical capacity to understand trends in the breadth of adoption; we thus contribute a novel dataset of democratic innovations in Canada from 2000 to 2020. To analyze the depth of adoption, we present a two-by-three framework, which we apply to interpret our dataset of Canadian democratic innovations. We find that while there is an increase in the total number of democratic innovations, a low quantity is observed that exhibits high influence and permanence.
How should democratic communities decide who should belong? Recent debates about issues such as voting rights for prisoners, denationalization policies or citizenship tests raise this fundamental democratic question. While many scholars argue that decisions about citizenship and voting rights should be more inclusive of subjected outsiders and more independent from electoral partisan politics, we still lack institutional proposals for inclusive and independent membership politics. This article contributes to the nascent institutional turn in the debate about democratic membership boundaries. My aim is to show that normative debates about membership politics can benefit from recent advances in democratic theory on sortition-based democratic innovations, constructive representation and systems thinking.
I argue that membership politics could be democratized by introducing a randomly selected political institution, which I call ‘boundary assembly’, that equally represents members and nonmembers and is charged with making binding decisions on a subset of a state’s membership questions. I argue that the strongest objections to empowered randomly selected assemblies (shortcut objection, alienation objection, capture objection, technocracy objection) lose most of their force in the ‘extraordinary’ political context of decisions on membership boundaries. Boundary assemblies cannot ‘solve’ the democratic boundary problem, but they could be a first step toward more democratic membership politics.
Right-wing populism has been widely implicated in the destabilization of democracy in traumatic events such as the presidency of Donald Trump. Chapter 4 examines the cultural, economic, and communicative aspects of populism and its origins, addressing arguments for including populist parties and leaders more effectively in conventional party politics, before moving on to a deliberative response. It may be possible to engage citizens attracted to populism (though not leaders) in deliberative terms. Populist leaders can be demagogues uninterested in abiding by democratic norms of any sort, least of all deliberative ones, though it might be possible to induce somewhat better democratic behavior on their part. Populist citizens are more promising in deliberative and democratic terms because some of their concerns and insecurities have a reasonable core: society really is dominated by an elite, just not the one that populist leaders stress. This core could be reached by deliberation, however much its concerns have been more effectively exploited by demagogues to date. Discursive psychology can be deployed in thinking about deliberative bridges to populist citizens. Populist citizens may be attracted to democratic innovations such as deliberative mini-publics. Contestatory deliberation involving democratic activism can counter populist leaders.
This chapter asks how political systems with deep-rooted democratic pathologies can be rebooted in a more deliberative direction, taking stock of the prospects for democratic repair and renewal in light of our analysis in the preceding chapters. It begins with possible reform of the representative institutions of liberal democratic states, in light of the fact that states with consensus institutions have higher quality public deliberation and stronger defenses against transgressions than do adversarial systems. Next the chapter examines how institutional democratic innovations such as mini-publics can contribute to democratic renewal, before exploring possibilities for more deliberative politicians and parties. Finally we take a citizen-centric view and discuss how a discursive infrastructure combining old and new media with personal networks and political activism can support democratic viability and vitality. A deliberative systems perspective means that no single institution or specific factor will drive democratic renewal, which rather depends on the interplay of the various factors we identify. Since this is not easy to imagine in the abstract, we apply this framework to an unhealthy system – the United States – and healthier ones – Germany and Switzerland. We finish with some take-home lessons for diabolical times.
This article examines the role of digital technology in enabling and enhancing democratic practices and forms of governance. It contributes to emerging debates on democratic innovations by proposing a novel theoretical account of decentralized participatory democracy. To develop our account, we draw on the experience of two EU-funded projects, D-CENT and DECODE, which produced innovative citizen participation platforms and digital public infrastructure. Bringing democratic theory into conversation with critical data studies and the new municipalism movement, we theorize how these projects advanced three political aims: organizing political communities to build collective power, empowering citizens through direct participation in decision making, and transforming political institutions. The article then analyzes the strengths and limitations of these projects to draw lessons for policy makers and practitioners for future digital democratic experiments.
Since democratization, Latin America has experienced a surge in new forms of citizen participation. Yet there is still little comparative knowledge on these so-called democratic innovations. This Element seeks to fill this gap. Drawing on a new dataset with 3,744 cases from 18 countries between 1990 and 2020, it presents the first large-N cross-country study of democratic innovations to date. It also introduces a typology of twenty kinds of democratic innovations, which are based on four means of participation, namely deliberation, citizen representation, digital engagement, and direct voting. Adopting a pragmatist, problem-driven approach, this Element claims that democratic innovations seek to enhance democracy by addressing public problems through combinations of those four means of participation in pursuit of one or more of five ends of innovations, namely accountability, responsiveness, rule of law, social equality, and political inclusion.
Edited by
Claudia Landwehr, Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz, Germany,Thomas Saalfeld, Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg, Germany,Armin Schäfer, Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz, Germany
We live in a period of hope and fear for democracy. The fears are top of mind, with surges of authoritarian populism in most countries in Europe as well as most developed democracies, and a series of high-profile setbacks for the project of the European Union (Chapters 2 and 13). In contrast to earlier challenges, the threats to the democratic project are not so much other forms of government, but rather mismatches between the problems that peoples and societies face, and the capacities of representative democracies to address them. Where the mismatch becomes a gulf, mechanisms long associated with democratic government, particularly competitive elections, have become a vehicle for authoritarian populists to undermine other, equally necessary institutions, including those associated with the rule of law and the rights that define and empower democratic citizenship (Galston 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Mounk 2018; Diamond 2020). Although the patterns vary by country, in places where representative democracy has been long established we are seeing elected leaders with autocratic tendencies, using the very tools central to the democratic project to erode democratic institutions. Democracies, we fear, may be eroding precisely through the electoral institutions that have come to define them (Chapter 13).
Edited by
Claudia Landwehr, Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz, Germany,Thomas Saalfeld, Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg, Germany,Armin Schäfer, Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz, Germany
On January 6, 2021, angry supporters of the outgoing president, Donald Trump, stormed the US Capitol building, harassed members of Congress and staff, and mocked democratic symbols. The protestors violently expressed a widespread sentiment among Republican voters that the election was rigged, and that Joe Biden should not be sworn in as the new president of the United States. If democracy depends on the support of those who voted for the losing party to accept the result of the election as legitimate, the events on Capitol Hill showed that this “losers’ consent” (Anderson et al., 2005) is crumbling. Although the degree of polarization in the United States is severe, other advanced democracies face similar challenges. A substantial number of citizens feel that the political system has deep flaws, that politicians have lost touch, and that political decisions do not reflect the preferences of the majority anymore. The chapters in this book highlight the pervasiveness of these problems across a variety of institutional and political settings well beyond the United States.
A ‘deliberative wave’, with increasing uses of deliberative citizen forums, is sweeping the globe. Whereas deliberative citizen forum enthusiasts claim that they represent appropriate tools to reconnect citizens with politics and demand a stronger empowerment of deliberative citizen forums, critics argue that they will reduce rather than increase democratic legitimacy. This letter sheds new light on the roles of deliberative citizen forums in democratic systems, with a particular eye on disaffected citizens. Drawing on a conjoint experiment with a representative sample of non-participating German citizens, it shows that citizens in general challenge notions of the strong empowerment of deliberative citizen forums. They prefer deliberative citizen forums that are limited to policy advice, collaborate with legacy institutions and include extra provisions (such as a large size or clear majorities). By contrast, disaffected citizens are more open to the empowerment and decoupling of deliberative citizen forums compared to allegiant citizens, but this not imply that they are generally in clear favour of such design features (in fact, they are mostly indifferent via-à-vis empowerment and decoupling). These findings have important ramifications for democratic designs.
Citizens that tend to experience political exclusion are often more supportive of direct and participatory forms of decision-making. We empirically verify two competing explanatory logics for such high support: the “anti-establishment” logic, which expects politically excluded citizens to unconditionally express more support than their fellow citizens for democratic innovations (DIs); and the “instrumental” logic, which expects politically excluded citizens to only express more support for DIs than other citizens when these innovations offer procedural control and favorable outcomes. Based on a conjoint analysis of Dutch citizens' preferences for participatory budgeting, we find no support for the anti-establishment logic and partial support for the instrumental logic. We show how measures of citizens' own feelings of exclusion help to explain the results.