This chapter asks the first of three questions about aid projects: what happens when politics is made central to its work. Charitable humanitarianism usually promotes itself as operating outside of politics. In Southern Africa, the Clutton-Brocks practised a form of inter-racial cooperation with the politics very much left in. The Cold Comfort Farm experiment near Harare was an affront to white minority rule. Clutton-Brock was deported, and his chief collaborator, Didymus Mutasa, was imprisoned. It failed as a practical aid project. Yet the grassroots initiative inspired others to establish similar ventures elsewhere: at Nyafaru on the border with Mozambique; in Malawi; and, most significantly, in Ruvuma in Tanzania. The memoirs and biographies of many Zimbabwean political leaders mention Clutton-Brock and Cold Comfort Farm for not only alleviating poverty through cooperative self-help but also for placing the spotlight on the underlying causes of poverty: the racist legislation of the Rhodesian government, particularly in regard to land tenure and ownership.

The chapter presents a novel perspective on exit, expanding it beyond physical migration from one country to another. It introduces the idea of death as a permanent form of exit, emphasizing its substantial influence on political dynamics. The text posits that voter exit is a critical factor in the survival of regimes, complementing various strategies employed by ruling parties to maintain their grip on power. This chapter also discusses the literature on dominant parties and different regime types. This chapter lays the groundwork for the rest of the book, exploring these themes in greater depth and detail. Exit, through migration and mortality, is a pivotal element for understanding the complexities of political stability and regime longevity.

This section draws on previous chapters to compare Zimbabwe to other resource-wealthy states in Southern Africa, particularly Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia. In all these states, resource sector policy has been essential to these states’ historical and institutional development. However, this chapter looks at how, even given many advantages and a level of development that was once ahead of these states regarding state capacity and democratization, Zimbabwe has fallen distinctly behind these other states. An overview of the resource sector shows that timing matters as other resource sectors are far more institutionalized than Zimbabwe and, while often leaving much to be desired, have not led to the same level of institutional and political decline. While these other states have had many of the same challenges and have had extreme difficulties, Zimbabwe has nonetheless been at the far end of the bell curve when it comes to resource curse dynamics.

This chapter introduces the central puzzle of this study: why, in contrast to other states in Southern Africa, have Zimbabwean democratic institutions stagnated or even declined since independence in 1980? To begin to answer this question, an overview of the resource sector in Zimbabwe, particularly the large diamond found in 2006, and the development of institutions since Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, is given. Furthermore, an institutional analysis, a brief overview of past studies, and a research design are outlined. In terms of case selection, Zimbabwe is placed in the overall population of cases when it comes to resource curse dynamics, and the concept of the “opaque” state is defined. Furthermore, Zimbabwe is defined in terms of democratization and state capacity, concepts that will be used throughout the study.

This chapter draws on past theories of ownership structure in the oil sector and applies them to the alluvial diamond sector in Zimbabwe. The alluvial diamond sector in Zimbabwe presents a natural experiment for understanding ownership structure in that the state and ruling party have been the same since 2006. Still, at least six different ownership regimes have been attempted. This chapter traces each of these and examines how the unpredictability of ownership in the diamond sector has often led to large-scale diamond smuggling and a regulatory framework reflective of political dynamics. The unpredictability of ownership has, in and of itself, caused difficulty in the Zimbabwean diamond sector and has reflected the unpredictability of state institutions. Thus, this chapter argues that past approaches that have been developed to examine the oil sector of states have some relevance for states that have a large amount of alluvial diamond wealth. However, the unique ability for a large amount of diamond wealth to be smuggled into a small space has made the significant increase in diamond wealth since 2006 a challenge for the formal economy and state capacity.

This chapter focuses on past literature on resource-wealthy countries and examines how alluvial diamond wealth may present unique challenges for states. State theory is discussed, and the “opaque” state concept is compared and contrasted with these. Then, an overview of different arguments that have been made to explain the relative decline of Zimbabwean institutions is given. Most of these can fall into three central categories: the psychology of leaders in ZANU-PF, the failure of economic policy, and external sanctions. The large diamond find in eastern Zimbabwe in 2006 is presented as a “critical juncture” for Zimbabwean institutions. Thus, this chapter places Zimbabwe in the overall population of cases when it comes to resource wealth and compares and contrasts how past approaches to resource politics, which have heavily focused on the oil sector, provide a roadmap for examining alluvial diamond wealth. However, this research must also be built upon as different resources, particularly a rapid increase in alluvial diamond wealth in the case of Zimbabwe, bring various challenges to state capacity and democratization.

In this chapter, we problematise the concept of mother tongue education in Africa in regard to the following: (i) UNESCO’s problem-solving paradigm applied to the African educational scenario; (ii) the role played by literacy as an epistemological framework in mother tongue education; (iii) the role of public education vs non-state actors as well as the role of language activism in this context; and (iv) mother tongue education as a bridge to reinforce a sense of community and sharing. We also discuss the politics of mother tongue education in Zimbabwe. By doing so, we prioritise the Zimbabwean perspective and experience in regard to language issues, avoiding the reproduction of South African-dominant interpretations of Zimbabwe.

The chapter seeks to understand how the 2030 Agenda expressed through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and climate urbanism reconfigure urban planning and related processes in Zimbabwe. As discourses of climate change and sustainability have gained traction, urban planning plays a critical role in achieving carbon-free societies. Through the case study of three Zimbabwean cities (Harare, Bulawayo and Gweru), the chapter aims to highlight opportunities and challenges presented to urban planning by Agenda 2030. The chapter employs primary and secondary data sources to understand how urban planning in Africa, and particularly in Zimbabwe, is being shaped by the climate discourse. As such, the chapter contends that there is a seemingly discernible paradigm shift in terms of urban planning processes in Zimbabwe, which seems to be drifting towards a multilateral planning vision dominated by climate-centred urban planning policies. It must be noted that climate-centred urbanisation will be useful in future in curbing and dealing with pandemics like COVID-19. However, it should be noted that climate-centred urban planning processes seem to be more abstract thinking than operationalisation. Finally, the chapter suggests ways to promote a pragmatic shift from abstract thinking to operationalisation of climate-friendly urban planning.