Rationally speaking, receiving testimony from an epistemic authority seems better than receiving testimony from anyone else. But what explains this?

According to the Preemptive Reasons View (PRV), the difference is one in kind, i.e., authorities provide you with preemptive reasons, whereas everyone else provides you with evidence. In this paper, I develop a novel problem for the PRV. In a nutshell, the problem is that the PRV cannot account for why there are cases in which the opinions of epistemic apprentices should count for something too. I conclude by offering a new reason for endorsing the Authorities-as-Advisors View (AAV). According to the AAV, testimony always provides you with evidence; it is just that relying on the say-so of an epistemic authority provides you with better evidence than relying on the say-so of anyone else.

It is both unavoidable and rational to form beliefs on the basis of testimony. But whose testimony should I trust? To whom would it be rational to outsource my beliefs? In this paper, I explore the role (if any) that intellectual virtues might play in rational belief formation on the basis of testimony. I begin by considering Linda Zagzebski’s proposed intellectual virtue of being able to recognize reliable authority. I argue that this quality, which is surely an excellence, is better categorized as a skill than a virtue. Then I explore whether other intellectual virtues contribute to assessing the reliability of a testifier. I consider two options: the role of virtues in (1) directly assessing a testifier and (2) indirectly assessing a testifier. With respect to (1), I follow Neil Levy and argue that such assessment requires like expertise to the testifier as opposed to intellectual virtue. With respect to (2), I argue that intellectual virtues are helpful in performing indirect assessment and they enable us to avoid social structures that undermine our ability to perform this assessment. Given that we all must form beliefs on the basis of testimony, this role for intellectual virtues is of great importance.

Advances in generative artificial intelligence (AI) have driven a growing effort to create digital duplicates. These semi-autonomous recreations of living and dead people can be used for many purposes. Some of these purposes include tutoring, coping with grief, and attending business meetings. However, the normative implications of digital duplicates remain obscure, particularly considering the possibility of them being applied to genocide memory and education. To address this gap, we examine normative possibilities and risks associated with the use of more advanced forms of generative AI-enhanced duplicates for transmitting Holocaust survivor testimonies. We first review the historical and contemporary uses of survivor testimonies. Then, we scrutinize the possible benefits of using digital duplicates in this context and apply the Minimally Viable Permissibility Principle (MVPP). The MVPP is an analytical framework for evaluating the risks of digital duplicates. It includes five core components: the need for authentic presence, consent, positive value, transparency, and harm-risk mitigation. Using MVPP, we identify potential harms digital duplicates might pose to different actors, including survivors, users, and developers. We also propose technical and socio-technical mitigation strategies to address these harms.

Robert Simpson and Toby Handfield recently argued in this journal that my epistemic environmentalism is too radical. It implausibly collapses the distinction between rational response to evidence and group epistemic success and – on the mistaken assumption that this best conduces to epistemic success – requires uncritical deference to apparent experts. In this response, I argue that Simpson and Handfield badly mischaracterize my view. I neither collapse the distinction between ecological and epistemic rationality, nor do I countenance uncritical deference. I argue that environmentalism has the resources to give the right answers in the cases that Simpson and Handfield urge against my view.

Is it ever rational to change your mind based on learning that others have changed theirs? This paper answers affirmatively and explores the conditions under which learning about others’ mind-changes should prompt you to reconsider your own. I propose that learning about others’ shifts in belief can motivate further inquiry, provide information about the existence or quality of first-order evidence, and recalibrate our evaluation of the issues at stake. However, not all changes of mind are epistemically meaningful: some may be superficial, misleading, or driven by non-epistemic factors. Critical evaluation is necessary for distinguishing between cases that provide genuine insight and those that are irrelevant. By investigating these dynamics, I aim to illuminate the broader epistemological significance of mind-changing and its implications for navigating complex and contentious issues.

In today’s ultra-connected world, personal and emotional narratives are omnipresent in media. This study examines how the emotional framing of second-hand testimonies about difficult or controversial past events influences attitudes. A sample of 154 Belgian participants, aged 18–77, evaluated their attitudes regarding Second World War (WWII) collaboration with Nazi Germany and the post-war repression before and after reading either the positively framed or negatively framed version of an ecologically valid interview. The narrative revolved around a son recounting his father’s past as a former collaborator joining the German forces during WWII. Results revealed a significant influence of the narrative’s emotional frame on attitudes towards collaboration and repression. The positively framed interview promoted more understanding attitudes towards collaboration and nuanced views on repression, while the opposite occurred with the negatively framed story, where participants viewed collaboration less favourably and regarded repression as justified and moral. Nevertheless, the role of emotions needs further investigation, exploring the medium of presentation of the narrative and considering the development of first-person narratives to elicit stronger emotional reactions.

It is common for caregivers of the cognitively disabled to speak on behalf of their charges who cannot speak for themselves. Their testimony, however, is often dismissed either because of doubt about their having relevant expertise or because of worries that they are blinded by love. This paper is positioned against such dismissals. I argue that good caregivers are uniquely positioned to offer reliable and often insightful testimony about the well-being of their charges and so ought to be taken more seriously. I argue first for the reliability of caregiver testimony via a phenomenological account, which reveals that accuracy is constitutive of good caregiving. I then argue further that caregiver testimony can be especially insightful because the love that is characteristic of good caregiving may be semi-transformative, facilitating insight into cognitively disabled lives in a way that cannot be achieved through more detached forms of engagement.

In the wake of the explosion of the “comfort women” issue, with the help of lawyers and activists, Chinese comfort women instigated four class-action lawsuits against the Japanese government. However, how the lawyers represented the history of comfort women and what happened in the courtroom have remained obscure. Unlike the conventional verdict-centered approach to civilian trials involving comfort women, this research adopts a procedural approach by delving into the court transcripts, legal briefs, and other evidentiary materials tendered to the court. It argues that although the plaintiffs lost every case, through the court proceedings the victims and their lawyers managed to carve out an official space for knowledge transmission and recognition. These proceedings have the potential to serve as an exemplary model for future civil trials adjudicating injustices (historical or otherwise) involving sexual and gender-based violence.

Standardly, echo chambers are thought to be structures that we should avoid. Agents should keep away from them, to be able to assess a fuller range of evidence and avoid having their confidence in that information manipulated. This paper argues against that standard view. Not only can echo chambers be neutral or good for us, but the existing definitions apply so widely that such chambers are unavoidable. We are all in large numbers of echo chambers at any time – they can be found not just on social media or in political groups, but in almost every social or epistemic group we could categorise ourselves into. Because we are finite and fallible, we cannot escape them and need to exist in them just to get by. The concept, then, does not actually capture something as structurally problematic as the paradigmatic cases would suggest. Our way of using the term in social epistemology needs to change.