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This chapter examines the introduction of new lay participation systems in Asian countries. Focusing on Russia, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, I explore the social and political contexts and goals of the policymakers that motivated the incorporation of citizen decision-making into the legal systems of these countries. In each of the four countries, the adoption of new systems of lay participation occurred during periods of political democratization. Those who argued in favor of citizen involvement hoped that it would promote democratic self-governance, create more robust connections between the citizenry and the government, and improve public confidence in the courts. Policymakers drew on the experiences of other countries, including other Asian nations, to develop a distinctive model that incorporated some features of lay participation systems elsewhere, and modified them to suit the specific circumstances of their own countries.
The rapid development of data analytics, computational power, and machine/deep learning algorithms has driven artificial intelligence (AI) applications to every sphere of society, with significant economic, legal, ethical, and political ramifications. A growing body of literature has explored critical dimensions of AI governance, yet few touch upon issue areas that directly resonate with the diverse context and dynamics of the non-Western world, particularly Asia. This chapter therefore aims to fill the gap by offering a contextual discussion of how Asian jurisdictions perceive and respond to the challenges posed by AI, as well as how they interact with each other through regulatory cross-referencing, learning, and competition. Premised upon an analysis of the diverse regulatory approaches shaped by respective political, legal, and socioeconomic contexts in such jurisdictions, this chapter identifies how Inter-Asian Law has emerged in AI governance in the forms of regulatory cross-referencing, joint efforts, and cooperation through regional forums and points to potential venues for normative interactions, dialogue, best practices exchanges, and the co-development of AI governance.
This chapter examines what is known about China’s remedied wrongful convictions including three well-publicized “back from the dead” cases. The predominant cause was false confessions obtained through police torture. As in the United States, remedied cases typically involved multiple rounds of litigation that establish proven or obvious innocence. China’s responses to well-publicized wrongful convictions from 2006 to 2013, including the introduction of an exclusionary rule for involuntary confessions, are assessed. These reforms may help legitimate or wrongful conviction wash an unjust system. Unremedied wrongful convictions may increase under a 2018 law to encourage guilty pleas. The precarious and marginal role of defence lawyers is examined. Compensation has increased for the wrongfully convicted and is available to the wrongfully detained. The extension of the authoritarian Chinese system would have regressive effects, given Hong Kong’s broader focus on miscarriages of justice and Taiwan’s more democratic approach and lesser reliance on guilty pleas.
The Internet has become a new domain for conflicts between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (China) with their complicated history. China’s cyber warfare against Taiwan is diverse and comprehensive. To defend Taiwan’s democracy, it has embraced a top-down approach in shaping its cybersecurity policy. Specifically, Congress amended the National Security Law to extend Taiwan’s territory to the Internet. This mirrors the notion of “Internet Sovereignty,” a principle endorsed by China’s Internet governance regime, diverging from the principle of a free and open Internet. Taiwan’s endurance of China’s attacks captures the two metaphorical views of the Internet, steering the course of normative development within the realm of Internet governance. Much of the foundational engineering of the Internet is embedded in the “cyberspace” metaphor, specifically evident in the United States (US). This has driven early discussions in the United Nations (UN) on developing cyber norms, which entails voluntary expectations of responsible state behavior. Simultaneously, China has been consistently advocating for the metaphor of “Internet Sovereignty” and has constructed its narrative through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), its Cybersecurity Act and the Digital Silk Road (DSR). Countries are encouraged to maintain control of information flows in a given territorial realm. To uphold Taiwan’s democratic system, this research argues that Taiwan should embrace the metaphorical view of the Internet as “commons,” transcending conceptions of “cyberspace” or “sovereignty.” This research further classifies the Internet commons from three dimensions: “cable commons,” “communications commons,” and “content commons.” Each commons presents its unique set of challenges. The tragedy of each commons, like cable interception, cyberattacks, and the dissemination of disinformation, introduces scenarios akin to cases of overexploitation. These situations give rise to the collective action problem reminiscent of classic social dilemmas – a “tragedy of the commons.” Developed by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom, polycentric governance offers a solution for the tragedy of the commons by facilitating coordination among diverse actors. It fosters norm development by adeptly tackling collective action problems through coordinating and harmonizing diverse decision making centers in the Internet. This offers a strategic advantage for Taiwan to safeguard its democratic system from the bottom-up in the various Internet commons.
Taiwan is regarded as the vanguard of LGBT+ rights in Asia. We conducted a scoping review to map research on LGBT+ inclusion in Taiwan, identify knowledge gaps and propose future directions for research and policy. Results indicate a predominant focus on health, with the over-representation of gay men and exclusion of lesbian and bisexual women and transgender/gender diverse people. Despite being the first Asian jurisdiction to legalise same-sex marriage, insufficient policy protections were evidenced concerning family formation, adoption, and parenting, with family systems that largely exclude LGBT+ people. Findings reveal pervasive discrimination and exclusion in education, an economic system that restricts LGBT+ people’s employment opportunities and advancement, and a healthcare system that lacks competencies in serving LGBT+ people. Future research on LGBT+ inclusion in Taiwan should address understudied populations, provide disaggregated data on LGBT+ individuals, and advance evidence to support policy protections in education, economic, family, health, and political domains.
Focusing on the implementation of southern seas history (nan’yō shi) at the Japanese imperial university in Taipei under Murakami’s tutelage, the chapter examines the effects of colonial knowledge practices on imperial Japan’s expansion into Southeast Asia. Drawing inspiration from postcolonial studies and decolonial thought, the chapter maps out how Murakami, along with his students and peers, researched, disseminated, and ultimately marginalized Indigenous and local agency in Southeast Asian and Taiwanese history. It examines the long-term historiographical effects of relying heavily on European colonial records, curricular and language choices, and a general overemphasis on Japanese historical agency.
The two crises in this chapter share three main characteristics. They involve territorial (border) conflict that relates to the independence of Ukraine (or, relatedly, the breakup of the Soviet Union), feature an East–West tension, and (as of this writing) do not escalate to a war among the major states. In 2014, after Ukraine attempted to move closer to Europe (i.e., it contemplated an EU agreement and the pro-Russian government fell), Putin annexed Crimea to secure the long-held naval base there. Although done forcefully, there were no military fatalities. In 2022, amidst a fear that Ukraine was again moving closer to Europe (i.e., it looked to be closer to joining NATO and its government became less pro-Russian), Russia invaded Ukraine. It failed to take Kyiv, even though it heavily bombed Ukraine. Russia then withdrew to the east, where a majority of Russian speakers had sought to separate from Ukraine. The United States and the European Union gave weapons and aid that expanded as the war continued. Deaths mounted on both sides. The Russians successfully created a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea. After his election, Trump attempted to negotiate a settlement that would end the war.
This article explores the intersection of Cold War geopolitics, cultural psychiatry, and migration in Taiwan from the mid-1940s to the 1970s. Building on recent scholarship in cultural psychiatry and Cold War science, it examines how geopolitical tensions shaped psychiatric knowledge production in East Asia. Focusing on the psychological and social impact of the 1949 mass migration, when over a million Chinese immigrants arrived in Taiwan, alongside the clinical and academic work of Taiwanese psychiatrists, the study highlights how migration and societal upheaval became central research concerns. Operating under the authoritarian Kuomintang regime and within the constraints and opportunities of international politics, Taiwanese psychiatrists – most of whom were native-born with colonial backgrounds – drew on intellectual traditions from imperial Japan, fascist Germany, and the Cold War Western bloc. Navigating both global psychiatric discourses and local concerns, they positioned themselves as key contributors to the international development of psychiatric research. While their portrayals of Chinese character structure and family dynamics sometimes reflected essentialist views, their work also demonstrated a nuanced awareness of historical change and contemporary realities during a period of intense political repression and uncertainty. By analysing archival sources and medical texts, this article illuminates the complex interplay between geopolitics and psychiatric knowledge production in Cold War Taiwan.
Despite ongoing affective polarization in the United States, support for Taiwan has somehow remained unscathed; Democrats and Republicans unanimously endorse US-Taiwan foreign policy. This is reflected both in public opinion surveys of American voters and support for Taiwan from elected officials. Theories of foreign policy and public opinion suggest that whether voters take top-down or bottom-up cues on foreign policy, we should expect some level of polarization on a salient issue like Taiwan. Utilizing two preregistered survey experiments in the United States, this study tests how robust bipartisan support for Taiwan persists when Taiwan is framed as either a Republican or Democratic issue. When presented as a partisan issue, do American voters still support Taiwan? Contrary to theoretical expectations, Taiwan presents a complex reality. Some foreign policy issues related to Taiwan can become partisan when framed along party lines while others remain bipartisan. Specifically, support for diplomatic and military policy may be affected by partisan framing, but support for economic policy remains bipartisan. This study contributes to theories of public opinion and foreign policy, particularly for scholars focused on US-Taiwan and US-China relations.
A well-defined territorial boundary is essential for the design and implementation of social policies, as it defines the scope of the political community. In states where territorial boundaries are contested, the contours of sovereignty remains ambiguous. This paper studies the effects of contested perceptions of territory on welfare states. The paper distinguishes between institutional solidarity (support for formal welfare arrangements) and intergenerational social solidarity (willingness to help the other generation at a personal cost) and argues that territorial state identity independently influences both, aside from national identities and nationalism. Employing Taiwan’s social security reform as the case, and using observational data derived from the 2019 nationally representative Taiwan Image Survey alongside data from an original survey administered in Taiwan in 2023, the article demonstrates that territorial state identity enhances support for both institutional solidarity and intergenerational social solidarity. This effect persists even when controlling for nationalism. This research underscores the importance of recognising territorial boundaries consistent with the welfare apparatus for the sustainability of welfare states.
In the final chapter, I offer some concluding reflections. First, I show that party-building experience by the CCP and the KMT during their violent struggles cast a long shadow on political development in mainland China and Taiwan after 1949, respectively. I illustrate that CCP elites developed strong preferences for a strong leader because Mao’s domination revived the CCP. In addition, the CCP frequently employed the same tactics in of mobilized compliance to implement unpopular policies after 1949, a practice that ultimately hindered the institutionalization of China’s political system. Meanwhile, the KMT leaders recognized the superior organization of the CCP as a decisive factor in its downfall. As a result, the KMT shifted its focus toward fostering elite cohesion and grassroots party structures in Taiwan. Although this strategy initially bore fruit for the KMT’s power consolidation in Taiwan, the party still relied on elite mobilization infrastructure for societal penetration. The KMT’s clientelistic machine eventually broke down when Taiwan democratized, losing its power monopoly to the Democratic Progressive Party. Finally, I revisit the seemingly miraculous reversal of fortune of the CCP and the KMT, highlighting both leadership domination and resource mobilization as the key foundations of powerful revolutionary parties. I further underscore the significance of contingencies in comprehending the political evolution of revolutionary parties.
A central feature of the international legal system is that States are the predominant actors within the system and possess international legal personality. States are able to enter into legal relations with each other by way of treaties, possess certain international legal rights as bestowed under international law, and are capable of enforcing those legal rights in international litigation or of being the subject of a claim if they are derelict in meeting their international legal obligations. This raises two important issues. First, how are 'States' characterised and recognised under international law? Second, are States the only international actors that possess international legal personality? This chapter first consides the characteristics of statehood and the legal tests for recognition of a State. Next, the political and legal dimensions of recognition of a State are considered. This is followed by a focus on the international legal personality of non-State actors, including international organisations, individuals and transnational corporations. Finally, the related issues of peoples and their right to self-determination, and secession are considered.
Research informed by sociological neoinstitutionalism often frames organizational reactions to legal norms as either loose coupling, where formal legal commitments are only weakly aligned with actual practices, or tight coupling, where strong internal or external compliance pressures drive close alignment. This article introduces a third pattern – contentious coupling – where some organizational members attempt to realign practices with legal commitments, but these very efforts provoke pushback from others, resulting in substantive yet constrained success. This paradox is key to understanding the widespread yet limited effects of legal rights. I illustrate contentious coupling by examining how international human rights law has shaped solitary confinement reform in Taiwan. While hierarchical enforcement led by rights advocates and policymakers has successfully reduced prolonged solitary confinement, it has also alienated frontline correctional officers by triggering a sense of relative deprivation and perception of hypocrisy, encapsulated in their complaints of a “human rights upsurge.” In response, these officers engage in two forms of passive resistance – formalistic care and resistance spillover – both of which undermine the authority of human rights and hinder their capacity to transform correctional culture.
From the 1950s to the 1980s, disputes about fishing rights and practices that emerged due to decolonisation processes and the expansion of maritime boundaries shaped diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Pacific polities. Whether legal or illegal, fisheries provided a space where Taiwan and Pacific locales engaged at state and non-state levels. Using newspapers and archival materials, this article examines how the Taiwanese fishing community in American Samoa became intertwined in American Samoan society and complicated state-level relationships. This legal fishing community then expanded into illegal fishing incidents in Tuvalu, Niue, and the Cook Islands, again shaping Taiwan-Pacific relations. Taiwan’s fisheries history demonstrates beyond-the-state encounters for Taiwan, overseas Chinese communities in the Pacific, colonised and independent Pacific locales, and colonial powers. It contributes to global history understandings of a deep relationality between histories of the Pacific Rim and Oceania that have been separated in historical analysis.
This article explores recent developments in English language education in Taiwan, situating them within broader sociopolitical shifts and demographic changes. It begins by outlining the emergence of English in Taiwan’s education system before presenting the formulation and objectives of the Bilingual 2030 policy. The article then analyzes how this national initiative has reshaped English language education across educational levels. In particular, it highlights the expansion of English–medium instruction (EMI) in higher education as a central feature of Taiwan’s bilingualization agenda. Finally, it discusses two key developments influenced by the policy: the internationalization of higher education as a response to demographic and policy pressures, and the resulting expansion of EMI courses as a central strategy for attracting global talent and sustaining university enrollment.
This chapter offers a summary of our research findings on the upside of the US-China competition within the security, economic, and political suborders in the Asia Pacific region. In addition, we emphasize two primary challenges to achieving institutional peace in the region: the escalating power rivalry between the US and China, which can lead to proxy wars/conflicts, and the inclination toward irrational and risk-taking decisions by leaders in both nations, often influenced by domestic politics. While it remains the responsibility of the United States and China to prudently manage their strategic competition, we contend that the involvement of secondary states within the region can play a crucial and independent role in mitigating tensions between these two superpowers over critical issues, such as the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea disputes. Their active engagement is indispensable for fostering institutional peace within the Asia-Pacific.
Throughout the twentieth century, Taiwan and South Korea underwent rapid economic development and successfully democratized without reversal to authoritarianism. Despite their similar trajectories, the two countries diverge significantly in political and public support for gender equality. Taiwan is widely seen as the most gender-equal country in Asia, while South Korea remains deeply polarized, with uneven progress in women’s representation. What accounts for this divergence between two democracies? This article advances a political institutions thesis, arguing that differences in democratic institution-building—particularly the actors and modes of democratization—have shaped the contour of gender politics of each country. Contrasting the histories of party-driven democratization in Taiwan and mass-driven democratization in South Korea, this article shows that the process of building democracy has had lasting effects on the institutionalization and sustainability of gender equality.
The operating goals of family firms (FFs) typically include building both economic and socioemotional wealth. Innovation is increasingly recognized as a key source for the development and growth of family firms. From the multiple dimensions of socioemotional wealth (SEW), this research has focused on how family influences a particular type of innovation – green innovation – in family firms. Using 5,071 observations from among the listed firms in Taiwan over an eight-year period (2014–2021), we examined the relationships between FFs and green innovation. The results indicate that FFs are more likely to develop green innovation than their nonfamily counterparts. In particular, there are complicated effects within different types of FFs – control deviation family firms (CDFFs).
The European Union and China have a relationship that is characterized by strong economic interdependence. But since Xi Jinping’s ascent to power, the gap in power and interests between the EU and China has widened, and cooperation has become more difficult. As a result, the EU’s China policy has shifted towards a more structural realist perspective, strategy, and policy. The EU’s realist turn will be analysed in two major areas of the EU–China relationship: security and defense with a focus on Taiwan, and trade. The EU has increased support for Taiwan and for maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by bandwagoning with the United States. In external trade, the EU is strengthening its own economic security and is balancing against China through diversifying its trade relations in the Indo-Pacific region.
Cartographic representations of Kashmir and Taiwan act as sites upon which Indian and Chinese state power is exercised to govern the logics of visibility and legibility for these two regions. Despite the differences in regime type, these major non-Western powers represent Kashmir and Taiwan respectively as internal and integral parts of their sovereign territorial form. In this article, we consider two cases that have not hitherto been studied together in International Relations (IR), putting forward ‘cartographic imaginaries’ as a framework to reveal systematic analytical dynamics in relation to representation, nationalism, and diaspora. Cartographic imaginaries are sites of productive power that evoke certain emotions and carry a set of ideas relating to territory that can be naturalised through repeated exposure. We present in-depth investigations providing a range of examples to trace Indian and Chinese states’ efforts, both domestic and international, involved in constructing and controlling cartographic imaginaries of Kashmir and Taiwan. Our analysis relates to significant current concerns in IR about critiques of imperial cartography, impact of rising powers on global order dynamics, and transnational governance of diaspora. Our framework thus demonstrates the connexions between affect, visuality, and state power and offers empirical insights into non-Western projections of imperialism on a global scale.