This article discusses the potential influence of the existence of an underlying armed conflict in Gaza on the applicability and application of jus ad bellum. It rejects the Israeli ‘displacement’ approach whereby jus ad bellum does not play a role during an ongoing armed conflict as it finds no support in the sources of international law, in particular state practice. The article then provides possible explanations for the Israeli reliance on ‘displacement’ regardless of its shaky foundations: namely, the preference to provide overall justification for the operation, to avoid difficult political topics, and to allow Israel freedom of action in other arenas (such as Lebanon and Syria). Regardless of such findings, the article acknowledges that jus ad bellum faces challenges to its application during hostilities. It analyses the right of self-defence, as Israel has relied on such right to justify its use of force in Gaza, addressing relatively briefly jus ad bellum necessity while focusing on the various approaches to jus ad bellum proportionality, and the differences between such approaches when it comes to the legality of the use of force in self-defence in Gaza. Ultimately, the article argues that states must provide clear pronouncements on this issue to prevent the adoption of an overly permissive approach to the regulation of jus ad bellum during hostilities.

Under the rule of law, everyone has a constitutional right to a remedy—that is, access to a court that decides a dispute over private rights and obligations according to the law of the land. Dispute resolution agreements are an instance of reflexive contracting, in other words, agreements on which substantive and procedural rules shall govern a contractual relationship. Where the choice for one or both parties is for a law or forum other than that applicable by default, dispute resolution agreements contain a waiver of the constitutional right to a remedy according to the law of the land. Party autonomy—that is, the freedom to contract on the rights and remedies applicable to the main contract—is conferred by reflexive contract law, that is, the law applicable to dispute resolution agreements. In this article I argue that reflexive contract law, in specifying the conditions under which reflexive contracts are enforced by the state, shall reflect the extent to which agreements to arbitrate, on forum selection, or on choice of law interfere with the constitutional right to a remedy. Coherent requirements as to the form and validity of consent, ex-ante information, or ex-post judicial control shall be proportional to the entailed dangers and the proficiency of the involved parties. However, as dispute resolution agreements are regulated by diverse instruments on the national, supranational, and international levels, consistency is very difficult to achieve. Moreover, the US and EU regulatory approaches regarding the protection of consumers and employees seem to be incommensurable.

The article examines how the Czech courts addressed restrictions on the right to conduct business during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although grounded in the Czech authorities’ response to the health crisis, the analysis extends to broader conclusions about the necessity of upholding rule-of-law principles. The article therefore highlights how constitutional imperatives of proportionality, equality and the justification of government actions must be preserved in judicial review, even in times of crises.

Calls to defund the police gained prominence with the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and take various forms. Depending on what will be defunded, the idea has attracted support from different parts of the political spectrum. The politicized nature of the debate often cuts short reflection on how best to assess proposals to defund the police. This article takes up that task. It begins by developing a typology of defund measures: abolitionist cuts, abolitionist reallocation, disaggregative cuts, and disaggregative reallocation. It then outlines a framework to evaluate policing and defund measures, drawing on criteria from the ethics of defensive force. Since policing relies on force, it faces a high justificatory bar and must satisfy the principles of just aim, proportionality, and necessity. The state should not fund unjustified forms of policing that violate those principles. Different violations, though, demand different policy responses.

Many constitutional courts use balancing in constitutional right adjudication. However, critics argue that balancing is an (self-)empowerment of the courts and a tool of judicial activism. It is claimed that constitutional courts are increasingly using this technique when ruling against the legislature, for example when striking down laws. This study empirically examines the status of balancing in the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court. It demonstrates that text-as-data methods can be used to analyze judicial reasoning by using word embeddings to measure the use of balancing language. It is shown that the use of balancing language increased during the first fifty years of the court’s existence. Since then, there has been a decline. The court also tends not to use more balancing language in decisions overturning laws. This evidence challenges the critique’s assumption that balancing is a tool of judicial activism.

It has become fashionable to attack the international investment system, even for former advocates such as the United States Trade Representative. This Article demonstrates a way forward of how the system may be saved—but not the way its proponents propagate. Because of the uncertainty of an economic justification, a rule of law legitimation is mostly advanced in defense of the international investment system. However, in an investment context, even the rule of law can be too much of a good thing, namely when in conflict with democracy. The Article elaborates how best to reconcile investment protection, rule of law, and democratic government, and concludes that only a thin understanding of the rule of law is acceptable on the international plane from the vantage point of democratic theory. Following from this, the Article advocates for a re-calibration of the standard of review and identifies proportionality testing as the setting screw of choice.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments worldwide invoked the ‘precautionary principle’ to justify policies designed to protect public health. This principle holds that the state may act proactively to avert harm where there is factual uncertainty about that harm and the efficacy of policies proposed to mitigate it. Many of the policies introduced during the pandemic limited citizens’ constitutional rights. This article accordingly analyzes how the precautionary principle can be integrated into the proportionality doctrine courts use to assess the validity of rights limitations. As our case study, we take the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada and its globally influential Oakes proportionality test. When articulating the test in the past, the Court has grappled with the need to defer to laws that pursue important public objectives when the evidence underlying those policies is indeterminate. However, it has been criticized for not creating detailed guidelines for when judges should defer, which is said to breed arbitrary, results-oriented decision-making. We update this criticism by showing that it continues to apply to judgments of lower courts in Canada that have followed the Court’s proclamations to evaluate laws that limit constitutional rights to combat COVID-19. We then construct the requisite guidelines by drawing analogies with existing legal principles found in tort and criminal law. We argue that in contexts of factual uncertainty, the degree of judicial deference should vary according to the gravity and likelihood of the harm the government seeks to prevent. This risk-based framework restrains judicial subjectivity and illuminates how precaution should operate at each stage of the proportionality test. We further argue that it can assist courts across jurisdictions when incorporating precaution within proportionality because, unlike approaches to this problem offered by other comparative constitutional scholars, it is suitably modest and avoids excessive revision of accepted proportionality principles.

This article focuses on the impact of the reform of the contract law section of the French Civil Code in 2016 in two key areas: remedies for breach of contract and regulation of unfair terms. In particular, it draws a contrast between the ways in which two of the most controversial provisions introduced by the reforms have been applied in practice. While new Article 1221, which limits specific enforcement where it is disproportionate, has been accepted by the courts, Article 1171, which deems unfair terms as not written, has been interpreted narrowly to the point of being marginalised.

Decision-makers rely on intelligence to make targeting decisions that comply with international humanitarian law (IHL), yet the relationship between intelligence and the law is not frequently discussed. This article explores crucial elements of intelligence and intelligence analysis that decision-makers should understand to increase their compliance with IHL, focusing on three crucial decision points: (1) the determination of whether a potential target is a military objective, (2) proportionality in attack analysis, and (3) the taking of effective precautions.

This article provides the personal perspectives of US military operational attorneys and analyzes three significant challenges in applying international humanitarian law (IHL) to modern military space operations: the lack of clear standards for assessing when IHL rules govern particular military activities in outer space; the challenges of effectively distinguishing between civilian objects and military objectives when targeting space systems; and the difficulties of applying IHL rules of proportionality when attacking space systems. To address these challenges, the article argues that States should take steps to develop non-binding norms for military space operations that contribute to broader understanding of States’ views on how IHL applies in space.