Past research has often attributed electoral backlash to structural economic change to a lack of compensation and interest group representation for affected groups. Is that backlash then mitigated in contexts where both of these conditions are fulfilled? I argue that perceived economic deprivation fuelling political disengagement as well as disappointment with the issue‐owning party are important factors contributing to such a backlash. Using the case of Germany, I empirically analyse the electoral repercussions of a coal phase‐out in the presence of compensation for affected groups as well as active involvement of labour and business interests in political decision‐making. By employing a series of staggered difference‐in‐differences models, I investigate whether the closures of coal plants and mines between 2007 and 2022 affected voting behaviour at the municipal level. I find that these closures resulted in an asymmetric backlash in the form of lower vote shares for the issue owner, the Social Democratic Party and higher abstention rates in affected municipalities. With the significant politicisation around fossil fuel‐based energy generation, these findings have important implications for the remaining coal phase‐outs worldwide.

Fiscal discipline, the sustainable balancing of government outlays with revenues, is one of the most extensively theorized and empirically investigated objects of inquiry in political economy. Yet, studies covering European Union (EU) countries have mostly ignored the oversight of national budgets via the EU excessive deficit procedure. I explain why this surveillance engenders lower deficits and investigate its effects across all EU member countries. Results indicate that the impact of surveillance during budget drafting offsets that of a two‐year shortening of expected government duration, the addition of one party to a government coalition when debt is high, or a leftward shift in government ideology when the risk of replacement is low. Moreover, estimates from exact matching on treatment histories indicate that these effects peak after four to five years. These findings have important normative implications for democratic policy‐making in European countries and the fledgling EU‐wide fiscal policy.

Political economy arguments on party behaviour usually address parties of the left and the right. This article introduces a novel argument that portrays house price changes as an economic signal that right‐wing parties disproportionately respond to in their programmatic positioning. This asymmetric partisanship effect is driven by homeowners’ importance for right‐wing parties as a core voter group. Increasing house prices improve homeowners’ economic prospects. Right‐wing parties thus have some flexibility to reach out to undecided voters by targeting the centre of the political spectrum. Falling house prices, however, signal worsening economic outlooks for homeowners. Right‐wing parties thus have a strong incentive to send out signals of reassurance and prioritise their core voters. For a sample of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from 1970 to 2014, the findings support this argument. Right‐wing parties move programmatically leftwards with booming house prices and rightwards when house prices fall, while parties of the left do not respond systematically.

Income and political attitudes are powerfully correlated in cross-sectional data, yet research based on panel data finds at most a weak correlation. In this paper, we examine this puzzling pattern by exploring the long-term evolution of attitudes over the life cycle. We evaluate the predictions of five different explanations on the relationship between attitudes and income experiences. These explanations focus on, respectively: socialization, anticipation, myopic self-interest, learning and status maximization. We employ accelerated longitudinal design models using data on core political values that span up to sixteen years from the British Household Panel Survey. Our findings reconcile the mixed evidence in the literature: the correlation between income and political attitudes, strong in cross-sectional studies but weak in short panel studies, emerges because attitudes crystallize – slowly but systematically – as income evolves over the life cycle. This pattern is most consistent with the learning explanation.

Many scholars and policymakers see rising debt burdens in the industrialised world as the product of ageing populations. Prominent theoretical models of government debt accumulation – used to justify fiscal rules and austerity measures – explicitly assume that support for debt reduction decreases with age. While such models have been influential, the fundamental relationship between age and preferences for debt has not been tested empirically. We test this argument but further theorise that the relationship between age and debt preferences is non‐linear. While the elderly have a clear preference for ignoring debt burdens, we add that the young should also prefer to delay reckoning with high national debts given their low income and expectations of higher future earnings. Using survey data (N = 112,689), we find that age does have a small to modest non‐linear impact on concern for national deficits and debt burdens. Middle‐aged respondents are most concerned about debt reduction, while the young and old view reducing government debt as less of a policy priority. Notably, the relationship is strongest in countries with more generous old‐age benefits.

The European debt crisis has uncovered serious tension between democratic politics and market pressure in contemporary democracies. This tension arises when governments implement unpopular fiscal consolidation packages in order to raise their macroeconomic credibility among financial investors. Nonetheless, the dominant view in current research is that governments should not find it difficult to balance demands from voters and investors because the economic and political costs of fiscal consolidations are low. This would leave governments with sufficient room to promote fiscal consolidation according to their ideological agenda. This article re‐examines this proposition by studying how the risk of governments to be replaced in office affects the probability and timing of fiscal consolidation policies. The results show that governments associate significant electoral risk with consolidations because electorally vulnerable governments strategically avoid consolidations towards the end of the legislative term in order to minimise electoral punishment. Specifically, the predicted probability of consolidation decreases from 40 per cent after an election to 13 per cent towards the end of the term when the government's margin of victory is small. When the electoral margin is large, the probability of consolidation is roughly stable at around 35 per cent. Electoral concerns are the most important political determinant of consolidations, leaving only a minor role for ideological concerns. Governments, hence, find it more difficult to reconcile political and economic pressures on fiscal policy than previous, influential research implies. The results suggest that existing studies under‐estimate the electoral risk associated with consolidations because they ignore the strategic behaviour that is established in this analysis.

In the light of the climate crisis, ‘green transitions’ are inevitable to address the environmental harm caused by fossil capitalism. The article argues that the pathway of such green transitions is closely interrelated with welfare setups, as the answer to the questions ‘who wins, who loses; who supports, who opposes the green transition—and why?’ is strongly dependent on the welfare setup of a given economy. The welfare state not only stabilises the economy, prevents deprivation and balances class interests, it also structures interest constellations, material living conditions, and cultural lifestyles. Hence, which ‘green social risks’ need to be addressed, which social groups will seek to have a voice in a green transition, which transition routes are seen as legitimate, and which societal cleavages emerge around the transition—all these factors are shaped by the welfare setup of a country. Drawing on comparative welfare state theory, the article provides an analytical starting point for considering country-specific factors of green transitions and thus, outlines the potential of this political science research strand for debates on eco-social policy, politics, and polity.

This article looks beyond economic explanations of the financial crisis in Iceland, and focuses on the political preconditions for the crisis. The argument is that liberalization of the economy, privatization of the banking sector and lax regulation, together with looting strategies from investors, explain both the rise and fall of the financial sector in Iceland. By examining the historic development of the Icelandic financial sector from 1991 until 2008, I show how fundamental changes, through liberalization and Europeanization, in the economic system made the crisis possible. Data have been collected from official government documents, newspapers, research papers and published reports.

This article analyses the consequences of the narrative construction of the group of countries that has been grouped as ‘PIIGS’ (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) for their sovereign debt risk rating. Acronyms for groups of countries can provide a useful shorthand to capture emergent similarities in economic profile and prospects. But they can also lead to misleading narratives, since the grounds for use of these terms as heuristic devices are usually not well elaborated. This article examines the process whereby the ‘PIIGS’ group came into being, traces how Ireland became a member of this grouping, and assesses the merits of classifying these countries together. The contention is that the repetition of the acronym in public debate did indeed shape the behaviour of market actors toward these countries. It is argued that this involved a co‐constituting process: similarities in market treatment drives PIIGS usage, which in turn promotes further similarities in market treatment. Evidence is found of Granger causality, such that increased media usage of the term ‘PIIGS’ is followed by increased changes in Irish bond yields. This demonstrates the constitutive role of perceptions and discourse in interpreting the significance of economic fundamentals. The use of acronyms as heuristics has potentially far‐reaching consequences in the financial markets.

This article assesses the constraints and capacities for Canadian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to enhance economic democracy. Constraints include the democratic deficit produced by the commercialization of SOEs, which shifted away from historically privileging the social outcomes of public enterprise, together with the construction of a global governance architecture with binding and enforceable trade agreements that constrain democratic decision-making and state activity. Capacities include opportunities for SOEs to address deleterious economic outcomes through a rejuvenation of the socially oriented public enterprise tradition in areas of vexing policy concern. The article argues that SOEs can be an important component of enhanced extended state democracy through their redistributive outcomes that provide non-market income support for social infrastructure and services.

While comparative research on nonprofit organizations has made much progress since the launch of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project in 1990, there now seems to be a loss of momentum. Some of the reasons for this have to do with aspects of definition, classification, and aggregation that can be corrected. The main issue, however, is the lack of progress in advancing comparative nonprofit sector theories beyond the social origins theory. To remedy this, the essay proposes four ways forward as part of a new research agenda.

This article presents an interactive theatre tool that aims to facilitate a nuanced, holistic exploration of different topics in political science. Its approach builds on insights drawn from the work of four playwrights who provide fascinating, in-depth examinations of social and political topics: Henrik Ibsen, George Bernard Shaw, Bertolt Brecht, and Augusto Boal. Two features that distinguish the method I present here from other techniques are student ownership and interaction with the audience. At a time when political science is increasingly criticised for becoming overspecialised, irrelevant, and unstimulating, this paper offers a promising and flexible tool that can help synthesise ideas from thriving but often ingrown areas of political science research, contextualise them, and examine their practical relevance.

It is argued in this article that the marketisation of schools policy has a tendency to produce twin effects: an increase in educational inequality, and an increase in general satisfaction with the schooling system. However, the effect on educational inequality is very much stronger where prevailing societal inequality is higher. The result is that cross‐party political agreement on the desirability of such reforms is much more likely where societal inequality is lower (as the inequality effects are also lower). Counterintuitively, then, countries that are more egalitarian – and so typically thought of as being more left‐wing – will have a higher likelihood of adopting marketisation than more unequal countries. Evidence is drawn from a paired comparison of English and Swedish schools policies from the 1980s to the present. Both the policy history and elite interviews lend considerable support for the theory in terms of both outcomes and mechanisms.

This article studies the relation between self‐serving elite behaviour and citizen political participation. It uses a fixed effects approach to analyse the association between portfolio investment in tax havens and voter turnout, using data from 213 parliamentary elections in 65 countries for the period 1998–2014. For well‐functioning democracies a positive relation between the use of tax havens and voter turnout is found, suggesting that self‐serving elite behaviour is associated with citizen political mobilisation rather than voter apathy. The estimated relationship is stronger in the period after the 2008 economic crisis, when elite behaviour was a particularly salient issue.

The evolution of economic policy in Western countries in the post‐1980 era is subject to extensive academic debate, but statistical modelling of its many qualitative aspects can be challenging. I use two sources of textual data from the United Kingdom – policy documents written by executive departments, as well as recently declassified cabinet minutes – together with unsupervised text‐as‐data methods to examine the evolution of economic policy discourse between 1983 and 2021. The findings challenge the hypothesis of an undifferentiated post‐1980 liberal era. Instead, several shifts away from the liberalizing priorities of the 1980s are identified. The first is an increased attention to the public services in the 1990s. The second is a rise of activist approaches focused on state‐supported innovation in the 2010s – a claim which has been widely articulated but has not been rigorously tested so far. These discourse‐based conclusions are validated through an econometric analysis of detailed spending data.