The rise of microtargeted online disinformation (MOD) has raised concerns over its harms to democracy and human rights. Debates over the regulation of MOD crystallise around Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to freedom of expression, and its limited capacity to regulate disinformation. As the chapter demonstrates, the effects of disinformation are compounded by microtargeting techniques. These facilitate the surgical spread of information to homogeneous groups, based on the analysis of people’s personal data. The chapter contends that human rights protection has shifted from human rights law to other legal regimes. They centre on the protection of personal data, the regulation of online platforms and search engines and the technological systems that propel them, and the use of targeted political advertising. The chapter demonstrates this claim with reference to selected European Union legal instruments, discussing their capacity to address the harmful effects of MOD. It will be argued that the broadening of human rights protection beyond human rights law should be welcomed, but it also has significant limitations, including enforcement gaps and wide-ranging scope for exemptions.

Digital services and artificial intelligence (AI) systems provide children with immense opportunities to communicate, learn, and play, but the use of tech platforms and AI may also pose risks to children’s rights. Rights that might be negatively affected include the right to privacy and data protection, freedom of thought, the right to freedom of expression, and the right to protection from violence and exploitation. Two recent European Union legislative instruments, the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA), aim to regulate platforms and AI systems. This chapter investigates to what extent the protection and fulfilment of children’s rights is addressed in the DSA and the AIA. We analyse the proposals, scrutinise the legislative process, and assess how each instrument contributes to the effective realisation of children’s rights in the digital realm. We find that whereas the DSA holds great promise for advancing children’s rights, depending on actual implementation and enforcement, the potential of the AIA for successfully protecting and promoting their rights in an increasingly AI-driven world is less clear and certain.

Some of the most important challenges flowing from the rise of algorithmic management for employment law, broadly conceived as encompassing both the individual and collective dimension of employment relation, as well as associated regulatory domains, including data protection and anti-discrimination law, insofar as they are relevant to the employment context, are examined.

Consumer data has become a driving force in the digital economy. As the number of data interactions increases, so too the insights into ever more intimate aspects of one’s daily life, behaviour and personality. Amongst the various products and services, one innovative advancement in the world of data-driven technology stands out as deserving particular attention: the capability to infer emotions from (personal) data and to use such information to respond to an individual’s needs on a highly intimate level. Whereas the technology has considerable potential, it is controversial not least due to the highly sensitive and private nature of emotions but also due to its questionable reliability as well as potential adverse effects. The authors indicate that the legal classification of emotions under EU data protection law is a grey area, before highlighting particular concerns in relation to the technology. With reference to the recent EU proposal for an ‘Artificial Intelligence Act’, the chapter focuses on how instruments in EU consumer law could alleviate certain asymmetries in power and information, and thereby allow for emotion AI to serve consumer needs

Technological tools currently being developed are capable of substantially assisting judges in their daily work. In particular, data analysis of widely available court decisions will evaluate, in an unprecedented way, the activity of the courts and the quality of justice. In doing so, it will allow for more efficient and faster dispute resolution, as well as cost reductions for litigants and society. Technological evolution will probably not cause the disappearance of humans from judicial adjudication but a new, progressive and subtle redistribution of tasks between men and machines.