Despite the considerable attention paid to Adam Smith’s ethical theory over the past quarter of a century, at least one area of his thought remains outstanding for the lack of interest it has received: Part V of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, “Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation.” This is unfortunate, however, insofar as there are good reasons for thinking that Part V is important to Smith’s project. This essay substantiates this importance by placing Smith’s intervention in the context of David Hume’s earlier attempts to wrestle with the problem of moral relativism. The connections between Hume and Smith on this matter have not previously been explored, yet doing so is crucial for gaining a more complete appreciation of Smith’s moral thought. Beyond this historical intervention, however, I also contend that neither Smith nor Hume offer satisfactory answers to the philosophical challenge posed by moral relativism. Despite remaining the two outstanding theorists in the tradition of ethical sentimentalism, both Smith and Hume fall short on this score. Insofar as moral relativism remains a challenge to ethical sentimentalists today, proponents of this tradition must look elsewhere for solutions.

This essay aims to clarify the characteristics of the political theories of Montesquieu and Adam Smith by comparing their views on liberty. Montesquieu divides political liberty into two categories: “liberty in its relation with the constitution” and “liberty in relation to the citizens.” The former concerns the security of the governed in their relationship with those who govern, whereas the latter concerns the security of citizens and their property against infringements by other citizens. Smith concentrates on civil liberty and elaborates on Montesquieu’s framework to develop a more refined theory of the separation of powers. However, their views diverge on constitutional liberty. Montesquieu expects the nobility, as an intermediate group, to restrain sovereign despotism, whereas Smith emphasizes that this group historically threatened citizens’ security and valued the central government’s role in checking it. A comparison of their views deepens our understanding of the foundations of a free society.

This essay deals with the influence of Adam Smith—at the end of the eighteenth century and during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars—on the constitutional projects and public debates through which reformers of southern Europe tried to import and translate British society. I focus on the intellectual filters that affected the reception of Smithian thought, particularly the political and ideological aim to realize a Whig social order, that induced the Mediterranean elite to link the Wealth of Nations with the thought of Edmund Burke and Arthur Young. The result is a moderate and conservative profile of Smithian liberalism that was is in tune with the ideological trend of the nineteenth century.

Adam Smith was against mercantilism and against monopolies in a time when mercantilism and monopolies prevailed. He was against slavery in a time when slavery was the norm. He was against the British Empire in a time when the empire he was a subject of was at its peak. He was against colonialism in a time when colonialism was the backbone of power. He was against taxation without representation in a time when democracy did not exist. He was against the established Church in a time when the Church had the power of life and death over people. He was against endowed universities in a time when education and its prestige were in their hands. When taken all together, one appreciates the extent to which Smith was a dissenter.

Adam Smith seeks to explain in the Wealth of Nations and Lectures on Jurisprudence the persistence of slavery as an institution. In order to accomplish this, he also draws on arguments he had developed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The result is a sophisticated explanation that bridges economic, psychological, and moral considerations. After presenting Smith’s explanation, I will consider a discussion of the moral wrong of slavery in the work of Ottobah Cugoano, author of the incisive criticism of the slave trade Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil of Slavery. I will suggest that Cugoano’s account of what is morally wrong in slavery shows an important lacuna in Smith’s views.

Adam Smith is often read as having sought to develop a systematic and universally applicable science of political economy, but in fact he did not believe that it was even possible to do so. This is true for a variety of reasons. First, Smith was generally skeptical of system-building, holding that intellectual systems tend to be reductive and distorting. Although Smith aspired to develop a theory of natural jurisprudence that would lay out a set of universally applicable laws, such laws were in fact incompatible with his own conception of justice. Smith’s general approach to politics and political economy also tended to be far more pragmatic, in several senses of that term, than universal or scientific. Finally, Smith’s aversion to the “spirit of system” in politics led him to be wary of implementing even his own preferred policies immediately or in their entirety.

Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations is standardly assumed, by apologists and critics alike, to have offered a theory of what money is: a “means of exchange” whose raison d’etre is to ease the inconveniences of barter. The present discussion rejects this consensus. Read charitably, neither Smith’s origin story in Book I nor his account of “the great wheel of circulation” in Book II traffics in a theory of what money is. Rather, the Wealth of Nations offers no theory of the nature of money at all. What Smith presents, instead, is a functionalist story of a piece with David Hume’s empiricism, which does not make any claims about natures or essences. Smith’s reply to the mercantilist theory of money—that money is specie—is not a rival theory of money’s true nature, but rather a broad depiction of the various ways money brings “conveniency.”

This essay examines how Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman draws on and revises key themes from Adam Smith’s moral philosophy. While Smith is often seen as a theorist of sympathy and market society, Wollstonecraft engages with his ideas to develop a distinctive critique of women’s social and moral subordination. I highlight how she reworks Smith’s account of moral development to emphasize the formative role of adversity, independence, and judgment—particularly in shaping female character. In doing so, Wollstonecraft also challenges the ideals of femininity promoted in contemporary conduct literature, exposing how they hinder moral agency and reinforce dependence. The analysis shows how she reimagines the moral conditions of modern society and offers an early feminist response to both commercial and sentimental conceptions of virtue.

One possible strategy in dealing with the so-called “Adam Smith Problem” is to probe the architectural unity of his two major works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations. The architectural elements of a theory consist of premises and perspectives chosen, processes and mechanisms described, and results obtained. In this essay, I trace in the Wealth of Nations the architectural building blocks as known from The Theory of Moral Sentiments, by analogy, all the way up to the Impartial Spectator. The key challenge of this thought exercise is to not simply carry over the ethical categories of The Theory of Moral Sentiments to the Wealth of Nations, but to remain entirely within its economic framework. There is no explicit mention of the Impartial Spectator in the Wealth of Nations, but one can find his counterpart in connection with prudence, the dimmed-down self-regarding virtue that connects the two books and drives much of the action in the economic realm. Specifically, it is the long-sightedness of prudence, that is, the consideration of the consequences of one’s economic actions on oneself and others over a longer time-horizon, that allows for an analogy to the Impartial Spectator procedure. Just as the Impartial Spectator from The Theory of Moral Sentiments is the result of spinning off from one’s person an imagined disinterested, more objective judge of one’s conduct, the unnamed Long-sighted Spectator of the Wealth of Nations would be conjured up by the economic agent to ensure better judgment and sustainable economic behavior over time.

Adam Smith treated the American colonial crisis as a case study that illustrates and further illuminates several of his core arguments in favor of commercial society. This essay examines his use of this case study, focusing on three elements. The first concerns economic policy and institutions, and specifically Smith’s treatment of the colonial crisis as an illustration of the pernicious effects of mercantilism and the beneficial effects of free trade. A second concerns moral theory, and specifically Smith’s treatment of the psychology of the colonial leaders as an illustration of the practical significance of the desire for respect and recognition of their “importance.” A third concerns political theory, and specifically Smith’s treatment of the efforts of the colonists to claim their place among the world’s nations as a key moment in the long transformative process that he believed would in time fundamentally reshape the global order.

This essay links Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant more closely in their politics and political theory through a shared, substantially similar debt to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. In particular, I argue that on some key political questions that are foundational to liberalism, they draw strikingly akin lessons from Smith and build on his ideas in a similar direction. That is, even otherwise very different strands of early liberalism find agreement on a constellation of ideas about trade, federalism, and peace. I show that these are not just preoccupations of Kant’s potentially idiosyncratic Perpetual Peace, but help define the whole political tradition.

Capitalism is in trouble, or so we have been told. I argue that Adam Smith has a lot to teach us about the future of capitalism. I first examine recent discussions about the current challenges and criticisms against capitalism such as the productivity slowdown, waning competition, the role of globalization, rising inequality, and climate change. I emphasize that there are some global trends, but there are also important national and regional differences reflecting differences in institutions and policy. Not only natural-scientific technology, but also social-scientific technology—that is, governance, policy, and institutions—matter. Then, I explain what Smith can teach us. First, Adam Smith conceives a truly inclusive capitalism: he takes income distribution into account when he argues for the desirability of economic development. Second, inclusive capitalism requires broad formation and sharing of knowledge among people. Third, the expansion of exchange and trade has beneficial effects, but we should be aware of its distributional consequences. Fourth, institutions matter. Fifth, proper law and institutions—the “system of natural liberty”—are essential to a well-functioning market economy. However, the “system of natural liberty” is not automatically achieved. Policy and institutions are history-dependent; therefore, history matters.

This essay investigates the meaning of “nominal prices” in Adam Smith’s the Wealth of Nations, its contraposition to “real prices,” and the impact of Smith’s nominal prices upon his assessment of the prices of wheat over the centuries. I also consider measure and value in the Wealth of Nations as well as Smith’s threefold standard of measure: labor, wheat, money. Smith chose an unusual measure to investigate prices over time, with nominal prices being referred to a specific quantity of silver. This raises questions about the possible impact of centuries-old debates over debasement and the value of money on Smith’s measurement of value across times.

Although the concept of sympathy is absent from the Wealth of Nations, this essay argues that it is the foundation that sustains the free market, gives it its moral limits, and enables its greater efficiency. Recognizing this function, which is not difficult to trace in the Wealth of Nations, allows us to understand why public policies that foster sympathetic relationships lead to greater wealth creation, while those that hinder such relationships impede exchange and reduce wealth. Similarly, when changes brought about by progress or personal ambitions and interests inhibit or distort the free play of sympathetic interaction, the awareness that sympathy is the lifeblood of a free society allows us to adjust public policies and restore the framework of security and order that provides the conditions for prosperity, recognition, and happiness for all.

The purpose of this essay is to explore Adam Smith’s work for ideas relevant to modern-day discourse on pluralism (understood as methodological pluralism). It is argued here that the emphasis on difference of perspective in his theory of human nature is potentially foundational for pluralism. I explore Smith’s philosophy of science, where his theory of human nature explains the motivation for building knowledge, the conduct of enquiry, and the appraisal of resulting theories. Finally, I explore exemplars of pluralist practice in Smith’s treatment of alternative approaches to economics to his own as well as in his account of different approaches to history and astronomy.