Hostname: page-component-68c7f8b79f-wfgm8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-01-03T19:01:20.287Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

When do parties emphasise extreme positions? How strategic incentives for policy differentiation influence issue importance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2026

Markus Wagner
Markus Wagner*
Affiliation:
Department of Methods in the Social Sciences, University of Vienna, Austria
*
Address for correspondence: Markus Wagner, Department of Methods in the Social Sciences, University of Vienna, Rooseveltplatz 2/4, 1090 Vienna, Austria. Tel.: +43 1 4277 49912; Fax: +43 1 4277 9499; E‐mail: markus.wagner@univie.ac.at
Get access

Abstract

Parties have an incentive to take up extreme positions in order to achieve policy differentiation and issue ownership, and it would make sense for a party to stress these positions as well. These incentives are not the same for all issues and all parties but may be modified by other strategic conditions: party size, party system size, positional distinctiveness and systemic salience. Using manifesto‐based measures of salience and expert assessments of party positions, the findings in this article are that parties emphasise extreme positions if, first, they are relatively small in terms of vote share; second, the extreme position is distinctive from those of other parties; and third, other parties fail to emphasise the issue. These findings have consequences for our understanding of party strategies, party competition and the radicalisation of political debates.

Keywords

extremismissue importanceparty competitionparty strategiespolicy differentiation

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
European Journal of Political Research , Volume 51 , Issue 1 , January 2012 , pp. 64 - 88
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 The Author(s). European Journal of Political Research © 2011 European Consortium for Political Research

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Adams, J., Merrill, S. & Grofman, B. (2005). A unified theory of party competition: A cross‐national analysis integrating spatial and behavioral factors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511614453CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Adams, J. et al. (2006). Are niche parties fundamentally different from mainstream parties? The causes and the electoral consequences of Western European parties' policy shifts, 1976–1998. American Journal of Political Science 50(3): 513–529. 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00199.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aldrich, J. (1983). A Downsian spatial model with party activism. American Political Science Review 77(4): 974–990. 10.2307/1957570CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benoit, K. & Laver, M. (2006). Party policy in modern democracies. London: Routledge. 10.4324/9780203028179CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brader, T. (2005). Striking a responsive chord: How political ads motivate and persuade voters by appealing to emotions. American Journal of Political Science 49(2): 388–405. 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00130.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brambor, T., Clark, W. & Golder, M. (2006). Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical analyses. Political Analysis 14(1): 63–82. 10.1093/pan/mpi014CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Budge, I. & Farlie, D. (1983). Explaining and predicting elections: Issue effects and party strategies in twenty‐three democracies. London: George Allen & Unwin. Google Scholar
Budge, I. & Laver, M. (1992). Coalition theory, government policy and party policy. In Laver, M. & Budge, I. (eds), Party policy and government coalitions. New York: St Martin's Press. 10.1007/978-1-349-22368-8_1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Budge, I. et al. (eds) (2001). Mapping policy preferences: Estimates for parties, electors and governments, 1945–1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/oso/9780199244003.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, G. (1990). Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems. American Journal of Political Science 34(4): 903–935. 10.2307/2111465CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dow, J. (2001). A comparative spatial analysis of majoritarian and proportional elections. Electoral Studies 20(1): 109–125. 10.1016/S0261-3794(99)00041-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row. Google Scholar
Ezrow, L. (2008a). Parties' policy programmes and the dog that didn't bark: No evidence that proportional systems promote extreme party positioning. British Journal of Political Science 38(3): 479–497. 10.1017/S0007123408000240CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ezrow, L. (2008b). Research note: On the inverse relationship between votes and proximity for niche parties. European Journal of Political Research 47(2): 206–220. 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00724.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gallagher, M. (2010). Election indices. Available online at: http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.phpGoogle Scholar
Gelman, A. & Hill, J. (2007). Data analysis using regression and multilevel/hierarchical models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
Green‐Pedersen, C. (2007). The growing importance of issue competition: The changing nature of party competition in Western Europe. Political Studies 55(3): 607–628. 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00686.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greene, K.F. (2002). Opposition party strategy and spatial competition in dominant party regimes: A theory and the case of Mexico. Comparative Political Studies 35(7): 755–783. 10.1177/0010414002035007001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grofman, B. (1985). The neglected role of the status quo in models of issue voting. Journal of Politics 47(1): 230–237. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grofman, B. (2004). Downs and two‐party convergence. Annual Review of Political Science 7: 25–46. 10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104711CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. Economic Journal 39(153): 41–57. 10.2307/2224214CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Iversen, T. (1994). Political leadership and representation in West European democracies: A test of three models of voting. American Journal of Political Science 38(1): 45–74. 10.2307/2111335CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kedar, O. (2005). When moderate voters prefer extreme parties: Policy balancing in parliamentary elections. American Political Science Review 99(2): 185–199. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kirchheimer, O. (1990 1966). The catch‐all party. In Mair, P. (ed.), The West European party system. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
Kitschelt, H. (1994). The transformation of European social democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511622014CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klingemann, H.‐D. et al. (eds) (2007). Mapping policy preferences II: Estimates for parties, electors and governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD, 1990–2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
Kriesi, H. et al. (2008). West European politics in the age of globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511790720CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laakso, M. & Taagepera, R. (1979). ‘Effective’ number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe. Comparative Political Studies 12(1): 3–27. 10.1177/001041407901200101CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Macdonald, S.E., Listhaug, O. & Rabinowitz, G. (1991). Issues and party support in multiparty systems. American Political Science Review 85(4): 1107–1131. 10.2307/1963938CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mair, P. (2007). Left–right orientations. In Dalton, R.J. & Klingemann, H.‐D. (eds), The Oxford handbook of political behaviour. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
Meguid, B.M. (2005). Competition between unequals: The role of mainstream party strategy in niche party success. American Political Science Review 99(3): 347–359. 10.1017/S0003055405051701CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meguid, B.M. (2008). Party competition between unequals: Strategies and electoral fortunes in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511510298CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miller, G. & Schofield, N. (2003). Activists and partisan realignment in the United States. American Political Science Review 97(2): 245–260. 10.1017/S0003055403000650CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mudde, C. (1999). The single‐issue party thesis: Extreme right parties and the immigration issue. West European Politics 22(3): 182–197. 10.1080/01402389908425321CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Netjes, C.E. & Binnema, H.A. (2007). The salience of the European integration issue: Three data sources compared. Electoral Studies 26(1): 39–49. 10.1016/j.electstud.2006.04.007CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Petrocik, J.R. (1996). Issue ownership in presidential elections, with a 1980 case study. American Journal of Political Science 40(3): 825–850. 10.2307/2111797CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Petrocik, J.R., Benoit, W.L. & Hansen, G.J. (2003). Issue ownership and presidential campaigning, 1952–2000. Political Science Quarterly 118(4): 599–626. 10.1002/j.1538-165X.2003.tb00407.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rabinowitz, G. & Macdonald, S.E. (1989). A directional theory of issue voting. American Political Science Review 83(1): 93–121. 10.2307/1956436CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, W.H. (1986). The art of political manipulation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Google Scholar
Schattschneider, E.E. (1960). The semisovereign people: A realist's view of democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Google Scholar
Schofield, N. (2003). Valence competition in the spatial stochastic model. Journal of Theoretical Politics 15(4): 371–383. 10.1177/0951692803154001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schofield, N. & Sened, I. (2006). Multiparty democracy: Elections and legislative politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511617621CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spoon, J.‐J. (2009). Holding their own: Explaining the persistence of Green parties in France and the UK. Party Politics 15(5): 615–634. 10.1177/1354068809336397CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steenbergen, M.R. & Scott, D.J. (2004). Contesting Europe? The salience of European integration as a party issue. In Marks, G. & Steenbergen, M.R. (eds), European integration and political conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
Stokes, D.E. (1963). Spatial models of party competition. American Political Science Review 57(2): 368–377. 10.2307/1952828CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stoll, H. (2010). Elite level conflict salience and dimensionality in Western Europe: Concepts and empirical findings. West European Politics 33(3): 445–473. 10.1080/01402381003654494CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strøm, K. (1990). A behavioral theory of competitive political parties. American Political Science Review 34(2): 565–598. 10.2307/2111461CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tavits, M. (2008). Policy positions, issue importance and party competition in new democracies. Comparative Political Studies 41(1): 48–72. 10.1177/0010414006293857CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van der Brug, W. (2004). Issue ownership and party choice. Electoral Studies 23(2): 209–233. 10.1016/S0261-3794(02)00061-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van der Brug, W. (2010). Structural and ideological voting in age cohorts. West European Politics 33(3): 586–607. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van der Eijk, C. et al. (2006). Rethinking the dependent variable in voting behavior: On the measurement and analysis of electoral utilities. Electoral Studies 25(3): 424–447. 10.1016/j.electstud.2005.06.012CrossRefGoogle Scholar