The origins of contemporary slavery in Mauritania

All the historical, geographical, ethnographic and socio-cultural constraints that have shaped Mauritania since its artificial colonial creation in 1960 have been described by Garba Diallo (Reference Diallo2004: 9) as an ideal ‘playground’ for the perpetuation of slavery, ethnic violence and military authoritarianism, which still persist in the country today. As Anthony G. Pazzanita (Reference Pazzanita2008) points out in his Historical Dictionary of Mauritania, the territory on which the Mauritanian state currently lies is a bridge between the Maghreb – traditionally inhabited by nomadic Arab–Berber traders and herders – and sub-Saharan Africa – historically populated by various sedentary Black communities mainly focused on subsistence agriculture. This duality between ‘valley and desert’, which McDougall (Reference McDougall1992: 61–5) sees as a central factor in the emergence of the trans-Saharan slave trade, has shaped the history of a territory that is ethnically and demographically situated at the crossroads of two worlds. In this regard, when asked about the roots of slavery, the eminent abolitionist Lehbouss (2024) maintains that the origins of oppression lie in the past of a region where Arabs and Berbers ‘traded with black communities to sell them into slavery for centuries’.

Lehbouss’s perspectives, shared by other anti-slavery figures interviewed, reveal that the collective imaginations of the current Mauritanian abolitionist movement have helped to construct narratives that tend to simplify the immense complexity of a scenario shaped by multiple identities and marked by the French colonial past (Beebe Reference Beebe2020: 123–8; Freire Reference Freire2014: 425–8). The division of the country by Europeans into two major political and administrative spheres – the ‘Moors’ and the ‘Blacks’ – has been analysed by Mariella Villasante (Reference Villasante2007: 16–9) to highlight the subtle distinctions within these categories. The former includes Arab-speaking communities with nomadic and commercial traditions, themselves separated into ‘White Moors’ (of predominantly bidān ethnicity, with a significant status-based meaning referring to originally free people) and ‘Black Moors’ (Villasante Reference Villasante1999: 82–9). This distinction, which Abdel Wahab (2024) describes as unfortunately still ‘widespread’ in the territory, has been used to conceptualize the forced assimilation into the Arab sphere to which Black Mauritanian communities have been subjected through the active practice of slavery for hundreds of years.

Taine-Cheikh (Reference Taine-Cheikh1989: 90) was one of the first authors to propose a marked differentiation between two alternative realities that Lehbouss (2024) and other contemporary abolitionists tend not to ‘erase’ but to ‘unify’ for political ends. On the one hand, there is the historical figure of the Mauritanian abd (slave), whose roots lie in various ethnic groups of Black Mauritanians, such as the Soninke, Wolof, Halpulaar and Bambara. Prominent contemporary abolitionist activists, such as Hanoune (2024),Footnote ⁶ identify themselves with the multiple identities of these groups. On the other hand, there is the category of Haratins or freedmen; thousands of abolitionists, including Lehbouss, ‘proudly’ identify themselves as descendants of forcibly assimilated slaves. It is estimated that around 40 per cent of the total population of present-day Mauritania fall into this category (UNPO and IRA Mauritania 2020). The existence of this group, historically subjected to various forms of oppression and discrimination, testifies to the complexity of the current Mauritanian context, where the issue of slavery goes far beyond the simple master–slave dialectic (Rossi Reference Rossi, Pargas and Schiel2023: 586; Esseissah Reference Esseissah2016: 10–14).

The relationship between these groups has been the subject of intense debate among many researchers, such as McDougall (Reference McDougall2020: 15), for whom the Haratin category in Mauritania has a special status, ‘separate’ and therefore ‘superior’ to that of slaves (abd). This view persists to this day, despite recent transformations within the abolitionist movement.Footnote ⁷ In spite of its historical origins, Dama Diarra (2024) argues that slavery continues to be reproduced at ‘different levels’ and ‘in different forms’, where the oppressive factors of the two social groups intermingle. From the ‘mental–psychological bias’ that Canivenc (2022) stresses is important for the abd, to the weight of ethno-cultural tradition that Lehbouss (2024) denounces among the Haratins, everyday realities such as the impossibility of free choice in marriage, or, in Lehbouss’s own experience, ‘the prohibition on accepting an academic scholarship without the master’s authorization’, illustrate what Rosana Garciandia et al. (Reference Garciandia, Ryan and Webb2020: 5–6) have described as ‘insufficient legislative progress’ towards the elimination of slavery by 2030, as proposed by the government as part of the sustainable development goals agenda.

In this regard, Hanoune (2024) is sceptical about possible progress towards the elimination of a practice that is based primarily ‘on the economic reality of a system of oppression’ and which Yacoub Diarra (2024) still links to what he calls schiavitù fondiaria (agrarian slavery) ‘reinforced in our time’ (IRA Mauritania–Italy Reference Mauritania–Italy2016). The combination of these factors in the configuration of contemporary slavery in Mauritania explains the entrenchment of this practice and the difficulties in addressing its elimination, as well as what Ana Lilia Carvalho Rocha and Tielly dos Reis Gomes (Reference Rocha2024) have described as the apparent absence of violence inherent in its survival and current social reproduction. In this context, the institutional silence maintained by successive Mauritanian governments on this reality, which Pierre Robert Baduel (Reference Baduel1989: 13–15) has referred to as the ‘Mauritanian paradox’ of the state versus the nation (‘l’État face à la nation’), has characterized the country’s political dynamics since its formal independence on 28 November 1960.

The first postcolonial administration, led by Moktar Ould Daddah (1960–78), was marked by a pan-Arabist process of religious unification aimed at what McDougall (Reference McDougall2010: 260–6) has described as a first attempt at cultural homogenization of the country, an attempt that is still strongly criticized today by Lehbouss (2024). Formal respect for diversity and equality between all Mauritanian communities was reflected in the country’s first constitution: ‘The Republic ensures equality before the law for all citizens, without distinction of race, religion or social condition.’Footnote ⁸ For Moktar Ould Daddah, the return to ‘authentic Islam’ would put an end to ‘cultural and spiritual oppression, inequality in work’ and would eliminate ‘all unpaid, non-contractual and non-guaranteed domestic, sharecropping or pastoralism’ (Ould Daddah Reference Ould Daddah2003: 564; Republic of Mauritania 1963: 42–8). The scope of these changes promised by Daddah in the fight against slavery (which he always avoided referring to explicitly) turned out to be what abolitionist leader Mariem Cheikh (2024b) describes as an aspiration ‘clearly insufficient in relation to his initial intentions’.

The coup d’état of 10 July 1978 ushered in a litany of military governments in which the issue of slavery occupied a significant place; Canivenc (2022) considers this ‘decisive’ in mapping the conditions that would mark the end of the twentieth century. The administration led by Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah (1979–84) explicitly abolished slavery in 1981 through a constitutional reform, which, as Boubacar Messaoud (Reference Messaoud2000: 292) acknowledged, never led to any visible changes in Mauritanian society. With the coming to power of Colonel Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya after another coup in 1984, persecution and discrimination in the country reached unprecedented levels (Ould Mohamed Salem Reference Ould Mohamed Salem2003). When asked about this period, Mariem Cheikh (2024b) recalls the persecution suffered by her father, a Haratin trade unionist and founder of the General Confederation of Mauritanian Workers (CGTM) in the town of Zuérate, where Moustapha Taleb Heidi (Reference Heidi, Freire and Tauris2022: 123–9) recently examined the issue of slavery in the light of the problem of gold panning. Like many other Mauritanians, Mariem Cheikh’s father was persecuted by the Social Democratic Republican Party-controlled state in the 1980s, which, according to his testimony, operated according to a repressive logic based on the motto ‘If you are not with me, you are against me.’

After decades of relentless persecution, the fall of Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya in 2005 marked the start of a new period in the history of Mauritania, still remembered with some emotion by Hanoune (2024), who had been severely persecuted by the state’s repressive apparatus. Following a transitional administration led by a military junta, presidential elections were held in March 2007 and were won by the independent candidate Sidi Mohammed Ould Cheikh Abdellahi, whose accession to power rekindled what Alain Antil and Céline Lesourd (Reference Antil and Lesourd2009: 365–8) have described as a wave of ‘social hope’ on the road to democratization after the reinforcement of sanctions against the practice of slavery. For Mariem Cheikh (2024b), this period saw the pioneering recognition of certain activists for the abolitionist cause, including Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, the first Haratin to hold a government post and founding leader of the People’s Progressive Alliance (Alliance Populaire Progressiste), a party in which Mariem Cheikh’s father was personally involved in the Tiris-Zemmour region.

On 6 August 2008, this brief period of change came to an end with the coup d’état led by General Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz. His regime, which Raquel Ojeda-García and Samara López-Ruiz (Reference Ojeda-García and López-Ruiz2023: 191) describe as a return to authoritarianism and the absence of any real opposition in Mauritania, lasted more than ten years, establishing a firm policy of slavery denial: ‘Slavery no longer exists in Mauritania, but in the minds of those who believe in it’ (Abdelaziz Reference Abdelaziz2011). Lehbouss (2024), like many other Mauritanian activists, still remembers their long sojourns in prison during this dark period, which were aimed at ‘weakening and intimidating’ the growing anti-slavery movement in the country. The testimonies of some of these activists reveal that government repression did not serve to marginalize the abolitionist cause; on the contrary, as David Malluche (Reference Malluche, Freire and Tauris2022: 208–13) suggested in his recent study in Nouakchott, it helped to strengthen the collective affinities and commonalities between many of the victims involved in the struggle against this form of discrimination. The ghost of the Mauritanian military governments of Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya and Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz is being relived in the country’s current leader, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, who stood as the ruling party’s candidate in the 2019 and June 2024 presidential elections, both marred by allegations of fraud and irregularities (Freedom United Reference United2020). Activist Dama Diarra (2024) declared that ‘Ghazouani is even worse than his predecessor’ because of the wide range of repressive measures he has deployed in recent years against the abolitionist movement. This continued persecution by the state of organizations engaged in the struggle against slavery has not, however, prevented the development of a long history of activism dating back to the 1970s (Ruf Reference Ruf1999: 19).

The first association set up to contribute to the fight against slavery and the promotion of the Haratin movement was created in 1978 under the name El-Hor (freeman) (McDougall Reference McDougall2010: 260–4). Despite its initial limited capacity for action, this organization was behind the social mobilization that led to the adoption of the first abolitionist decrees in the early 1980s (Fleischman Reference Fleischman1994: 84–9). In spite of the difficulties encountered by these early activists, described by Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem (Reference Ould Ahmed Salem2010: 283) as ‘barefoot activists’, Mariem Cheikh (2024b) acknowledges that El-Hor (where her father was a local representative) ‘sowed a seed’ that was later followed by other movements. Thanks to the precedent set by some of these early experiments, the abolitionist struggle within Mauritanian society gained new momentum in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries with the emergence of new groups (Fresia Reference Fresia2009: 19). These include SOS Slaves (SOS-Esclaves), founded in 1995 to offer support to victims of slavery through psychological care and legal advice (Palmiste Reference Palmiste and Rodriguez2011: 302–8), and the AHME, founded in 2001 by Mohamed Yahya Ould Ciré (Reference Ould Ciré2014) to respond to the ‘specific nature of Haratin oppression’ through a broad spectrum of action recognized by Hanoune (2024) as ‘fundamental’ to the liberation struggle.

The joint action of these organizations – supported by groups allied in the struggle, such as ‘Touche Pas à Ma Nationalité’ (Ould Ahmed Salem Reference Ould Ahmed Salem2018: 77–9) – ushered in a wave of change with the arrival of the new millennium. Starting with the media-silenced Mauritanian Arab Spring, numerous demonstrations, including that of the youth-led February 25th Movement in Nouakchott, shook the country, awakening what Ojeda-García (Reference Ojeda-García2013: 74) has termed ‘a revitalisation of political, social and economic life’. The demand for principles such as full citizenship with the right to vote, recognition of the identity of Mauritania’s different population groups, and the creation of a legal basis for the criminalization of slavery and its aftermath, alongside the demand for equal access to state functions, shook Mauritanian society as never before (Pelckmans and Hardung Reference Pelckmans and Hardung2015: 5–10). In this context of popular high-spiritedness, the Mauritanian abolitionist movement triggered a wave of mobilizations led by numerous activists such as Mariem Cheikh, Hamady Lehbouss, Yacoub Diarra, Biram Dah Abeid and many others grouped under the aegis of a new organization.

IRA Mauritania: testimonies on its origins, actions and impact on the fight against contemporary slavery

The Initiative for the Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement, or simply IRA Mauritania, was founded in 2008 by Mauritanian activist Biram Dah Abeid and other activists interviewed for this article. As a Haratin of direct paternal descent from slaves, Biram Dah Abeid’s humble origins are closely linked to what Bullard (Reference Bullard2016: 247–9) calls ‘the historic national abolitionist cause’. The deep commitment of this eminent leader, dubbed the ‘Mandela of Mauritania’, led him to join the anti-slavery organization SOS Slaves early on, before taking the definitive step of establishing IRA Mauritania (Keating Reference Keating2013). The founding principles of this organization, which Abdel Wahab (2024) still defends today, were based on the fight against slavery in all its ramifications, and on the rejection of the stigmas to which groups of servile origin have historically been exposed, such as ‘exploitation, marginalisation or social and political exclusion’ (IRA Mauritania Reference Mauritania2013; IRA Mauritania–France Reference Mauritania–France2021).

The starting point for this survey of IRA Mauritania’s contemporary action lies in the analysis of the origins of some of its most active members, who are still seeking to achieve what Anthony C. Andrist (Reference Andrist2024: 5) calls a ‘complete redefinition of the Mauritanian social and political landscape’. Lehbouss (2024), for example, identifies himself as ‘a member of the historic community of slaves and former slaves of Mauritania’. His grandparents were slaves and, in recalling his origins, he alludes to the traumatic process by which the nomadic communities of the north, whom he calls ‘the Whites’, traded with his ancestors, ‘the Blacks of the south’. Stripped of their roots during this process, which also put an end to the use of their respective mother tongues, according to their testimony, they are all ‘Black Arabs’, a group with pejorative origins, as studied by Taine-Cheikh (Reference Taine-Cheikh1989: 95). Today, almost half a century after the first studies, they still play an important role in the country’s contemporary collective identities.

Hamady’s claim to a Haratin identity is directly linked to the personal experiences shared by those who have been involved in the struggle since childhood, such as Biram Dah Abeid and Hanoune (2024). Hanoune gives a human face to the ‘ethnic and cultural complexity’ historically present in the Mauritanian context (ACCORD 2022). Born of a Halpulaar mother and a Haratin father in the southern Guidimaka region (Ould Yengé), this Mauritanian abolitionist grew up in an ‘extremely poor’ environment, surrounded by relatives of Soninke origin as well as a few ‘white Moors’ to whom he is also related (Hanoune 2024). The roots of leader Mariem Cheikh (2024b), on the other hand, are linked to the heritage of the struggle passed on by her father, already mentioned, but also by her mother, Niaye Mint Boulkheïr, who, as Mariem reminds us, ‘never tried to persuade her husband to stop his protest actions’. Thus, by selling fatayas (fried pastries filled with fish or meat), her family was able to survive, enabling Mariem to ‘forge a fighting shield’ from which she says she still draws her ‘strength of resistance, perseverance and taste for revolt against the unjustly established order’. These statements by key persons involved in the Mauritanian vanguard corroborate McDougall’s (Reference McDougall2010: 259) assertions about the deep roots of the awakening of the ‘post-slavery’ era in the country since Abdellahi’s victory in the 2007 presidential elections.

Beyond Mauritania, on the international stage, members of IRA Mauritania have played an equally notable role in making visible the persistence of slavery throughout the world (DIDR-OFPRA 2023). Through its various branches in Italy, France, Belgium and the USA, IRA Mauritania has succeeded in bringing the Mauritanian reality before international bodies such as the United Nations, thanks to the work of anonymous activists from a wide range of backgrounds (Peyton Reference Peyton2020). This is the case of Dama Diarra (2024), who, despite her Neapolitan roots, has been linked to the struggle since her youth, after she became interested in the African reality ‘through the work of Amnesty International’ as well as other organizations. The beginnings of other international activists, such as Canivenc (2022) and Bullard (2024), are to be found in the sphere of academia and university activism; together, they make up a heterogeneous mosaic completed by Mauritanian figures who are now internationally recognized, such as Abdel Wahab (2024). It should be noted, as Elhadj Ould Brahim (Reference Brahim2024: 367–9) pointed out, that for some of these activists living outside Mauritania, speaking out publicly against government policies and the personalities involved does not have the same consequences as for those permanently resident in the country. Lehbouss (2024) and Mariem Cheikh (2024b) have had to face continuous prison sentences on Mauritanian territory (which continue to this day), but this has not succeeded in silencing ‘their voices in the fight against slavery’.

The process of linking IRA Mauritania activists to the abolitionist struggle is, in most cases, connected to ‘situations of oppression experienced personally’ by some of those on the front line (IRA Mauritania–Italy Reference Mauritania–Italy2024: 2–4). Prominent leaders of the organization, including Biram Dah Abeid, Mariem Cheikh and Yacoub Diarra, are ‘direct and indirect victims’ of the phenomenon of slavery (Pressenza 2022), giving rise to a group of what Benedetta Rossi (Reference Rossi, Pargas and Schiel2023: 594–8) has called active subjects supported by a road map based on the ‘recognition of fundamental human rights’. The Mauritanian activists who lent their voices to this article, such as Hanoune and Lehbouss, see this process as a direct consequence of the violent reality they experience in the country. In this context, Hanoune (2024) sees himself as a ‘victim’ of this situation, having seen Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya withdraw a grant from him years ago that he had received to complete his studies in Nouakchott. This specific situation refers to the notion of ‘veiled’ oppression that Audra Elisabeth El Vilaly (Reference El Vilaly2017: 58–64) analyses in her work on the role of themes, memory and emotions within the broad abolitionist spectrum. Hanoune’s (2024) personal commitment to the struggle developed in collaboration with other pioneering activists, including Mohamed Yahya Ould Ciré, in organizations such as the AHME or El-Hor, and has ‘remained unwavering over the years and to this day’, despite recent political events. In the case of Lehbouss (2024), it was the ‘unbearable reality of the violence and oppression visible in our neighbourhood’ that prompted him to take up the struggle. Accompanied by his ‘childhood friend’ Biram Dah Abeid, he mapped out a course of action in which Francisco Freire’s (Reference Freire2018: 498) so-called local repressive dimension (analysed in the case of Mohamed Ould Cheikh Ould Mkhaitir by Freire) would be transformed into a national and international movement.

Mariem Cheikh (2024b) recalls the beginnings of her political activism, which started ‘at the tender age of fourteen’. After her stint with SOS-Slaves, she made the leap in 2009 to the young organization IRA Mauritania (IRA Mauritania Reference Mauritanian.d.), which, as Abdel Wahab (2024) acknowledges, has undergone changes in legal status that have influenced its ‘methods’ and ‘capacity for action’. According to Hanoune (2024), the law relating to associations that was in force from 1964 to 2021 (Republic of Mauritania 2021), under which the Ministry of the Interior had to authorize the registration of Mauritanian organizations for them to operate legally in the country, has limited IRA’s ‘potential’ since its foundation. This assertion, which is also echoed by Corinne Fortier (Reference Fortier, McDougall, Martinoli and Boulay2020: 181–4), highlights what is known as the ‘abolitionist self-perception’ of the path travelled from the founding of the organization to date by some of its pioneering activists. The abolition of this law, however, which occurred in the context of the end of Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz’s mandate and the rise to power of Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, was perceived as a possible new direction in Mauritania (Freedom House 2022), which, according to Canivenc (2022), succeeded in ‘exciting’ some activists at the international level.

However, despite the symbolic events organized by the government to formalize the legalization of IRA Mauritania (on 31 December 2021), or to discuss the need to ‘make the fight against slavery a common and consensual struggle between civil society and the governments of the Sahel countries’ (at a symposium held in March 2022), hopes of change were dashed once again: the persistent persecution of activists was evident (Faujas Reference Faujas2020). The change in the organization’s legal status, as its members acknowledge, did not alter the repressive laws or the death threats against Biram Dah Abeid, which intensified throughout 2022 and increasingly contained a strong religious connotation imbued with what Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem (Reference Ould Ahmed Salem2013: 11–14) has analysed as ‘Mauritanian political Islam’ in its ‘most repressive dimension against social change in the country’. In this light, the leader Mariem Cheikh (2024b) notes that she has ‘been among the IRA activists who have been the most arrested over the past decade, those who best know the typology of the different police stations in Nouakchott’ (IRA Mauritania–France Reference Mauritania–France2022).

Despite the repression suffered by some of its leaders, IRA Mauritania has done meaningful work in the fight against slavery thanks to the ‘novelty of its methods of action’, as analysed by Giuseppe Maimone (Reference Maimone2020: 83), which have succeeded in attracting activists such as Hanoune (2024). As such, the functioning of IRA Mauritania as a pressure group, articulated through periodic marches, public demonstrations, peaceful sit-ins or rallies in front of foreign embassies, has resulted in what Lehbouss (2024) calls a ‘raising of the level of the struggle to previously unknown heights’.

In parallel with this important step at the national level, IRA Mauritania has built up similarly sustained activity at the international level (CRIDEM 2020). Through its various branches in Senegal, Mali, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands and the USA, IRA Mauritania has coordinated a significant collective effort through multiple initiatives over the last decade (IRA Mauritania–France Reference Mauritania–France2021). According to Bullard (2024), international activities, notably the formation of a ‘pressure group’ in the USA, have led to concrete, effective measures including ‘the exclusion of the Mauritanian government from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)’ as a mechanism for lobbying in favour of human rights. Alternative proposals, such as the request for UN special envoys to Mauritania, as well as appeals to the Commission on Human Rights, the African Union, the European Union, Amnesty International and the International Federation for Human Rights, have also played a decisive role in certain processes relating to the release of detained abolitionist activists (Front Line Defenders 2016), as recalled by Lehbouss (2024), who has always found strength and support in ‘international pressure’ during his trials and arbitrary arrests. This intense social mobilization, which for David Malluche (Reference Malluche, Freire and Tauris2022: 208) reached its peak at the beginning of the last decade, has undergone a series of transformations that have altered the prospects for ‘real change’ in the country in the short term, according to activists such as Hanoune (2024).

Perspectives on the abolitionist movement in Mauritania

As highlighted by the actions and words gathered from some of its protagonists, the scope of IRA Mauritania’s widely known national and international action has had a significant impact on the country’s abolitionist struggle ever since its founding, which Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem (Reference Ould Ahmed Salem2013: 11) considers the dawn of major change in anti-slavery mobilization in Mauritania. Thanks to the organization’s actions, its visible leader, Biram Dah Abeid, has received various international awards and recognition from Front Line Defenders (2018) and even the United Nations (UN Watch Reference Watch2017; HRW 2019). However, in recent years, as Anthony C. Andrist (Reference Andrist2024: 18–20) and some of the activists interviewed for this article admit, the abolitionist organization has been unable to further increase its potential for political transformation, due to a number of factors that currently persist.

First, IRA has failed to achieve political power, although its active engagement in national elections has become a central feature of its scope, in line with the surge in popularity of the abolitionist movement that Lotte Pelckmans and Christine Hardung (Reference Pelckmans and Hardung2015: 5–9) have examined within the context of the so-called post-slavery ‘mobilization cycle’ of the past decade. Lehbouss (2024) highlights that, in defiance of ‘the continuous prison sentences and death threats’ against Biram Dah Abeid, the leader of IRA Mauritania topped the opposition lists in the two presidential elections held in the country in 2014 and 2019, being the candidate with the most votes behind the ruling party candidate on each occasion (Freire Reference Freire2018: 499). In the context of these two elections, the impossibility of running on an explicitly abolitionist manifesto forced Biram Dah Abeid to resort to using political platforms such as the Refoundation for a Global Action (RAG) as an ‘umbrella’ − following the approach of Jorge Brites et al. (Reference Brites, Evrard, Melly and Pettigrew2022: 271–4) on so-called politico-democratic responses to the ‘illusion of alternation’ of Ghazouani’s government – in order to be able to electorally represent the interests of a large part of the Mauritanian population (Sneïba Reference Sneïba2023). Dama Diarra (2024) reiterates that the ‘remarkable electoral results’ achieved by the abolitionist cause must be viewed within the context of extreme ‘violence and political repression’ against opposition groups. The need to continue building new electoral alliances in the form of a broad opposition front has recently materialized, as pointed out by Hassan Ould Moctar (Reference Ould Moctar2024: 23–8), in the form of agreements such as those between Biram Dah Abeid and the Ba’athist Sawab party to contest the 2024 elections together (Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2024).

This rapprochement with the pan-Arab movement took place within the context of an intense internal struggle within IRA Mauritania following the departure of the movement’s vice president, Coumba Dada Kane, who, after her dismissal, went so far as to describe Biram Dah Abeid as an authoritarian ‘dictator’ (Senalioune 2023). The criticisms levelled by this hardened abolitionist were shared (more discreetly) by Bullard (2024), who also acknowledged recent changes in the movement’s drift that partly explain its current alienation in the international sphere. At this point, it is important to note that, despite its significant successes in the past, IRA Mauritania has shown a growing weakness and an inability to cope with the transformation of the country’s socio-political reality. In this regard, from a critical view of the current situation, the discontinuation of some of the most innovative work that, according to Giuseppe Maimone (Reference Maimone2020: 84), ‘allowed the organisation to distinguish itself in its early days’ and the absence of a visible renewal of its cadres and its programme of political action have led to considerable discontent and an increasingly reduced socio-political impact in the country.

Despite IRA Mauritania’s relative loss of influence on the political scene, during the presidential elections of June 2024, Mauritania once again became the epicentre of intense national, regional and international debate due to global geopolitical changes that led to what Nora Mareï and Jérôme Lombard (Reference Mareï and Lombard2024: 81–3) call a ‘renewed importance’ of the government in Nouakchott. In this context, Ghazouani revalidated his mandate in a climate of maximum excitement, where, despite political repression (and the internal difficulties of IRA Mauritania), Biram Dah Abeid once again led the opposition, achieving over 22 per cent of the vote. He declared the result an ‘electoral hold-up’, after not recognizing the election results (Jeune Afrique Reference Afrique2024), and called for demonstrations to ‘take over the streets of the country’ (Dah Abeid Reference Dah Abeid2024). The current political uncertainty about the future of the abolitionist movement in Mauritania is directly linked to the growing presence of various international actors in the region. As Canivenc (2022) argued some years ago, one of the most repeated historical demands of IRA Mauritania activists since its foundation has been the denunciation of the role played by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the Mauritanian context of the fight against slavery.

The absence of conditions relating to the real promotion of human rights as a prerequisite for the granting of economic resources to the Mauritanian government has become an aggravating factor in the harsh social reality in which a large part of the Mauritanian population lives today (Le Calame Reference Calame2022). This is one of the key points that has proved capable of determining the success or failure of the struggle for social justice in the country, as demonstrated by the vulnerability of the Mauritanian state to pressure from the international sphere and from international development aid donors such as the World Bank and the IMF (2023). During the last elections, Hanoune (2024) denounced the way in which these agencies have historically contributed to the ‘maintenance of slavery’ and the ‘social and economic stratification of Mauritania’ through their support and loans granted to Mauritanian governments as part of development programmes that still exist. In December 2024, the IMF released an immediate instalment of US$47.4 million for Ghazouani’s government (Al Mouahidi Reference Al Mouahidi2024).

Beyond the electoral framework, and despite criticism of its lack of mobilization and loss of impact, IRA Mauritania is making efforts to renew and relaunch itself in order to face the emerging challenges of a complex global reality (IRA Mauritania–Italy Reference Mauritania–Italy2024). From this perspective, Mariem Cheikh (2024b) pays close attention to the specific role of women, who, like her, are currently demanding a renewed abolitionism, ‘a very feminine way of doing politics’, in which the defence of women’s rights occupies an increasingly important place. The significant presence of women in IRA Mauritania’s activism illustrates the organization’s particular interest in innovating at a time when authors such as Elhadj Ould Brahim (Reference Brahim2024: 369) have contributed to recognition of the realities of patriarchal oppression currently suffered by Haratin women. Lehbouss (2024) echoes this idea by emphasizing that ‘women’s militancy is a fundamental element in the process and a sine qua non for the fight against slavery in the present and, above all, in the future’. Hanoune (2024), for his part, points out that the various forms of ‘violence and discrimination’ to which the country’s women are subjected constitute a driving force for future liberation, with today’s abolitionist activists being the ‘hope and example’ for the revitalization of the movement in the twenty-first century.

The renewal and growth of female protagonism at the heart of the Mauritanian abolitionist cause is not, however, the only challenge currently facing the anti-slavery initiative in the country. In recent months, government repression against IRA Mauritania activists has increased considerably and has had a significant impact on the electoral performance of the movement as a whole. In the build-up to the 2024 presidential elections, Biram Dah Abeid was subjected to ‘intense political persecution’, as reported by Dama Diarra (2024). Mariem Cheikh was arrested for political reasons a few days after delivering the testimony gathered as part of this study, while other IRA representatives, such as Warda Ahmed Souleimane, were arbitrarily arrested as recently as 3 April 2025 (Taqadoumy 2025). This fact not only demonstrates the topicality of this persecution, but also serves to recognize what Elhadj Ould Brahim (Reference Brahim2024: 366–7) has suggested are the increasingly patriarchal connotations that place women abolitionists in the crosshairs of the repressive state setup.

This current dramatic reality, which suggests a bleak horizon, has been exacerbated by various foreign phenomena that are increasingly topical in Europe, such as the worsening of the migratory crisis in the region, which has a significant impact on the future of the abolitionist cause. In this context, Mauritania has consolidated itself over the past year as a stage on the main migratory route between Africa and Spain via the Canary Islands, where, in January 2024 alone, 7,270 migrants arrived from the country (Europa Press Reference Press2024b). The recent ‘economic aid packages’ mentioned at the beginning of this article have been mainly aimed at creating ‘a barrier against immigration and the arrival of canoes’ (Cué Reference Cué2024), which has drawn much criticism from forward-thinking activists within the abolitionist movement. Hanoune (2024), for example, deplores the way in which European governments are handling the issue, pointing out that all this ‘development aid will end up enriching the same old minority’. In his view, if Europe’s commitment to human rights were real, other measures would be taken to tackle the problem of migration, which is simply ‘the result of the impossibility of living a dignified life suffered by millions of Africans in their countries of origin’. Ultimately, for this activist and for many other Mauritanian abolitionists, ‘halting the funding of dictators’ would be a ‘good humanitarian measure’ to alleviate the migration crisis in Europe in the future.

Increasing European intervention in the region has served to reinforce what Katherine Ann Wiley (Reference Wiley2018: 193–6) has called the state’s position of strength vis-à-vis human rights organizations in the country in recent years. Lehbouss (2024), in this regard, has criticized the transformation of Mauritania into a ‘militarized frontier’ with European funding, a situation that foreshadows an uncertain and increasingly bleak scenario for IRA Mauritania, many of whose members have recently been forced to leave the country in the face of increased repression – among them, young people who dared to criticize the government on TikTok. These include Malick Ba and Bocar Diallo, who were forced into exile in Senegal in 2025 in the face of death threats (García Cataño Reference García Cataño2025). In addition to migration issues, Mauritania has been attracting growing interest from European countries because of its potential for renewable energy production. Recently, the European Union, in collaboration with a number of Danish companies, has been promoting energy projects aimed at producing photovoltaic and wind energy as well as green hydrogen in Mauritania (Roca Reference Roca2023). These processes, which are an additional source of both government funding and instability in the region, are threatening to transform the desert country into what some specialists have already called an ‘energy colony’ of Europe (Allan et al. Reference Allan, Lemaadel and Lakhal2022: 50–9). In this sense, although authors such as Daryl L. Jones (Reference Jones2024: 388) have recently suggested in their work that climate change could contribute to the abolition of descent-based slavery in Mauritania, Mariem Cheikh has referred to this reality in recent parliamentary speeches (Reference Cheikh2024a), expressing concern about a murky and discouraging situation for abolitionism in the region.

In this uncertain climate, Lehbouss and Hanoune are disillusioned by the lack of progress made in recent years on the phenomenon of slavery. According to their testimonies, ‘impunity reigns supreme’ in Mauritania and there is no prospect of a radical change in the situation in the short term. Abdel Wahab (2024), for his part, is concerned about the future of Biram Dah Abeid in a context of maximum tension, while Dama Diarra (2024) is pinning her hopes on a future electoral change in an increasingly repressive scenario led by Mohamed Ould Ghazouani. Others who know the Mauritanian context well, such as Bullard (2024), are even more pessimistic, saying that it is difficult to remain optimistic when Mauritanians are increasingly forced by circumstance to flee their country. In her particular case, the approval of new applications from Mauritanians to enter the USA illegally via Nicaragua is symptomatic of a context in which all that is left to cling to is the ‘human capacity for survival in the face of adversity’.