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The European Court of Human Rights and Climate Change: Expanding beyond Traditional Limits

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 November 2025

Patrick Abel
Patrick Abel*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Passau, Passau, Germany
*
Email: Patrick.Abel@uni-passau.de

Abstract

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recently issued its first rulings on climate change, affirming that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) requires states to take action. These landmark rulings will profoundly impact both the ECHR and international law. They strike a balance between states’ discretion in regulating climate policy and the human rights protection needed for future generations. However, the ECtHR left several key questions unanswered. More fundamentally, the rulings raise the question of whether a human rights court is the best forum for climate change litigation.

Résumé

Résumé

La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH) a récemment rendu ses premiers arrêts sur le changement climatique, affirmant que la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH) impose aux États d’agir. Ces arrêts historiques auront un impact profond sur la CEDH et le droit international. Ils établissent un équilibre entre le pouvoir discrétionnaire des États en matière de réglementation de la politique climatique et la protection des droits de l’homme nécessaire aux générations futures. Cependant, la CEDH a laissé plusieurs questions clés sans réponse. Plus fondamentalement, ces arrêts soulèvent la question de savoir si une cour des droits de l’homme est la meilleure instance pour les litiges liés au changement climatique.

Keywords

European Court of Human Rightsclimate changepositive obligationsprivate and family lifeaccess to courtenvironmental associationsextraterritorial jurisdictionvictim statusexhaustion of local remediesCour européenne des droits de l’hommechangement climatiqueobligations positivesvie privée et familialeaccès à la justiceassociations environnementalescompétence extraterritorialestatut de victimeépuisement des voies de recours internes

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Type
Notes and Comments / Notes et commentaries
Information
Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , First View , pp. 1 - 10
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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© The Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international 2025

ECtHR (GC), Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland, Application No. 53600/20 (9 April 2024), <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-233206>.

ECtHR (GC), Duarte Agostinho and Others v Portugal and 32 Other States, Application No. 39371/20 (9 April 2024), <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-233261>.

ECtHR (GC), Carême v France, Application No. 7189/21 (9 April 2024), <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-233174>.

These three rulings listed above are the first of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on climate change, delivered by its Grand Chamber.Footnote 1 Most importantly, the ECtHR acknowledged that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) enshrines positive obligations to combat climate change.Footnote 2 In doing so, it delineated what states are required to do under the ECHR to mitigate climate change and adapt to its consequences and drew the boundaries of their margin of appreciation. The decisions also contain significant findings on admissibility and jurisdiction, including victim status, extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the exhaustion of local remedies. The rulings break new ground in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence and offer a novel interpretation of the ECHR specifically for the challenge of climate change. These landmark decisions will have profound implications for the ECHR and international law.

* * *

Since 2021, twelve individual complaints related to climate change have been lodged before the ECtHR. It declared three complaints inadmissible and adjourned the examination of six further cases.Footnote 3 In the remaining three proceedings of Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, Duarte Agostinho, and Carême, the competent chambers referred the cases to the Grand Chamber and fast-tracked the complaints.Footnote 4

The applicants in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen v Switzerland were a Swiss environmental association of Swiss senior women (the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz) and four of its members. They argued that, due to their age, they would be particularly vulnerable to climate change-induced effects such as heat waves.Footnote 5 Duarte Agostinho was lodged by a group of Portuguese children and youth, suing their home state, Portugal, and thirty-two other ECHR parties. As young people, they would come to experience particularly harmful effects of aggravating climate change in the future, especially through wildfires.Footnote 6 The proceedings in Carême were initiated against France by a former mayor of the Grande-Synthe, a French municipality that was particularly susceptible to climate change-induced floodings.Footnote 7 Only the applicants in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen and Carême had exhausted local remedies.Footnote 8 In Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, Duarte Agostinho, and Carême, all applicants claimed violations of the right to life (Article 2 of the ECHR) and to private and family life (Article 8 of the ECHR), among other rights, because the respondent states had insufficiently engaged in climate change mitigation. As a result, the respondent states had contributed to global warming, which already harmed people’s lives and health today and would risk doing even more so in the future.Footnote 9 The applicants in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen also raised a violation of the right to access to court (Article 6 of the ECHR) because the Swiss administration and courts had rejected their domestic claims as inadmissible due to a lack of standing.Footnote 10

The ECtHR unanimously dismissed the application in Carême as inadmissible. The applicant did not have victim status under Article 34 of the ECHR. Footnote 11 He had moved to Brussels and could thus not be directly affected by potential floodings in the Grand-Synthe.Footnote 12 Furthermore, as a former mayor, his conduct was attributable to France, and, as a state organ, he was subject to the human rights obligations of the ECHR of France instead of enjoying protection against France.Footnote 13

In Duarte Agostinho, the ECtHR unanimously dismissed the application as well.Footnote 14 It addressed extraterritorial jurisdiction first. The Portuguese applicants claimed that the thirty-two states other than their home state had violated the ECHR due to the adverse effect of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from these states’ territory on their health. The respondents contended that this alleged effect was outside their jurisdiction under Article 1 of the ECHR. Footnote 15 In agreeing with the respondents’ arguments, the ECtHR indicated that the concept of jurisdiction was generally territorial, and the exceptions developed in its case law for extraterritorial jurisdiction did not apply here.Footnote 16 The ECtHR was also not prepared to create a new exception.Footnote 17 In doing so, the ECtHR rejected to adopt new approaches of other human rights bodies that recently accepted broad extraterritorial jurisdiction of the states in the climate change context.

Notably, in 2017, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) held that, under the American Convention on Human Rights, states have extraterritorial jurisdiction for transboundary harm “if there is a causal link between the action that occurred within its territory and the negative impact on the human rights of persons outside its territory” in Advisory Opinion PC-23/27.Footnote 18 In 2021, the Committee on the Rights of the Child took the same approach under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, citing the advisory opinion of the IACtHR.Footnote 19 The ECtHR took note of these rulings but did not follow their approaches.Footnote 20 On the contrary, it held that, as GHG emissions mainly arose from activities that could not “be labelled dangerous” but from “basic human activities,” such extraterritorial jurisdiction would be limitless.Footnote 21 This would cause “untenable uncertainty for the States” and turn the ECHR “into a global climate-change treaty.”Footnote 22 Concerning Portugal, the applicants had not exhausted the local remedies as required under Article 35 of the ECHR.Footnote 23

The application in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen was largely successful. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that the environmental association had standing and that Switzerland had violated the right to private and family life (Article 8 of the ECHR) and the right to access to court (Article 6 of the ECHR). It declared the application inadmissible in regard to the senior women due to a lack of victim status. Interestingly, only the findings that Switzerland had violated Article 6 of the ECHR and that the claim by the senior women was inadmissible regarding the right to privacy and family life were reached unanimously. The rest of the judgment was taken by a majority of sixteen votes to one. Judge Tim Eicke delivered a partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion.Footnote 24

The judgment observes that global warming is caused by human activities that emit GHGs, increasing mortality and posing a serious health risk, especially for older adults and persons with chronic diseases.Footnote 25 Following an analysis of Swiss law, relevant international materials, and comparative law,Footnote 26 the ECtHR made fundamental “preliminary points” on climate change and the ECHR. Footnote 27 While climate change measures were subject to democratic decision-making, it was for the judiciary to complement democratic decision-making and limit the powers of the majority.Footnote 28 Future generations were “likely to bear an increasingly severe burden” while having “no possibility of participating in the relevant current decision-making processes.”Footnote 29 Climate change was different from other environmental problems, influencing the interpretation of the ECHR. This included the multitude of sources of emissions and the complex chain of effects that led to health and environmental risks.Footnote 30 The ECHR was a living instrument that must react to “an evolution of scientific knowledge, social and political attitudes and legal standards … in the context of climate change,” which recognized “the urgency of addressing climate change and its adverse effects.”Footnote 31 The causal link between acts or omissions by states and any harm or risk of harm was “necessarily more tenuous and indirect” than in other contexts, and responsibility for violating the ECHR could thus already arise from aggravating risks.Footnote 32 That a global response was necessary to mitigate climate change successfully could not preclude the responsibility of individual states.Footnote 33

On jurisdiction and admissibility, the ECtHR first rejected that the individual applicants had victim status under Article 34 of the ECHR. Footnote 34 It established a threshold that “is especially high” for individuals to show victim status in climate change-related complaints: applicants “must be subject to a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change” and “there must be a pressing need to ensure the applicant’s individual protection.”Footnote 35 This was to prevent admitting an actio popularis. Footnote 36 Because climate change threatens everyone, a broad interpretation of the victim status “could cover virtually anybody and would therefore not work as a limiting criterion.”Footnote 37

In contrast, the ECtHR introduced a more lenient threshold for the standing of environmental associations. In its view, environmental associations “may be one of the only means through which the voice of those at a distinct representational disadvantage can be heard.”Footnote 38 Their rights to broad access to justice were recognized under the Aarhus Convention, European Union (EU) law, and the domestic law of multiple EU member states.Footnote 39 It witnessed “an evolution in contemporary society,” recognizing their importance in climate litigation.Footnote 40 To have standing before the ECtHR in climate change matters, associations must, within the respective jurisdiction, be lawfully established, show a dedicated purpose to defend the human rights of its members or others, and be “genuinely qualified and representative” to defend those “subject to specific threats or adverse effects of climate change.”Footnote 41 Notably, it is not necessary for any of its members to meet the strict victim-status requirements in the climate change context under Article 34 of the ECHR as developed by the court.Footnote 42 The ECtHR held that the applicant Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz fulfilled these criteria for its claim under the right to private and family life (Article 8 of the ECHR) and the right to access to court (Article 6 of the ECHR).Footnote 43

On the merits, the ECtHR affirmed that the ECHR parties had a positive obligation under the right to private and family life (Article 8 of the ECHR) to “put in place the necessary regulations and measures aimed at preventing an increase in GHG concentrations in the Earth’s atmosphere and a rise in global average temperature beyond levels capable of producing serious and irreversible adverse effects.”Footnote 44 By reference to the Paris Agreement, it confirmed that it is for each individual state to “define its own adequate pathway for reaching carbon neutrality.”Footnote 45 States must “undertake measures for the substantial and progressive reduction of their respective GHG emission levels, with a view to reaching net neutrality within, in principle, the next three decades,” for which public authorities had “to act in good time, in an appropriate and consistent manner.”Footnote 46 The ECtHR underlined that “to avoid a disproportionate burden on future generations, immediate action needs to be taken.”Footnote 47

The ECtHR distinguished between two categories in defining the margin of appreciation that state parties enjoy in setting their climate policy. The margin was “reduced” in regard to the “State’s commitment to the necessity of combating climate change and its adverse effects, and the setting of the requisite aims and objectives in this respect”; in contrast, the margin was “wide” with respect to the “choice of means to pursue those aims and objectives” and the “operational choices and policies.”Footnote 48 In determining whether states have remained within their margin of appreciation, the ECtHR will examine if they adopted “general measures specifying a target timeline for achieving carbon neutrality and the overall remaining carbon budget for the same time frame or another equivalent method of quantification of future GHG emissions” in line with their mitigation commitments, set intermediate GHG emission reduction targets and pathways and evidence of complying with them while keeping them duly updated, and if they “act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner when devising and implementing the relevant legislation and measures.”Footnote 49

The ECtHR clarified that it will, “in principle,” make an overall assessment if states meet these criteria, “meaning that a shortcoming in one particular respect alone will not necessarily” be tantamount to a violation of the right to private and family life (Article 8 of the ECHR).Footnote 50 It added that states must supplement climate change mitigation by adaptation measures and, procedurally, provide information on the decision-making process of public authorities and ensure that the views of the public and interested or affected parties can be taken into account.Footnote 51 The ECtHR held that Switzerland had violated the right to private and family life of the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz under Article 8 of the ECHR. Footnote 52 The state had not met its GHG emission reduction commitments for 2020, had not set intermediate targets for the period between 2025 and 2030, and had not defined a remaining carbon budget.Footnote 53 The ECtHR found that it was unnecessary to analyze the right to life in Article 2 of the ECHR. Footnote 54

Concerning the right to have access to court (Article 6 of the ECHR), the ECtHR held that, even though states were generally allowed to reject an actio popularis in their domestic legal systems, this was subject to a proportionality test.Footnote 55 However, it also observed that Article 6 of the ECHR did not “guarantee a right to access to a court with power to invalidate or override a law enacted by the legislature” if domestic law does not provide so.Footnote 56 It found that Switzerland had violated the association’s right under Article 6 of the ECHR. The Swiss administration and courts had not taken the association’s complaint seriously enough as they had left the association’s standing open and only dealt with the individual applicants’ claims.Footnote 57

* * *

The climate rulings of the ECtHR have been long awaited. Environmental associations have been increasingly engaging in climate change litigation worldwide, especially in the United States.Footnote 58 Decisions such as Urgenda Footnote 59 and Shell (first instance)Footnote 60 in the Netherlands had an impact far beyond the boundaries of the respective national jurisdictions. Strategic litigation aims at generating landmark decisions prone to trigger systemic change and suitable to be cited in other international and domestic proceedings.Footnote 61 Thus, the applicants had hoped for a progressive landmark judgment that would generate a tailwind for other proceedings. They have succeeded partly. The Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment can be considered a win for the applicants. The ECtHR acknowledged that states have positive obligations under the ECHR to combat climate change and upgraded the role of environmental associations in the climate change context. On the other hand, the rulings also established limits to climate change litigation before the ECtHR — for example, by setting a high threshold for individuals to claim victim status and rejecting the extraterritorial jurisdiction for the transboundary effects of GHG emissions in Duarte Agostinho.

The landmark decisions raise many issues of substance and procedure that cannot be covered exhaustively here. As to the substance, by holding that states have positive obligations under the ECHR to combat climate change, the ECtHR stabilized the link between human rights and climate change in an ongoing scholarlyFootnote 62 and political debate.Footnote 63 The International Court of Justice and the IACtHR will deliver advisory opinions on this question soon.Footnote 64 They will likely take account of the ECtHR’s climate rulings as a secondary source of interpretation, extending their impact beyond Europe.

In fleshing out the positive obligations discussed above, the ECtHR has struck a careful balance between specifying what the ECHR requires states to do and respecting their sovereignty to adopt their own climate policy approach. It requires states to develop an appropriate general climate law framework (“setting of the requisite aims and objectives”) while leaving the choice of concrete instruments (“means to pursue those aims and objectives”) largely to the states. That the ECtHR rejected an extraterritorial jurisdiction of states for the transboundary effects of GHG emissions adds to the nuanced character of the rulings. The ECtHR was conscious of the implications for democratic decision-making and the separation of powers, given that the sensitive matter of climate policy increasingly affects all aspects of private and professional life.Footnote 65 Overall, the remaining leeway for states under the ECHR remains substantial.Footnote 66 In the author’s view, this is appropriate given that the ECHR only establishes a minimum standard for human rights and leaves room for cultural and political pluralism amongst its diverse treaty parties.

Yet the ECtHR has left important questions of substance open. For example, in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, it left unanswered whether states are responsible for emissions caused by the production of goods abroad and later imported into their territory, the “embedded emissions.”Footnote 67 While it stated that it was “difficult, if not impossible, to discuss Switzerland’s responsibility” without taking into account embedded emissions, the court explicitly left open the “actual effects of ‘embedded emissions’ … on the State’s responsibility under the Convention” as it did not elaborate on this aspect in its ruling.Footnote 68 This is controversial in light of an ongoing discussion about standards of corporate responsibility for GHG emissions and will certainly be taken up in future climate litigation. Notably, the ECtHR also had little to say about climate justice and the relationship of the ECHR parties to developing countries. By requiring states to adopt a national remaining carbon budget or a different equivalent quantification, they will likely have to be clearer about their share in the global efforts to combat climate change.Footnote 69 However, the ECtHR did not operationalize the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities through the ECHR any further.

Among the issues of procedure that the rulings raise, the upgraded role of environmental associations appears particularly important. The ECtHR made it rather easy for environmental associations, and almost impossible for individuals, to file admissible individual complaints. While the requirements of standing for environmental associations remain rather vague, it is notable that the association does not even have to show that its members are specifically affected by climate change; instead, it is sufficient to show that it represents people subject to specific threats or adverse effects of climate change, apparently without having to individualize any victims.Footnote 70 Thereby, effectively, the ECtHR has lowered the bar for the requirement of standing so much that it, practically, allows an actio popularis filed by environmental associations in the climate change context unprecedented in its jurisprudence, as also pointed out by Judge Eicke in his partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion.Footnote 71 This approach – which opens the gate to adjudication for associations while closing it for individuals – seems inadequate for a regional human rights court, which is otherwise renowned for empowering individuals to directly defend their rights in an international adjudicatory procedure.

On a more theoretical level, the rulings provoke further reflection on the relationship between human rights and the combatting of climate change, including where they conflict. They are an interesting case study to test if human rights offer the best vocabulary for a planetary perspectiveFootnote 72 on changes that the earth is undergoing and that far exceed the lifespan of humans. The ECtHR seemed conscious of its limitations as a regional human rights court. It is ambitious that it seeks to overcome them, at least in part, by departing from its characteristic focus on individual victims. But it cannot escape an anthropocentric approach to climate change that is ingrained in the nature of human rights. Other international tribunals may face fewer restrictions in this regard, which is another reason why the pending advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change is eagerly anticipated.Footnote 73

References

1 ECtHR (GC), Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland, App No 53600/20 (9 April 2024), online: <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-233206> [Verein KlimaSeniorinnen]; ECtHR (GC), Duarte Agostinho and Others v Portugal and 32 Other States, App No 39371/20 (9 April 2024), online: <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-233261> [Duarte Agostinho]; ECtHR (GC), Carême v France, App No 7189/21 (9 April 2024), online: <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-233174> [Carême]. Earlier, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) declared three cases on climate change inadmissible in non-public written procedures in single judge and committee judicial formations for being (manifestly) inadmissible. See Application Nos 36959/22 (11 December 2022), 35057/22 (11 December 2022), and 32068/23 (5 October 2023), thus without public reasoning given.

2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) [ECHR].

3 The ECtHR declared inadmissible the Application Nos 36959/22, 35057/22 and 32068/23, and adjourned those with Nos. 14615/21, 14620/21, 18859/21, 34068/21, 19026/21, 31925/22, 31932/22, 31938/22, 31943/22, 31947/22, 46906/22. The ECtHR prepared a fact sheet on climate change, which lists these applications, together with short abstracts, “European Court of Human Rights” (last modified 18 April 2024), online: < www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/FS_Climate_change_ENG>.

4 Council of Europe, Rules of Court (28 March 2024), art 41 online: <www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/rules_court_eng> (which allows the court to prioritize an application and thus change the order of dealing with cases).

5 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note 1 at para 300.

6 Duarte Agostinho, supra note 1 at para 66.

7 Carême, supra note 1 at para 67.

8 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note 1 at paras 22–63; Carême, supra note 1 at paras 11–38.

9 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note 1 at paras 299–304; Duarte Agostinho, supra note 1 at para 66; Carême, supra note 1 at para 56.

10 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note 1 at paras 577–81.

11 ECHR, supra note 2, art 34 (which states that “any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation” of the ECHR can file an individual application before the ECtHR).

12 Carême, supra note 1 at paras 81–84.

13 Ibid at para 85.

14 The applicants also filed an application against Ukraine, which the ECtHR stroked out on their demand after they decided in the course of the proceedings that they did not want to pursue it any further in light of the Russian war against Ukraine. See Duarte Agostinho, supra note 1 at paras 158–60.

15 ECHR, supra note 2, art 1 provides that the treaty parties “shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction” the rights of the ECHR.

16 Duarte Agostinho, supra note 1 at paras 168–88. In paragraph 168, the ECtHR points to its own succinct summary of its jurisprudence on jurisdiction and extraterritoriality in ECtHR, MN and Others v Belgium, App No 3599/18 (5 May 2020) at paras 96–109.

17 Duarte Agostinho, supra note 1 at paras 189–214.

18 IACtHR, Environment and Human Rights, Case OC-23/27, Advisory Opinion (15 November 2017) at para 104(lit h); American Convention on Human Rights, 21 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into force 18 July 1978).

19 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Sacchi et al v Argentina et al, Comm No 104–108/2019, CRC/C/88/D/107/2019 (8 October 2021) at paras 9.7–9.12; Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, [1992] CanTS no 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990).

20 Duarte Agostinho, supra note 1 at paras 59, 63, 210.

21 Ibid at para 207.

22 Ibid at para 208.

23 Ibid at paras 217–28. ECHR, supra note 2, art 35 contains admissibility requirements for individual applications.

24 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note 1 at paras 233–58.

25 Ibid at paras 64–68.

26 Ibid at paras 121–272.

27 Ibid at paras 410–57.

28 Ibid at paras 411, 412.

29 Ibid at para 420.

30 Ibid at paras 414–19.

31 Ibid at paras 431, 433, 434.

32 Ibid at para 439.

33 Ibid at paras 442–44.

34 Ibid at paras 527–35.

35 Ibid at paras 487, 488.

36 Ibid at para 488.

37 Ibid at para 485.

38 Ibid at para 489.

39 Ibid at paras 491–94; Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 1998, 2161 UNTS 447 (entered into force 30 October 2001).

40 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note 1 at para 497.

41 Ibid at para 502.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid at paras 521–26, 615–25.

44 Ibid at paras 519, 546.

45 Ibid at para 547.

46 Ibid at para 548.

47 Ibid at para 549.

48 Ibid at paras 543, 549.

49 Ibid at para 550.

50 Ibid at para 551.

51 Ibid at paras 552, 554.

52 Ibid at paras 555–74.

53 Ibid at paras 558–59, 561–68, 569–72.

54 Ibid at para 536.

55 Ibid at paras 631–32.

56 Ibid at paras 594, 609, 629.

57 Ibid at paras 630–40.

58 For the latest developments, see Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Global Climate Litigation Report (2023). On US climate litigation, see the empirical study by Sabrina McCormick et al, “Strategies in and Outcomes of Climate Change Litigation in the United States” (2018) 8 Nature Climate Change 829.

59 Hague Court of Appeal, State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610 (9 October 2019); Supreme Court of the Netherlands, State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007 (20 December 2019). See Maiko Meguro, “State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation” (2020) 114 Am J Intl L 729.

60 District Court of the Hague, Milieudefensie et al v Royal Dutch Shell plc, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2021:5337 (26 May 2021). The Hague Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs. See Hague Court of Appeal, Shell Plc et al v Vereniging Milieudefensie, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2024:2099 (12 November 2024). However, this judgment is not final. See “Why We’re Taking Our Shell Climate Case to the Supreme Court,” Milieudefensie (11 February 2025), online: <en.milieudefensie.nl/news/why-we2019re-taking-our-shell-climate-case-to-the-supreme-court>. For an analysis of the case, see Benoit Mayer, “The Duty of Care of Fossil-Fuel Producers for Climate Change Mitigation” (2022) 11 Transnational Environmental L 407.

61 Cf Michael Burger & Maria Antonia Tigre, Global Climate Litigation Report: 2023 Status Review (New York: Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, 2023) at 7.

62 See e.g. John H Knox, “Climate Change and Human Rights Law” (2009) 50 Va J Intl L 163; Jacqueline Peel & Hari M Osofsky, “A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?” (2018) 7 Transnational Environmental L 37; Benoit Mayer, “Climate Change Mitigation as an Obligation under Human Rights Treaties?” (2021) 115 AJIL 409.

63 See, for example, the acceptance of a human right to a sustainable environment by the UN General Assembly Resolution 76/300 (28 July 2022).

64 ICJ, Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change, request for Advisory Opinion (12 April 2023); IACtHR, Request for an Advisory Opinion on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights submitted to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights by the Republic of Colombia and the Republic of Chile (9 January 2023).

65 Cf Gareth Davies, “Climate Change and Reversed Intergenerational Equity: The Problem of Costs Now, for Benefits Later” (2020) 10 Climate Law 266. Furthermore, see e.g. Anna Hoffmann, “Five Key Points from the Groundbreaking European Court of Human Rights Climate Judgment in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v Switzerland” (2024) 26 Environmental L Rev 91 at 92 (who considers expanding Article 8 of the ECHR to include a positive obligation in relation to climate change as one of the major outcomes of the case); Andreas Hösli, “Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland: The European Court of Human Rights’ Answer to Climate Change” (2024) 14 Climate Law 263 at 277 (who comments that the ECtHR gives particular weight to procedural safeguards available under domestic law when defining the margin of appreciation); Ivana Jelić & Etienne Fritz, “The ‘Living Instrument’ at the Service of Climate Action: The ECtHR Long-Standing Doctrine Confronted to the Climate Emergency” (2024) 36 J Envtl L 141 at 153–56 (on the positive obligations established in the climate change context as an emanation of the living instrument doctrine).

66 See Patrick Abel, “Mixed Signals for Domestic Climate Law: The Climate Rulings of the European Court of Human Rights,” Sabin Center Climate Law Blog (17 April 2024), online: <blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2024/04/17/mixed-signals-for-domestic-climate-law-the-climate-rulings-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights/>.

67 Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note 1 at para 287.

68 Ibid at paras 280, 283. For a similar interpretation of the ruling, see Andreas Buser, “A Human Right to Carbon Import Restrictions? On the Notion of ‘Embedded Emissions’ in Klimaseniorinnen v Switzerland,” EJIL:Talk! (16 April 2024), online: <www.ejiltalk.org/a-human-right-to-carbon-import-restrictions-on-the-notion-of-embedded-emissions-in-klimaseniorinnen-v-switzerland/> (who finds that the ECtHR did not decide the question in the merits but “points in the direction that States can be held accountable for failing to reduce their economies’ extraterritorial GHG footprints”). For a different perspective that offers a more expansive interpretation of the ruling with respect to embedded emissions, see Geraldo Vidigal, “International Trade and ‘Embedded Emissions’ after KlimaSeniorinnen,” Verfassungsblog (1 May 2024), online: <verfassungsblog.de/international-trade-and-embedded-emissions-after-klimaseniorinnen/>.

69 See Chris Hilson, “The ECtHR’s Klimaseniorinnen Judgment: The Meaning of Carbon Budget within a Wide Margin of Appreciation,” Sabin Center Climate Law Blog (11 April 2024), online: <blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2024/04/11/the-ecthrs-klimaseniorinnen-judgment-the-meaning-of-carbon-budget-within-a-wide-margin-of-appreciation/>.

70 See Violetta Sefkow-Werner, “Consistent Inconsistencies in the ECtHR’s Approach to Victim Status and Locus Standi,” European Journal of Risk Regulation [forthcoming], online: <doi.org/10.1017/err.2024.95> (stating that “an association can bring an application without there being a designated individual victim” [emphasis in original]).

71 ECtHR, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v Switzerland, App No 54600/20 (9 April 2024) at para 45, Partly Concurring, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eicke. The position put forward here is supported, for example, by Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, “‘KlimaSeniorinnen Revolution’: The New Approach to Standing” (2024) 5 European Convention on Human Rights L Rev 423 at 424. For a contrary position, see e.g. Sefkow-Werner, supra note 70 at 7–8.

72 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, The Climate of History in a Planetary Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021)10.7208/chicago/9780226733050.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73 See ICJ, Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change, Request for Advisory Opinion Transmitted to the Court pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 77/276, 2023 General List No 187 (29 March 2023). On the request, see e.g. Daniel Bodansky, “Advisory Opinions on Climate Change: Some Preliminary Questions” (2023) 32 RECIEL 185.