Is Christian nationalism a threat to democracy in Africa, and to what extent are its adherents “anti-democratic” as is often claimed? Using the Afrobarometer Round 7 (2016-18), I examine how extensive these attitudes are held among Africans. Although I find that the proportion of the population on the continent that holds Christian nationalist views is somewhat limited, I find support for the argument that Christian nationalists tend to be less supportive of democracy than others, and more receptive to authoritarian alternatives to democracy. However, they are not more likely to hold intolerant attitudes with regard to other religions and LGBTQ individuals. In addition, I do not find, contrary to the existing literature on Christian nationalism in Africa, that Pentecostals are more intolerant of out groups than other Africans.

Arguably, no subject has captured more attention in the study of American religion in recent years than “Christian nationalism”—a political theology that seeks a privileged place for Christianity in American public life. Social scientific inquiries into the causes and consequences of Christian nationalism have yielded much fruit in a relatively short period of time. Nevertheless, the literature tends to treat Christian nationalism as if it were a monolithic category, with all “Christian nationalists” being motivated by the same beliefs. In reality, Christian nationalists, although presumably seeking the same goal—namely the establishment of a Christian nation—are a diverse lot, motivated by very different, in some cases mutually exclusive, belief systems. This article attempts to remedy this oversight by exploring the divergent beliefs and theologies undergirding different forms of American Christian nationalism. Specifically, it delineates three main forms of Christian nationalism present in American public life: charismatic dominionism, Calvinist nationalism, and Catholic integralism. It explores what differentiates these different Christian nationalist movements and what they mean by and how they work together to bring about a Christian America.

Brazilians in the United States voted overwhelmingly for right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro in 2022. What role did religion play? Based on exit polling, focus groups, and observation of local Brazilian churches, this article explores how Christianity drives support for right-wing populism among Brazilian migrants to the Boston area. Christians, and especially evangelicals, are significantly more likely to vote for Bolsonaro, and the priests and pastors of Brazilian migrant churches are particularly willing to discuss parties and candidates. Yet neither clergy endorsements nor political conversations at church explain this religious effect. I argue that indirect influence within congregations, which reinforces a conservative worldview in non-overtly political ways, helps explain why most observant evangelicals favor Bolsonaro. Migrants potentially influence the voting behavior of friends and family in Brazil, including via transnational religious communities, so their political attitudes can help bolster authoritarian populism in the homeland, as also seen in India and Turkey.

About a decade after the Arab Uprisings, the Tunisian Ennahda party experienced the exodus of several high-profile leaders. Motivated by the party’s growing factionalism and shrinking support, this article investigates the organizational factors that account for the low system-ness of an Islamist-born party following major organizational changes. It does so by drawing on interview data and organizational developments that unfolded inside Ennahda (2016–2021). In a framework that intersects the field of party politics and organization studies, this article argues that the major factors that account for Ennahda’s low system-ness include (i) an inefficient and inadequate theorization of the need for the party’s specialization in political activities, (ii) a problematic identification with the subsequently refashioned organizational identity, and (iii) an uneasy coexistence of distinct group identities involved in separate processes of organizational identity recrafting. This article concludes by challenging the way scholars traditionally conceive coherence, cohesion, and “change” in religious parties.

Gun culture is properly measured by a population's emotional and symbolic attachment to guns and not by rates of gun ownership. Using data from the Baylor Religion Survey (wave 6), we find that nearly all gun owners feel that guns provide them with a physical sense of security (Gun Security), but a distinct and crucial sub-set of owners express an additional and strong attachment to their weapons (Gun Sanctity). Gun Sanctity measures the extent to which owners think their guns make them more patriotic, respected, in control, and valued by their family and community. We propose that Gun Sanctity is a form of quasi-religious or magical thinking in which an object is imbued with unseen powers. To assess this proposal, we look at the extent to which gun ownership, Gun Security, and Gun Sanctity are related to traditional religion and various forms of magical thinking, namely, (a) conspiratorialism, (b) the belief that prayer can fix financial and health problems, and (c) support for Christian Statism, a form of American theocracy. We find that Gun Sanctity is highly predictive of different forms of magical thinking but is often unrelated to more traditional religious practices and beliefs.

Why does religion continue to emerge as a flashpoint in the age of secularization? Although models of religious resurgence suggest that religious cleavages are more prominent in the modern era, other models continue to show declining religious involvement. What is needed is a theory that can observe both resurgence and secularization at the same time. I argue that globalization—and the flow of people across borders, in particular—provokes a religious backlash at the societal level due to its secularizing effects. As the public is exposed to new and diverse religious traditions, religiosity declines; as a result, however, religious practitioners become more aggressive toward other religious groups. I test this theory using data on globalization, religious discrimination, and religious practice. I find that types of globalization dealing with the flow of people and information across borders have an outsize effect on societal religious discrimination, or SRD. This effect, however, is contingent on a decline in religious practice. This study suggests that religious resurgence can take place in secularizing environments, and that both resurgence and secularization share root causes.

Islam provides counteracting rules on women's economic rights. In order to understand the effect of the opposing rules in Islamic doctrine on women's economic rights at the state level, I test the relationship, along with a set of competing hypotheses. Using data from 1990 to 2014 on the population of Muslim-majority states, I employ a multilevel mixed-effects linear regression model. I find that at the state level, Islam is not a major influence on women's economic rights. However, other cultural and economic factors are strong predictors. To better understand the causal mechanisms linking the predictors to women's economic rights, I employ a most similar systems case study, comparing Jordan and Morocco. These cases are selected because they share many similarities, yet have contrasting records on women's economic rights. The case study reveals that Arab states that can overcome the dominance of patriarchal interests in the policymaking process are better positioned to advance women's economic rights.

How do military chaplains perceive the legitimacy of US drone strikes? Though chaplains are entrusted to shape the moral use of force, scholars have not studied what accounts for their perceptions of legitimate drone warfare, and whether these relate to legal-rational or moral considerations. To understand these dynamics, we field a survey experiment among a rare sample of US Army chaplains. We find that while chaplains’ perceptions of legally and morally legitimate strikes largely covary, they can also deviate. Chaplains discount the legality of strikes in undeclared theaters of operations, even when they are tightly constrained to minimize civilian casualties. Though chaplains may perceive strikes as legitimate, they can also support them less. Finally, other factors shape chaplains’ perceptions, with combat experiences exercising the greatest effect on perceptions of legal versus moral legitimacy. This first evidence for chaplains’ attitudes toward drone warfare has implications for policy, research, and military readiness.

This qualitative research investigates the growing social activism against the trend of desecularization within non-religious state education in Israel, employing a social movement framework. By conducting in-depth interviews with individuals engaged in this activism, the study examined the ideological frameworks of the actors, their perceived organizational structures for mobilization, and their view of political opportunities used to uphold secular principles in the Israeli educational system. The study contributes to social movement research by highlighting secular motivations, often overlooked in favor of faith-based activism, and addresses the limited literature on desecularization in public education. It also underscores the nonlinear progress of secularization and liberalism in Israel, noting a sense that the tendency toward desecularization has been gaining momentum in certain parts of society. This research enhances understanding of desecularization as a social movement in education and informs broader discussions on the intersections of religion, culture, and governance in democracies.

Research on whether religiosity promotes or reduces prejudice has produced plenty of paradoxical findings. In this article, we address the relationship between religiosity and anti-diversity attitudes (xenophobia and homophobia) among Christians in Western Germany. We ask what the relationship between religiosity and anti-diversity attitudes is and how it can be explained. Two (complementary) theoretical explanations are presented: the religious-ideology explanation emphasizes the role of fundamentalism, and the loss-of-privileges explanation underscores the importance of perceived disadvantage. Our analysis is based on a representative sample of Christians in Western Germany and provides evidence of a curvilinear religiosity–prejudice relationship. Up to a certain level of religiosity, xenophobia and homophobia decrease as religiosity increases; however, the relationship then reverses—anti-diversity attitudes are particularly pronounced among the highly religious. The level of xenophobia among the highly religious is fully explained by fundamentalism and perceived disadvantage, whereas their level of homophobia is only partially explained.

Individual religiosity is often discussed and at times found to be associated with anti-pluralistic attitudes and outgroup hostility, such as nativism. Yet, less is known about contextual factors like the strength and visibility of actors that instrumentalize religion to reinforce nativist sentiments. The most prominent actors in that regard are populist radical right parties (PRRPs) that politicize Christianity to promote their right-wing stances. I seek to address this gap by assessing whether PRRPs’ participation in government influences the impact of individual religiosity on nativism. I argue, first, that more religious Christians are likely to have a stronger tendency toward nativism and expect, second, that governing PRRPs reinforce this impact. The study analyzes 37 European and Latin American countries using data from the Joint EVS/WVS (2017–22). Results show that religiosity is indeed related to nativism. However, there is no evidence that PRRPs in power strengthen this religiosity–nativism nexus.

Religious language plays a pivotal role in shaping political behavior and attitudes. This study investigates how representatives utilize religious rhetoric when addressing the House floor and their constituents, and how this language is influenced by congressional leadership. The inauguration of openly religious Mike Johnson as House Speaker in 2023 provides a unique case to explore these dynamics. Using difference-in-differences and triple difference models, we analyze House speeches and newsletters from before and after Johnson became House Speaker to assess changes in religious speech between Republican and Democratic representatives. Our findings reveal a significant increase in newsletters using religious language sent out by Republicans after Johnson became Speaker, while religious speech on the House floor remains unchanged. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature on the relationship between religion, partisanship, and Congressional leadership, highlighting the potential influence of the Speaker of the House on religious communication to constituents.

Researchers regularly use large survey studies to examine public political opinion. Surveys running over days and months will necessarily incorporate religious occasions that can introduce variation in public opinion. Using recent survey data from Israel, this study demonstrates that giving surveys on religious occasions (e.g., the Sabbath, Hannukah, Sukkot) can elicit different opinion responses. These effects are found among both religious and non-religious respondents. While incorporating these fluctuations is realistic in longer-term surveys, surveys fielded in a short window inadvertently drawing heavily on a holiday or holy day sample may bias their findings. This study thus urges researchers to be cognizant of ambient religious context when conducting survey studies.

The first decade of the twenty-first century saw the rise of a phenomenon known as new atheism. In recent years the visibility of new atheism has waned, but scholarly research into the causes of this decline remain limited. This paper examines the rise and fall of new atheism within the broader context of the U.S. atheist movement. Employing the conceptual framework of the social movement lifecycle, the analysis shows how the trajectory of the movement was shaped by its internal organisational challenges as well as the wider political and cultural landscape. While the early atheist movement was able to leverage internet technology and effectively use ‘atheism’ as an empty signifier to thrive in a hostile environment, growing conflicts over the aims and direction of the movement, fuelled in part by the growth of identity politics as part of the wider culture wars, led to an increasingly bitter factionalism that drove the movement apart.

As Catholic churches played a tremendous role in the third wave of democratization, it is crucial to examine their role in the current trends of autocratization. Given the potential for democratic backsliding resulting from elections, I study the official stances of national Catholic churches toward electoral manipulation in 59 cases across different regions, post-Third Wave. I find that 32% of the Catholic churches resisted electoral manipulation, while 34% called for peace, and 34% took no stance. I argue that beyond religious market dynamics, historical context also shapes Catholic churches’ cost-benefit calculations. Using logistic and multinomial regression models, I contend that Catholic churches resist electoral manipulation when government favoritism toward Catholicism is too low, even when they control a considerable proportion of the population. Additionally, the historical pro-democratizing role of Catholic churches positively influences their decision to resist electoral manipulation, particularly for those facing high competition in the religious market.

It is often assumed that the rural identity is linked to the Republican Party and the urban identity to the Democratic Party, but little scholarship has investigated how voters connect thiese identities to the parties in an electoral context and how that perception may influence their electoral preferences. Furthermore, recent elections have seen various political elites employ rural and Evangelical Christian identity labels in virtually synonymous ways in their association with the Republican Party. But are these partisan stereotypes really how Americans perceive these candidate identities? Utilizing a novel survey experiment, we find important distinctions between religious and place-based candidate cues. Our results show the enduring power of religion in partisan politics and suggest America’s urban-rural divide may be asymmetric in the minds of voters. These findings are subsequently meaningful for the study of religion’s place in America’s growing array of politicized social identities.

The presence of new religious movements (NRMs) is often fraught with tensions and confrontations. Depicted as foreign elements and “cults” they face opposition demanding to restrict their activities. NRMs in Israel, despite small numbers, raised concerns and objections, attributed among other things to the dominance and power of Orthodox religion. Gradually, however NRMs managed to establish themselves in Israel and to successfully deflect the opposition to their presence. In this work, based on interviews and media reports, we explore two strategies that enabled the movements in Israel to minimize rejection and opposition to their presence. The first, based on a republican concept of citizenship, included the adoption of Zionist ideology and taking part in settlement ethos and military service. The second, based on neoliberal concept of citizenship, fits well with more current trends in Israel, offers paths to economic advancement and social mobilization through education and ethos of success.

Faith-based organizations that are rooted in India’s diverse faiths give shape to their roles in an operational space shaped by the Hindu nationalist government. This paper, based on interviews with 34 FBOs, compares how FBOs rooted in five different faith traditions perceive that operational space, and how they relate to the state based on their perceptions of these conditions. One key finding is that there are important similarities in these FBOs’ perceptions and ways of responding. Another key finding is that ways of understanding and responses vary in ways that can be explained at least partly by the differentiated position of diverse faith communities in Indian society itself and the specific challenges faced by members of each faith tradition. That is, the specific context of marginalization or promotion of a religious community by the state positions FBOs to advance their objectives through collaboration, confrontation, or by keeping distant from state agencies.

Many scholars now contend that the wall separating church and state has been effectively dismantled. One of the strongest pieces of evidence used to make this argument is the transfer of over five million taxpayer dollars to churches during Covid-19. But who exactly received this money? When the wall separating church and state came crashing down, as some assert, was there an ambush of religious actors seeking to collect federal funds? Or did we see many religious actors maintain their distance? What distinguishes one group from the other? This research note examines the behavior of religious congregations during Covid-19 with regard to the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). We compare a sample of 2020 and 2021 PPP congregation recipients with the 2020 US Religious Census to note which denominations are over- and under-represented and then test the hypotheses suggested by the existing literature on faith-based organizations and government funding.

What causes demographic misperceptions of minority populations? We anticipate that the extent to which members of the majority group perceive the minority group as a threat shapes their estimation of minority group size. While existing research argues that demographic misperceptions of minority groups can lead to a sense of threat, we argue that the opposite relationship may exist—that threat also causes demographic misperception. We test our argument using an experiment embedded in a survey of Muslims in Indonesia. We manipulate perceived threat of Christians in Indonesia and then ask respondents to estimate the size of the Christian population. While Muslims generally overestimated the size of the Christian population, we find that Muslims who felt a greater sense of threat estimated the Christian population to be significantly larger at both the national and provincial levels. This finding provides new insights on the directionality of the relationship between the widely acknowledged connection between threat and demographic misperceptions.