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Flower of Endurance: An Ethnography of Opium’s Untold Role in Iran’s Capitalist Margins

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2025

Amir Khorasani*
Affiliation:
Anthropology and Cultural Research, Bremen University, Bremen, Germany
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Abstract

This ethnographic study reassesses the role of opium in Iran’s economic landscape, challenging dominant narratives that frame opium users as unproductive and burdensome. Based on fieldwork conducted between 2010 and 2018 in the Pars Special Economic Energy Zone (PSEEZ), the research examines how construction workers use opium to endure and enhance productivity under extreme environmental and economic pressures. It critiques a century-long anti-opium discourse—rooted in the Iranian Constitutional Movement (1905–1911) and perpetuated through shifting regimes of criminalization and medicalization—that consistently associates opium use with economic idleness. Through autoethnographic reflection and archival analysis, the article first outlines this dominant discourse, then constructs a counternarrative in which laborers deliberately integrate opium into their daily practices to sustain bodily performance and contribute to Iran’s petroindustrial expansion. Described as “narco-nomad science,” this practice enables the formation of resilient working bodies and repositions opium as an active agent within circuits of capitalist production. Drawing on actor-network theory and assemblage thinking, the study foregrounds the material agency of opium. It offers new analytical frameworks for understanding its role in labor, infrastructure, and the political economy of the PSEEZ.

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© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Association for Iranian Studies.

“No one knows what to do with drugs, not even the users. But no one knows how to talk about them either.”Footnote 1

Opium question

In his gripping memoir Opium: The Diary of His Cure, famed French artist Jean Cocteau presents a striking metaphor that compares life to an “express train racing toward death.”Footnote 2 He depicts smoking opium as disembarking from this high-speed train before it reaches its inevitable destination—death—essentially viewing opium as a means to escape the confines of both life and death. Neither wholly engaging in the movement and productivity of life nor yielding to the stillness and eternal rest of death, opium smoking creates a distinct realm separate from the life–death continuum, characterized by sluggishness and nonproductiveness.

As an artist who, like many of his peers, experienced opium habituation firsthand, Cocteau’s introspective account effectively represents the crux of contemporary discourse on opium. This discourse, as similarly echoed in the work of Edward Granville Browne, the influential British Iranologist, views opium as “the most potent, most sovereign, most seductive, and most enthralling master.”Footnote 3 Opium is seen as a manipulative force that ensnares and dominates its users by blunting their senses, promoting passivity, triggering hallucinations, and distorting their perception of linear time. In essence, the use of opium deprives individuals of the physical capacity required for productive activities, effectively rendering opium users incapable of generating economic value.Footnote 4

This study critiques this prevailing orthodoxy that underpins both Iranian and global discourse on opium, by revealing the often-overlooked productive role of regular opium users in generating surplus value. Drawing on ethnographic research, I excavate a distinct mode of interaction between opium and laborers that not only empowers their productive capacity but also significantly contributes to the national economy. I examine the dynamics between regular opium users—deemed “addicts” in criminal terms and “abusers” in medical discourse —and the creation of surplus value through physical labor in Iranian industries.

Following an overview of the current state of Iranian scholarship on opium and clarifying the theoretical framework guiding this study in the remainder of the introduction, the paper is structured in two main sections. Each section is further subdivided into subsections to facilitate an exploration of the topic.

The first section, “The Unproductive Body As the Pillar of Opium Discourse,” argues that the enduring portrayal of opium habitual users as economically inert has profoundly influenced Iran’s legal, medical, and political spheres since the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911). The section opens with an autoethnographic reflection, sharing my experiences as a schoolboy in a small town in northern Iran during the 1980s and’90s. Through this personal lens, I explore how evolving narratives of opium in postrevolutionary Iran were mediated by the press, institutions, family life, and urban change. This reflection sets the stage for analyzing how the transition from criminalization to medicalization restructured policies and perceptions, yet consistently upheld one foundational belief: that opium addiction renders individuals unproductive. The section then turns to key historical episodes, beginning with the constitutional era (c. 1880s–1925), tracing an enduring anti-opium discourse that, despite ideological shifts across successive regimes, has remained anchored in a single claim: that opium undermines the ability of regular users to generate surplus value, therefore threatening national prosperity. I argue that from late nineteenth-century intellectuals to Ayatollah Khomeini and his contemporaries, the image of the “unproductive opium body” has served as a constant ideological motif—a tacit consensus that continues to structure dominant narratives.

In contrast, the second section, “Unearthing Productive Opium in the Margins,” challenges dominant narratives through ethnographic research conducted intermittently between 2010 and 2018 in the Pars Special Economic Energy Zone (PSEEZ), Iran’s flagship industrial project since the 1979 revolution. This section forms the core of the study, focusing on opium use among laborers during the construction phase of the PSEEZ. I begin by tracing overlooked histories of regular and productive opium users, drawing on archival sources, literature, and expert accounts to recover these marginalized practices. Then, I examine how construction-phase laborers in PSEEZ, working under severe environmental and economic stress, have cultivated a symbiotic relationship with opium. Shifting the focus from pathology to productivity, I explore how these laborers have crafted a unique form of “domesticated opium” to harness and channel its energy toward infrastructure production. This transformative process fosters resilient, productive bodies capable of generating sustainable surplus value. Additionally, it gives rise to a “narco-nomad science” among workers, focused on harnessing opium’s energy for infrastructure production. This practice centers on extracting opium’s energy, storing it within the body, and directing it toward building petroinfrastructure—a process that ensures remuneration for laborers and bolsters surplus for employers. It engenders a unique politics within the damaged environment. Finally, I revisit a couple of foundational concepts of political economy, suggesting how this material approach to opium can inspire new questions and challenges to traditional understandings of petrocapitalism and surplus generation.

Power, and the ontological turn in opium studies

In recent years, Iran’s postrevolutionary drug policies have come under closer scrutiny through qualitative research. Pioneering studies in this emerging field have shed light on the subject with ethnographic, sociological, and historical perspectives. Madani Qahfarrokhi traces the evolution of drug policies and the germination of novel ideas from the crucible of post-1979 debates.Footnote 5 Similarly, Christensen focuses on the interplay of drug use and civil society during Iran’s “reform era,” and Ghiabi delves deeper into the political undercurrents of drug dynamics, exploring how illicit substances become pawns in a grand game of state control.Footnote 6 Rahimipour Anāraki shifts the focus to the lived experiences of drug users, exploring the various methods of medicalization and criminalization.Footnote 7 Together, these works, often grounded in Foucauldian concepts such as biopower, crisis, apparatus, governmentality, medical gaze, and panopticon, have significantly advanced our understanding of the politics of drugs in postrevolutionary Iran. However, they frequently treat substances themselves—be they heroin, crystal meth, or opium—as passive mute partners, overlooking their agency in social and political life. This perspective reinforces the fetishization of opium and its users, perpetuating the familiar trope of the unproductive body and marginalizing a significant group: the productive laborers who regularly consume opium. In this oversight, critical literature reveals an uncritical blind spot, leaving unexplored the complex materiality of substance use that defies dominant commonsensical associations.

Recent work by Ghiabi moves away from this essentialist understanding of opium, seeking instead to trace its varied agencies across different contexts.Footnote 8 He insightfully describes “drugs” as “spirit-like commodities,” whose value emerges from a dynamic interplay of individual, psychological, social, cultural, economic, and medical factors. In a similar vein, his analysis of the role illicit drugs play in reshaping urban spaces in Iran highlights the distinct agency of different substances.Footnote 9 By exploring the “lifeworld of opium,”Footnote 10 Ghiabi aligns with the ontological or material turn in social science, a framework that resonates with the present study. Drawing inspiration from Latour’s actor-network theory (ANT)Footnote 11 and the “assemblage thinking” of Deleuze and Guattari,Footnote 12 this investigation charts the “ontological journey”Footnote 13 of opium among the laborers in the construction phase of PSEEZ. Far from being a static entity with immutable properties, opium reveals itself as a chameleon-like substance, its properties shifting as it traverses new terrains of experience. Rather than assuming fixed properties of substances, this approach investigates what substances become as they engage in various webs of relationships.Footnote 14

This ethnographic research unearths an unintuitive relationship: laborers forging partnerships with opium not to escape reality, but to amplify their productivity and generate increased “surplus value.” Such an approach liberates us from the shackles of anthropocentric analysis, which often relegates opium to the role of an inert, passive, “natural” substance.Footnote 15 Instead, I see the landscape, opium, and the human body as dynamic actors—“objects multiple”—that assemble various human and nonhuman elements to generate new properties and transform the actors around them.Footnote 16

In this paradigm, opium emerges as a substance poised for ontological metamorphosis, its essence shifting as it becomes embedded in diverse relational networks. Concurrently, the laboring body transcends traditional class boundaries, with the capacity to be influenced, “effectuated,” moved, and mobilized by an array of actors, human and nonhuman. Moreover, the landscape of PSEEZ is not merely a passive backdrop for the interactions between opium and laborers. Instead, it is an actor that collaborates with other actors, playing a significant role in shaping the assemblage.

Per the assemblage approach and ANT, the unit of analysis is the assemblage or network, rather than individual actors. Here I investigate how various actors come together and become networked, thereby acquiring new properties. In the second part, I concentrate on the dynamism between landscape, laborers, opium, their accommodation, the economic landscape, and climate to understand how these elements are assembled and transformed in ways that render opium productive.

The unproductive body as the pillar of opium discourse

Growing up with the opium discourse in the 1980s and 90s

It is a little hazy now, but I can still recall the first time the word “opium” popped up in my life. It was during a heated debate between my grandfather and aunt in the mid-1980s when I was just a kindergartner. Grandpa staunchly defended opium’s rejuvenating effects for the elderly, waving off the typical warnings as “hogwash.” Meanwhile, Auntie’s voice shook with concern as she pleaded with him, trying to steer him away from the hazards that opium might unleash on our family. It was not until years down the road that I started to understand where my grandfather was coming from: he was part of a generation that still saw opium as something of value, especially among rice farmers, not just for a bit of leisure but also to ease the pain of ailments like osteoarthritis.

A few years later, in the late 1980s, in our neighborhood, a suburb of a northern Iranian town, we kids found an odd source of entertainment. With great amusement, we would ironically imitate not a hero or role model, but Ā-Taqi, an opium-addled character from a government-sponsored cautionary show.Footnote 17 His slurred speech, stumbling steps, hunched posture, and sluggish movements were like a symphony of dysfunction, the very image of opium’s destructive impact on the body. He was a walking billboard for disaster—ruined finances, legal troubles, public disgrace, family turmoil, and a bleak future.

The image of opium as a harbinger of doom was deeply woven into the fabric of our daily lives. School textbooks subtly blamed the failures of the Qajar and Pahlavi monarchs on their opium-induced stupor. Our muʿallem-e parvareshi, the educational mentor known for his lengthy lectures on proper youth conduct in the postrevolutionary era, frequently cited Ashraf Pahlavi, the charismatic twin sister of the last shah, as an example. Her alleged involvement in narcotics trafficking and use was held up as emblematic of the previous regime’s moral decay and political corruption. Television broadcasts often featured police and politicians urging citizens to report opium-related offenders—both dealers and users—to purge society of their “parasitic” presence and channel them into prison for rehabilitation. Reports of executions were widespread for individuals labeled sodāgarān-e marg (death merchants)—those accused of trafficking opium—with some executions even carried out publicly in the main square of our town.Footnote 18

Back in our neighborhood, I recall my uncle and his soccer pals pointing out an addict near their playing field, invoking the name of some Chinese bigwig—who I’d later learn was Mao Zedong—and lamenting the Iranian government’s failure to deliver a “final solution.” They yearned for a day when the government would resolutely “cast all opium addicts into the sea,” their words laced with a fire that sent shivers down my young spine. I conjured up vivid images of a police officer hurling Ā-Taqi from a boat into the turbulent waters, his frail limbs no match for the crashing waves.

These haunting images and sentiments were etched into my impressionable psyche. So, when the government later announced plans to send addicts to a remote island in the Persian Gulf, I was not shocked.Footnote 19 Religious preachers, parents, and media outlets all reinforced the same message, branding opium users as unproductive, pleasure-seeking, and irresponsible parasites. The sight of addicts being arrested on the streets, coupled with hushed family conversations about loved ones who had fallen into opium’s grip, only cemented this communal understanding of the drug among the neighborhood kids. Religious preachers, parents, and media all drove home the same message, branding opium users as irresponsible, unproductive parasites. The sight of addicts being arrested on the streets, coupled with hushed family conversations mourning loved ones caught in the grip of opium, only reinforced and solidified the understanding of the neighborhood kids about the drug.

During the late 1990s, as I progressed through high school, a perceptible shift began to reshape societal attitudes toward those previously condemned as ill-willed, parasitic opium addicts. At our neighborhood park, where we had grown accustomed to witnessing furtive exchanges between opium dealers and their clientele, an unexpected metamorphosis unfolded. A group of self-proclaimed addicts, who became known as the “NA guys,”Footnote 20 began gathering regularly, heralding a transformative moment in societal perceptions of addiction and treatment. The changes observed at the park extended to medical facilities, as the emergence of the “Center for Substance Abuse Treatment” signs initially baffled the public.

Furthermore, the language employed by medical professionals in these centers, and more notably, the sudden influx of opium addicts seeking treatment, evoked widespread bewilderment and astonishment. Indeed, the terminology of opium use experienced a seismic shift, replacing traditional labels such as “addicts” with “patients,” “addiction” with “abuse,” “rehabilitation” with “treatment,” and “purging” with “harm reduction.” Consequently, official and increasingly medicalized discourse ceased to label opium users as parasites or lazy, instead acknowledging them as social victims or patients grappling with substance abuse.

This evolution marked a significant departure from criminalization and a turn toward medicalization, fundamentally altering the discourse surrounding addiction and its implications for society. As these shifts gained momentum, institutions adapted, and people’s attitudes toward substance use began to change, gradually supplanting the entrenched, criminalized narratives of the past.

However, one fundamental principle stubbornly endured: both criminalization and medicalization rhetoric persisted in viewing regular opium users as unproductive and incapable of generating value. Neither the condemned criminal nor the care-seeking patient was regarded as a productive workforce member. Except for the elderly or those afflicted with severe illnesses, who were categorized as inherently unproductive, every other user became subject to criminal condemnation or the “medical gaze.” The cornerstone of both narratives lies in the belief that opium’s debilitating effects on the workforce impede the national economy’s growth potential. This perceived hindrance to the generation of surplus value and the nation’s prosperity underpins both perspectives, despite the evolution of societal attitudes toward addiction and the shift toward medicalization.

Fixed motif amid fluxing narratives

In the modern era, opium has been relegated to moral ambiguity due to its perceived nonproductiveness, contrasting sharply with “drug foods” like sugar, coffee, and tea, which have been embraced for their role in enhancing labor discipline and supporting global capitalism.Footnote 21 This perception of opium originated not in countries like Iran or China, where opium use was widespread, but in Western rhetoric. In the nineteenth century, Western attitudes toward opium were complex and contradictory. The Western imagination oscillated between romanticizing Oriental pleasures and denouncing them as sinful.Footnote 22 This ambivalence was particularly evident in the British colonial context. Colonial administrators grappled with a significant moral and economic dilemma: how to profit from the lucrative opium trade while simultaneously protecting their own population from its addictive effects.Footnote 23 These complexities ultimately led the West to demonize opium and seek to eliminate any uncontrollable sources of nonproductiveness from society. The discourse that emerged linked opium inextricably to the “Oriental other,” associating it with Eastern ethics and mysticism in ways that often said more about Western preoccupations than about the realities of opium use in other societies.Footnote 24

However, opium discourse in Iran was shaped by different forces, articulated by the early twentieth-century modernist reformers involved in the Iranian Constitutional Movement. Although these reformers drew upon Western ideals,Footnote 25 their stance on opium was far from a simple emulation of their Western counterparts. Instead, it was deeply rooted in the distinct realities of their homeland. In a nation where opium use was widespread, these reformers recognized that the eradication of the substance was not merely a public health necessity but a vital part of their grander vision of national renewal. To them, the war against opium was an existential struggle, essential to their broader perspective of a transformed Iran: to sculpt a modern state and a productive national economy from a nation plagued by widespread opium use and its debilitating effects, among other difficulties.

For over a century, Iran has grappled with one of the world’s largest populations of opium users. As part of the Golden Crescent, alongside Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran witnessed a dramatic surge in opium consumption in the late nineteenth century, catalyzed by the introduction of the opium pipe (vafur) and an unparalleled boom in opium farming and trade.Footnote 26 As the nineteenth century ended, the rise in opium consumption extended far beyond its traditional roles in medicine and recreation. Opium’s reach was vast and indiscriminate. It engulfed nearly all social strata, from merchants to beggars, military personnel to clergy, and even the royal court. Its presence was ubiquitous, found in opium dens, coffeehouses, streets, bazaars, barracks, and homes. Iranian reformists of the time grew increasingly concerned by this nationwide narcotic panorama. In their eyes, opium had forfeited its age-old status as a “normative element” within Iranian society.Footnote 27 Formerly treasured for its multifaceted utility—as an effective pain reliever, a profitable cash crop, a wellspring of poetic creativity, or even an aphrodisiac, and more—opium had morphed into a menacing substance, a national catastrophe, or as Azarkhosh termed it in the mid-twentieth century, a “plague of life.”Footnote 28

Frustrated by how opium had seeped into every corner of society and how dependent the economy had become on it, reformists painted it as the enemy of a modern, thriving nation. From that point forward, a rare consensus shaped among Iran’s reformists and politicians—whether modernist, Islamist, or socialist. Despite their different visions for Iran’s future, they all saw opium as a major roadblock to their dreams of building a productive, industrialized, and sovereign nation rooted in law and justice. The substance’s entrenched associations with lethargy, nonproductiveness, indifference, and capriciousness starkly opposed their vision of national progress. Over the past century and continuing to the present day, the aspiration for a broad, disciplined, and productive labor force to construct an ideal society has been in continuous conflict with the unremitting sway of opium.

Hassan Sotoudeh’s analysis of opium addiction in 1940s Iran provides a compelling example of how the discourse on opium articulates the above conflict. Sotoudeh, a leading legal economist and technocrat, questioned the prevailing notion that only 8 percent of Iranians (around 800,000–900,000 individuals) were addicted to opium. Despite limited data, he argued that the drug’s impact was far more pervasive and detrimental, affecting not just the individual but the nation’s economy. By focusing on adult male addicts over the age of twenty, Sotoudeh estimated that a staggering quarter of the “active population”—the crucial labor force driving Iran’s economy—was incapacitated by opium addiction. This troubling assessment underscored the profound economic consequences of widespread addiction, emphasizing the urgent need for targeted interventions to mitigate the issue.Footnote 29

Although Sotoudeh’s analysis dates to the 1940s, his articulation of the economic consequences of opium addiction represents the prevailing perspective shared by reformists both before and after his time. The echoes of his insights can be found resonating across a diverse array of media, including novels, poetry, historical texts, political pamphlets, and more. This deep consensus on the detrimental impact of opium stands in stark contrast to the reformists’ frequent divergence regarding the root causes of its rampant prevalence within Iranian society.

In this vein, Zeyn al-Ābedin Maraghei, a pioneering Iranian reformist from the fin de siècle, expressed in his widely recognized travel diary his belief that the rampant opium use among Iranians is rooted in “the very marrow of their being, which is fashioned by a proclivity for indolence and slacking.”Footnote 30 In 1908, the Constitutionalist physician Adib al-Ḥukamā elevated the issue, wielding sarcasm to brand addicts as “opiated reactionaries”—willful accomplices to despotism—and “socialist voluptuaries” engaged in a covert assault on Iran’s freedom fighters.Footnote 31 Poet laureate Mohammad-Taqi Bahār’s verses (c. 1910) joined the chorus of condemnation, portraying opium users not merely as societal burdens, but as threats to the motherland’s very essence. Others, like the outspoken satirist poet Iraj Mirzā, went so far as to mockingly label opium users as “indolent” individuals in the “greater Jihad of life, which is indeed defecation.”Footnote 32 Yet in the mid-1940s modernist journalist Kuhi Kermāni, a disciple of Bahār, went beyond merely attributing blame to individuals for their opium use. Kuhi Kermāni dedicated an entire historical book to the subject, framing opium as a “social affliction” that threatened Iran’s modern transformation. He condemned opium dens as “centers of corruption,” portraying addicts as hindrances to developing new social and political ordersFootnote 33—a stark contrast to the progressive Iran that Kermāni and his fellow reformists sought to construct.

Throughout the years, this perception endured across generations and political regimes, despite the evolution of antidrug policies from criminalization to medicalization and harm reduction. The underlying narrative of unproductive opium users remained constant, echoing the essence of Sotoudeh’s analysis: the inevitable link between regular opium use, unproductive labor, and detrimental effects on the national economy.

The same motif continued during the proliferated narratives produced during the reign of the second king of the Pahlavi dynasty. Health Minister Jahanshah Saleh, the architect of the 1955 policy to ban opium cultivation, lamented that, in an era when Iran was striving to embrace Western ideals and project itself as an enlightened, modernizing nation, opium persisted as “a shameful remnant of a dark Oriental past,” hindering the nation’s progress toward modernization.Footnote 34 Similarly, scholars like McLaughlin, surveying Iran’s drug policy in 1976, echoed Saleh’s sentiments by attributing the country’s drug abuse epidemic to deep-seated cultural disparities.Footnote 35

Yet this view was far from universal. Early psychoscientists, as Schayegh notes, proffered an alternative perspective, positing that the siren call of opium stemmed not from some intrinsic “Iranian culture,” but rather from the relentless pressures of modern life.Footnote 36 Others still sought to place the origins of addiction in different quarters, attributing it either to a more nebulous notion of “diseased willpower”Footnote 37 or to the social deprivations—such as life in the slums, poverty, lack of education, and broken homes—that left individuals particularly vulnerable to the lure of opium.

The 1979 revolution ushered in a seismic shift in every aspect of drug life. Revolutionary leaders, officials, and clergy recast addiction as an urgent politico-religious issue, painting it as a “satanic trap,” a nefarious conspiracy orchestrated by the “corrupt” Pahlavi regime and imperialist powers to corrupt Iran’s youth. Mohammad Sādegh Khalkhali, Iran’s first hākem-e shar’ (leading state prosecutor), invoked this rhetoric to justify draconian sentences against drug offenders, attributing drug distribution to “the satanic and dividing hands of Imperialism and social imperialism.”Footnote 38 In this new rhetoric, opium transcended its status as a mere social ill or economic burden; it became a weapon aimed at the very heart of Iran’s revolutionary fervor. Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolution’s first supreme leader, elevated the stakes further. In a public address ten months postrevolution, he declared that “saving an addict is not only saving a person, but it also equates to saving Islam.”Footnote 39 With these words, he transmuted the fight against addiction into a matter of profound religious significance. Khomeini’s subsequent unprecedented fatwa, issued just before the revolution’s first anniversary, branded drug smuggling and trafficking as haram (forbidden) under Islamic jurisprudence.Footnote 40 In response to this reimagined threat, a new government apparatus emerged, its mission to rescue society from its misled youth. This shift in perception led to a range of policies, from harsh criminalization to more nuanced medicalization approaches, each reflecting the complex and evolving understanding of addiction in postrevolution Iran—as briefly mentioned in my childhood memories and explained in detail by scholars of the field.Footnote 41

This brief, selective review shows how, since the early twentieth century, the anti-opium campaign in Iran saw numerous explanations emerge for widespread opium use, alongside the implementation of various policies with differing rationales and levels of efficacy. Over this time, political regimes changed, new scientific disciplines entered the fray, public opinion evolved, and global addiction science underwent paradigmatic changes. Yet, among all these fluctuations, one central theme persisted unwaveringly: the enduring association of opium users with nonproductiveness. This persistent link reinforced the idea of the habitual opium user as inherently unproductive, a figure ultimately impeding economic progress. Just as all roads lead to Rome, so these various explanations converge upon Hasan Sotoudeh’s exemplary analysis.

Unearthing productive opium at margins

“We don’t even know what a body is capable of, we prattle on about the soul and the mind and we don’t know what a body can do.”Footnote 42

Traces of the productive regular opium user

Production is a broad concept, with applications spanning various fields. The discourse on opium recognizes opium agencies in certain fields of production. For instance, opium has long been associated with the generation of dreams, artistic inspiration, and spirituality. An extensive body of literature exists on this aspect of production, spanning diverse fields such as literature, psychoanalysis, and history. Some notable examples include Thomas De Quincey attributing the authorship of his book to opium’s “marvelous agency”;Footnote 43 Nigel Leask’s exploration of colonial objects like opium acting as “psychotropic technology” for British Romantic writers;Footnote 44 Ankhi Mukherjee’s examination of the legacy of dream writers in the nineteenth century;Footnote 45 and Jason Mohaghegh’s reflections on opium and its paraphernalia in Sadegh Hedayat’s seminal novel The Blind Owl.Footnote 46 Even Edward Browne recounts opium’s role in fostering spirituality among Iranian dervishes.Footnote 47

However, in this study, the focus is exclusively on producing value through physical labor. The discourse on opium readily embraces opium’s role in dream or artistic production, yet unequivocally rejects the notion of regular opium users as productive laborers, asserting that the substance renders them unproductive. Despite being ignored by opium discourse, there exists substantial, albeit dispersed, evidence that contradicts the prevailing discourse, suggesting that some long-term opium users are indeed productive, if not hyperproductive, in their physical labor. More importantly, significant economic sectors in Iran, and likely elsewhere, have been highly dependent on opium-induced laborers and the energy that opium releases in their bodies.

Reflecting on the historical accounts provided by RegavimFootnote 48 and Matthee,Footnote 49 which detail the widespread use of opium among those engaged in farming and trading the substance, a thought-provoking question arises: do those immersed in opium farming or workshops, accustomed to its effects, truly transform into unproductive bodies? What can be said about Courtwright’s documentation of Chinese chair-bearers, boatmen, and laborers who were intimately involved with opium? Or the British official’s assertion, recounted by Courtwright, that “the opium-smoking coolie is probably as reliable a workman as any in the world,”Footnote 50 and Westermeyer’s report of a “vigorous woman” who labored “harder than two women” despite her using morning opium “pepper-upper” for decades?Footnote 51 Moreover, were the Chinese laborers using opium regularly in the early twentieth-century United States genuinely unproductive bodies?Footnote 52 There exists a myriad of similar cases.

In present-day Iran, this phenomenon similarly invites scrutiny. Iranian experts and authorities assert that the country contends with an above-average prevalence of opium-addicted laborers. Official Rapid Situation Assessment (RSA) reportsFootnote 53 and several other accounts caution against the growing prevalence of opium use across numerous labor sectors.Footnote 54 Agahi and Spencer further emphasize opium’s function as a work enhancer during periods of high seasonal demand, such as rice planting.Footnote 55 In my interviews, Mohammad Bināzādeh, an activist and addiction medicine specialist, has stressed the pressing challenge of an opium epidemic within industries such as steel, oil, and fishing. Similarly, Abbās Deylamizādeh, CEO of Rebirth Charity Society, has illuminated the long-standing custom of laborers who have consumed opium for decades. Even among the urban middle class, opium discourse transcends cautionary narratives, with memories of habitual opium use of everyday figures like drivers, shopkeepers, masons, and plumbers fostering a sense of nostalgia.

In this context, it is not my intention to delve into the reasons behind the repression or silencing of the history of productive opium users. Such an endeavor would require comprehensive historical research and meticulous discourse analysis. However, it is worth briefly acknowledging the theoretical constraints that have hindered even seasoned scholars from effectively addressing this significant topic.

An industrial gathering

In the 1990s, off the coast of the Persian Gulf, southwest of Bushehr Province, Iranian experts unearthed a treasure trove of gas: part of the world’s largest nonassociated gas reservoir, a direct extension of Qatar’s renowned North Field. It marked a watershed moment, a seismic shift resonating within the national and international energy market.Footnote 56

By 1998, this discovery gave rise to the sprawling behemoth PSEEZ, which spanned over 100 kilometers and encompassed four towns across a massive 45,000 hectares.Footnote 57 Asaluyeh County, once a humble abode for 30,000 mostly Sunni fishers and farmers, metamorphosed into a bustling gateway for dynamic trade within the PSEEZ, symbolizing a shift from “dirty oil” to “clean gas,” national wealth, and job opportunities. As Ashtiani Iraqi put it, it was not just a town anymore; it had evolved into Iran’s economic capital.Footnote 58 In 2011, Iran’s supreme leader ramped up the national significance of the project, cheering on Asaluyeh’s dedicated workers, painting their efforts as an “economic Jihad for the cause of Allah.”Footnote 59 Asaluyeh epitomized what Hetherington terms the “promissory nature of infrastructure.”Footnote 60

As we entered the early 2000s, PSEEZ left an indelible mark on the region’s landscape and workforce dynamics. Two thousand non-Iranian staff and an equal number of petroleum ministry officials flooded the zone,Footnote 61 enjoying decent benefits, ranging from state-provided accommodations to secure contracts and generous compensation. However, the backbone of PSEEZ’s labor force comprised the construction workers, a formidable group of 60,000 to 80,000 individuals with diverse skill levels, bound by three-month contracts subject to renewal at the employer’s discretion.Footnote 62

Aligned with the onset of the state’s neoliberal policies, the oil industry, traditionally a pioneer in constructing company towns in energy hubs, took a different turn in the postwar 1990s.Footnote 63 PSEEZ significantly reflected this shift, with the oil ministry eschewing plans for family-centric towns, reserving housing solely for its officials and managers. The rhythm of life for the laborers followed a unique beat: twenty days of labor followed by a ten-day break each month.Footnote 64 However, many laborers often forewent breaks, choosing overtime, eschewing family engagement due to opium habituation, or simply saving on travel expenses.

Comrade opium

In June 2012, near an industrial site in Asaluyeh, I first encountered Kamal amid a heated confrontation with two young laborers who had just purchased heroin. With fervor blazing in his eyes, Kamal railed against the drug, condemning it as a ticket to a parasitic existence and a forewarning of a grim future. Despite apologies from his younger colleagues, Kamal’s tirade continued unabated. He seized the heroin and scattered its powder into the air. Calming slightly, he remarked, “Here in Asaluyeh, opium lays the bricks, but heroin knocks the whole thing down.” His stance was not just anti-heroin; it was an unexpected advocacy for opium.

After the dispute, I followed Kamal to the workers’ camp. Introduced by a mutual friend, I learned that Kamal was a respected laborer who could provide insights into the daily lives of his peers. Despite his robust appearance and commanding presence, the weariness etched on his sunken cheeks and pallid complexion betrayed a stark contradiction. His eloquent speech and vigilant demeanor stood in sharp contrast to the toll of a decade entrenched in opium’s grip, marking his thirty-four years.

Entering the camp, one encountered an amateurish Persian calligraphy sign adorning a worker’s unit, proclaiming, “Opium is our comrade in tough times.” My astonishment prompted a seasoned laborer, deeply immersed in opium’s embrace for nearly a decade, to interpret its meaning. “What do you want from a comrade, huh? Someone to stick by you in this crazy life? Well, opium’s our constant companion, whether we’re grinding at work or chilling out for some leisure. It steps in for our folks, the little ones, and the missus. So, what do you want from a comrade? A bit of solace? Heck, I even spill my guts on my opium dose.”

In this enclave of shared struggles, opium reigned supreme, disregarding illegality and societal disapproval. Abundantly available and seamlessly integrated into the workers’ routines, opium was a constant presence. “There is more opium than you can shake a stick at,” remarked one worker. Whether enjoyed at night or during strenuous hours at the construction site, workers openly indulged—puffing on the substance in abandoned kiosks or welding atop towering posts.

Within the industrial realm, opium gained tacit approval, with employers and security forces often turning a blind eye or subtly endorsing its use. A security member at a refinery admitted, “Everybody respects opium here,” revealing a disconcerting reality.Footnote 65 However, this respect extended exclusively to opium; other narcotics faced rejection. Heroin or amphetamine users were viewed skeptically; their presence met with the anticipation that they would inevitably depart the industrious community. A loader driver emphasized, “No way to leash the shisheh [Iranian crystal meth]; it turns you into its little pet.”

Studies conducted elsewhere suggest that drug-using employees are more prone to requesting time off and face an increased risk of on-the-job accidents.Footnote 66 However, in the absence of any reliable survey, both the working community and employers here held a firm belief that opium users exhibit higher discipline and productivity.

Mouse holes

In 2002, Kamal, a farmer turned semiskilled welder, traded his rural existence for the vibrant community of Asaluyeh. Upon arrival, he secured a modest house in Nakhl-Taqi village. As Kamal formed connections with his roommates, he was introduced to the euphoria of opium. Initially apprehensive about succumbing to addiction, he hesitated before ultimately yielding to the allure of the substance. As the pungent aroma of smoked opium pervaded the dwelling, it drew the ire of neighboring residents. Suspicions mounted, and tensions escalated, culminating in an untimely eviction notice issued by the landlord a mere six months after Kamal’s arrival.Footnote 67

In search of a new home, Kamal found himself in a contractor-built camp, joining thousands of fellow laborers squeezed into austere accommodations. Although engineers enjoyed comparatively spacious seventy-meter dwellings shared by four to six people, workers like Kamal were consigned to cramped thirty-meter quarters for an equal number of occupants. These meager lodgings, aptly nicknamed “mouse holes” by the workers, were charged with a lackluster atmosphere. Yet, they offered refuge from the unwelcoming urbanity of Asaluyeh, allowing Kamal and his cohorts to escape the tension, marginalization, and disdain that plagued their daily lives. Within the confines of these “mouse holes” opium’s euphoric embrace proved a powerful antidote to the laborers’ daily struggles. The potent substance instilled a sense of loquaciousness and heightened focus, dissolving the pervasive tension and guiding their bodies into a state of deep relaxation.

Within these seemingly lifeless lodgings, opium-fueled conversations, dubbed “nonsense therapy” by workers, transcended their surface-level function as a tension reliever. Although these exchanges may have appeared as mere gibberish to the uninitiated, they embodied a deeper significance as a form of “phatic labor,” a term coined by Julia Elyachar.Footnote 68 Amid seemingly nonsensical banter, the workers strategized job prospects, devised plans to secure higher wages, and navigated challenges posed by demanding supervisors. By shrouding these conversations in the semiotics of opium-infused discourse, the workers effectively transformed their confined, opium-laden gatherings into active, productive spaces. Their crumpled bodies, huddled in the cramped flats, were reconfigured as dynamic agents of phatic labor, forging a vital cybernetic infrastructure that underpinned their collective economic survival.

Aspirational body

Despite Kamal’s sobering accounts of the grueling toil in PSEEZ, the project remained deeply enticing for his fellow villagers, many of whom harbored a strong desire to tread Kamal’s path. With few opportunities beyond small workshops or declining agriculture, their aspirations reached far beyond their circumstances. With hopeful eyes fixed on corporate giants, they sought a more stable horizon. “Asaluyeh might be tough, but we were confident in fattening our wallets,” declared Reza, Kamal’s cousin, who joined the venture three years later. Their unwavering objective: break free from the shackles of their class through intensive, short-term labor in PSEEZ.

Zooming out to the macro level, Behdad and Nomani’s research highlighted a striking “fragmentation of the workforce” in the post-2000 era, echoing a trend from 1976 to 2006. Although the Iranian working class ballooned from 3.6 million to 6.2 million, their employment share dwindled. The petite bourgeoisie and middle class expanded, leading to a diffusion of the working class across a multitude of small enterprises.Footnote 69 The “concentration ratio” plummeted from 16.3 in 1976 to 3.1 in 2006, illustrating the profound disintegration of laborers and curtailing of laborers’ bargaining power.Footnote 70 The postwar transformation of labor laws in Iran also had detrimental implications for worker bargaining power. Key among these changes was the exclusion of special economic zones (such as PSEEZ) and small-size workshops from crucial labor protections. As a result, short-term contracts became increasingly prevalent, with 80 to 95 percent of Iranian workers subject to these precarious arrangements.Footnote 71

Kamal’s circumstances paralleled the broader labor dynamics in the region, as workers grappled with a challenging decision that would shape their futures. Despite the absence of legal distinctions in job security between local workshops and the PSEEZ, individuals like Kamal were faced with a stark choice: remain in their hometowns for less demanding work but endure low wages, or journey to the inhospitable environment of PSEEZ in pursuit of more lucrative, yet arduous, mid-term employment. The prospect of the so-called harsh and high-paid jobs in PSEEZ held a powerful allure for the labor force, as workers were caught amid economic deregulation and an inflation rate surpassing 30 percent. Their ambition soared; after years in PSEEZ, they dreamed of outpacing inflation and launching their own business in their hometown—an aspiration once deemed impossible.

The optimism among Asaluyeh’s laborers was distilled into a straightforward formula: endure a harsh job, earn high pay, and devise a strategy to outpace the unrelenting inflation rate. The rationale was clear: confront adversity, secure competitive wages, and, within a decade, amass sufficient resources to launch an enterprise or acquire valuable assets. In their minds, it was a grueling race against inflation, and their sole objective was to muster the energy necessary to surpass its unyielding momentum—and opium surfaced as the oil for their engines.

As time wore on, the unrelenting uniformity of daily life began to erode the initial optimism felt by many workers. Boredom crept into every facet of their existence, sapping the once-vibrant hope that had accompanied their arrival at PSEEZ. The monotony of work routines and the idle hours spent in the confines of the camp blurred together, creating a seemingly endless cycle of sameness that pervaded even the most mundane aspects of their lives. From the unchanging uniforms to the never-varying tools wielded in their labor, and from the shared spaces inhabited by familiar roommates to the repetitive daily objects that filled their world, the once-novel environment of PSEEZ gradually lost its luster. It summoned daydreams of a distant utopia: leisure, a sense of family, female companionship, and urban spaces shimmering like a mirage. Visual perception was fixated on a repetitive tableau: faces blending into a flickering collage of heat, humidity, and pollution. Audio perception numbed to the industrial cacophony during uptime and a chorus of humdrum voices during downtime—a sensory haze cocooned in a monochrome world of dullness. The landscape unfolded as a dusty expanse punctuated by imposing industrial structures, machinery, and sheds, with boredom saturating every corner of the repetitive scenery. The numbing cycle of monotony echoed Kierkegaard’s “demonic pantheism,” an all-encompassing system devoid of individual meaning or purpose.Footnote 72

In this milieu, opium emerges as a gateway to transcend the pervasive ennui, enhancing emotional processing plasticity by stimulating dopamine release in the brain’s reward system through opioids. This influx of dopamine counters abyssal emptiness, amplifying the allure of otherwise mundane pursuits.Footnote 73 The laborers regularly mentioned those who abandoned PSEEZ, ill-prepared in the face of this boredom.

Here, opium redirects and distorts desires. Acting as a hypotensive agent, it steers users toward sweet indulgence, quelling hunger and relieving laborers of food preparation burdens. Prolonged use also decreased libido noticeably, advantageous where female companionship was sparse.Footnote 74 Although conventional discourse on opium often asserts that it distracts users from the rhythm of daily life, in this context, opium instead acclimatizes them to the mundane cadence of production, profoundly reshaping their phenomenological experience.

Sizzling bodies

My initial encounter with Asaluyeh’s landscape occurred at midnight, as I journeyed by taxi from the airport toward the town. The pungent aroma of sulfur hung heavy in the air, an olfactory assault that foreshadowed the complex tapestry of experiences that awaited me. Amid the sensory overload, the captivating spectacle of the gas flares first captured my gaze. Against the backdrop of the darkened landscape, these brilliant fiery trails of flares appeared as beacons of promise, their luminous dance an alluring symbol of industrial progress.

As I delved deeper, however, the initial allure of these fiery sentinels gave way to a stark realization: the gas flares, lacking the requisite refining filters, perpetually spewed forth a toxic concoction of gases. The spectacle that had captivated me with awe and boundless possibility on that first night was soon overshadowed by an unmistakable atmosphere of decadence and decay.

In my interactions with local experts, I discovered that this dichotomy of emotions, the tenacious determination for progress and the oppressive weight of degradation, was a recurring theme. The environment itself seemed to foster this internal conflict, as the workers grappled with the grim reality of their circumstances while clinging to the flickering hope that their efforts might someday bear fruit.

It was within this crucible of contrasting emotions that opium emerged as a vital lifeline for the laborers. By subtly reshaping their phenomenological experience, the substance offered a means of reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable, tempering the harsh realities of their existence while nurturing their dreams of a brighter future. As the workers navigated the treacherous terrain of their daily lives, opium became an indispensable ally, a biochemical balm that granted them the fortitude to carry on amid the twin specters of hope and despair.

Asaluyeh, a coastal strip wedged between the towering Zagros mountains and the vast expanse of the Persian Gulf, presented a climate of unparalleled hostility. Here, the very air seemed to conspire against human endurance. From March to mid-November, the mercury routinely soared past 45 degrees Celsius and humidity levels often exceeded 90 percent, creating an atmosphere that clung to the skin like a suffocating shroud. In this unforgiving realm, the human body was pushed to its limits, with hyperthermia lurking as a constant threat. Heatstroke, exhaustion, and muscle cramps were not mere possibilities but daily realities for the workers who toiled under the merciless sun. The challenges intensified for those who scaled the towering structures that punctuated the landscape. Each climb became a Herculean feat, a battle against gravity and the relentless heat that sapped strength and resolve in equal measures. The land itself seemed to wither under the sun’s assault, with annual rainfall dwindling to a mere 240 millimeters over two decades, leaving the earth parched and gasping.Footnote 75

Yet it was not just the natural elements that assailed the senses in Asaluyeh. The air was thick with a noxious blend of industrial fumes, transforming the atmosphere into something infernal. This pollution, a toxic cocktail of gas well emissions, ammonia, and urea, wrapped the region in a shroud of contamination. The once-vibrant waters of the Persian Gulf now bore silent testimony to this ecological disaster, their marine life tainted by accumulating heavy metals.Footnote 76

The human toll of this environmental catastrophe was equally stark. Respiratory ailments surged among the populace, with asthma cases skyrocketing and the specter of lung cancer looming large. Asaluyeh’s notoriety as one of the world’s most polluted regions—with air reportedly a hundred times more contaminated than Tehran—spoke volumes of the ecological nightmare unfolding along this narrow coastal strip.

Additionally, economic sanctions against Iran have significantly exacerbated the manifold forms of pollution that plague the region. By rapid currency devaluation and impeding access to the crucial resources and technologies required to monitor and mitigate the impact of industrial contamination, these sanctions have contributed to the ongoing ecological crisis that now engulfs Asaluyeh and its people.Footnote 77

The convergence of heightened humidity, scarce rainfall, soaring temperatures, heat-radiating materials, and a toxic environment marred by poisonous air, contaminated soil, and polluted water has ushered in a new ecological reality, leading to a chemically altered molecular composition of the ecosystem, specifically for laborers. This transformative confluence of different factors signaled the dawn of what Murphy termed “alterlife”: a state of existence marked by an intimate entanglement of life-forms with the infrastructure that both sustained and imperiled them, a kind of “enmeshment and enfleshment in infrastructures.”Footnote 78 As the boundaries between the natural and the man-made blurred, a symbiosis emerged—a dance of resilience and adaptation in the face of adversity.

In this harsh milieu, opium emerged as a comrade in the laborers’ fight for survival. By inhibiting the transmission of pain signals along neural pathways and subtly reshaping perception, the substance fortified the resilience of those workers using opium in this unforgiving landscape. As a biochemical response to the inescapable entrapment of life on a damaged planet, opium offered a lifeline, a means of coping with the unrelenting environmental challenges and nurturing a unique symbiotic bond between the laborers and their embattled surroundings.

Domesticated opium

In the realm of PSEEZ, opium takes on a unique guise—a “domesticated opium,” as Kamal astutely terms it: a far cry from the “flower of evil”Footnote 79 of urban middle-class society. Consider the daily tribulations of Kamal: at the break of dawn, he awakens in a cramped camp room, inhaling the nation’s most polluted air before even partaking of breakfast. As he hurries to catch the company transport, the unrelenting sun and omnipresent toxins join forces to exacerbate the toxicity that fills his lungs. By 8:30, Kamal finds himself perched a hundred meters above the ground, welding in sweltering heat and stifling humidity. His dreams of financial stability are at odds with the unforgiving reality of his situation, and the physical demands of his work obstruct any attempts at clear thinking. Troubles with his employer loom large, and the prospect of contract extensions weighs heavily on his mind. Amid these struggles, Kamal grapples with myriad life considerations, from the longing for his distant fiancée to the urgent need to save for a house deposit.

As the clock strikes ten, the oppressive heat and humidity take their toll, and Kamal’s thoughts dissipate. The unyielding sun, pervasive pollution, and the physical strain of his work demand that self-preservation become his priority. After enduring a grueling twelve-hour shift, Kamal withdraws to the camp, seeking refuge from the day’s trials while fortifying himself for the life challenges that await.

Upon sharing this account with a seasoned worker, one might elicit a wry smile and the sage counsel: “Ah, but you’ve overlooked the ‘poppy magic,’ my friend.” The allure of a harsh and high-paid job cannot be denied, and opium has become an integral component in maintaining that allure. Kamal nonchalantly washes down opium peas with his morning tea, seamlessly integrating the substance into the rhythm of his workday, and as dusk descends, partakes in a communal opium skewer session with his roommates.

Not for every laborer, but particularly for those single individuals entrenched in austere camps enduring the arduous grind of monotonous jobs like welding, driving, concrete placing, and rebar binding in this region, opium emerges as a comrade.Footnote 80 These tenacious individuals require bodies that can withstand a range of challenges, including humidity, scorching heat, boredom, emotional isolation, backbreaking toil, less-than-ideal living conditions, and prolonged exposure to air thick with pollutants—all the while battling against the unyielding march of inflation. Their mantra? “No midnight oil, no sweat, no toil”Footnote 81 echoes through the air when the conversation shifts to opium.

How did opium, the “flower of evil,” evolve into a comrade? When I probed Kamal on the rationale behind his encounters with opium, his response was stark: sans opium, he would have “no future” in PSEEZ. “I can only endure five hours of high-post welding, but with opium, I can soldier on for more than ten hours,” he asserted. His rationale defied my common sense of opium. His reasoning challenged conventional wisdom. I envisioned a scenario in which the sinister grasp of opium destroyed the promising futures of laborers. Yet, a closer look into the actual opium usage patterns among these workers unveiled a distinct material agency in this context.

Laborers eschewed opium pipes, deeming them too extravagant for their substantial consumption—no lethargic rituals in this domain. Instead, three contenders stepped into the arena: ingestion; “qolqoli” (employing an improvised hookah crafted from Coca-Cola bottles); and “Sikh-o-Sang” (heating opium on a skewer and inhaling the fume through a straw or rolled paper). Ingestion claimed the spotlight: an opium “pea” effortlessly consumed with tea or solo.

The grand mission: to forge a resilient body, impervious to challenges. A mentor assumed command to steer opium consumption in this resolute direction. Mentors were revered opium sages, maestro in both labor and opium finesse, adept at shepherding novices. Their charge: impart the art of attaining and maintaining the opium plateauFootnote 82 while mitigating its undesirable side effects. These sagacious mentors cautioned against premature ingestion, foreseeing the onslaught of nausea, gastric reflex, and acute constipation.

Now, step into the realm of Sikh-o-Sang, an accessible initiation in which the mentor guides novices through the art of inhaling vaporized opium from a rolled paper. In the initial stages, the novice should procure the opium directly from either the mentor or the recommended dealer. Due to variations in purity levels, opium may exhibit differing qualities when obtained from various dealers. The mentor, endowed with the discernment to ascertain opium’s purity and determine the optimal duration of baking, assumes a position of authority. As novices acclimatize themselves to the process, the mentor authorizes a gradual escalation in opium intake, progressing from a quarter to half a pill. Dietary counsel, incorporating plums, olive oil, and a long list of other remedies, aims to counteract constipation, complemented by guidance on fortifying physiological endurance through opium interaction. At a critical turning point, the journey of opium use plateaus, signaled by an adeptly calibrated dosage tailored to one’s unique tolerance. This phase occasionally encounters an impasse, entangled in the absence of a universal prescription, compounded by the novice’s reluctance to heed the mentor’s sagacious counsel.

In the early weeks, the mentor, a meticulous navigator, probes the worker’s well-being with a battery of questions, like a detailed medical check-up: “Nausea hitting you? Enough water intake? How’s your restroom frequency? Riding euphoria waves often? Is work efficiency intact? Enough sleep? Drowsiness or agitation plaguing you?” And so forth.

Mentor users tiptoe the tightrope, allowing opium quantities to dance on the edge of moderation. It all starts with a small “pea” of opium, with laborers graduating to skewers, inhaling opium whispers after lunch, rekindling consumption until evening’s embrace. Collective opium sessions, weekend dalliances with qolqoli, and post-work rituals are all meticulously regulated. Novice seekers are directed to pursue their mentor’s counsel, ensuring a sustained, functional engagement with opium even during furloughs, during which some keep the opium flame alive or dally in methadone for a few days.

This process entails mastering the discernment between prime opium and subpar varieties, understanding nuances of administration methods, adjusting opium dosages to reach the plateau, and, crucially, interpreting bodily reactions and symptoms. Once the novice learns to navigate the differing materiality of dealing with smuggled, nonstandardized opium, an unstable body, and an erratic environment, they can take control and advance. Not every laborer dares to venture into this realm, and not every enthusiast can gracefully navigate the plateau indefinitely. Some, seduced by the allure of heroin or higher doses, eventually recede from the opium and working scene. The crux lies in how the body learns to orchestrate opium’s energy in a harmonious symphony of productivity.

Kamal embarked on the opium odyssey in the village house, navigating opium seas without a mentor’s compass. Eventually, a fellow worker assumed the role of an opium mentor, guiding Kamal in refining his opium journey. He referred to this finesse as the “domestication of opium,” signifying a communal agreement in which individuals must align themselves with productive endeavors. Kamal’s roommate declared, “The opium should be your pet.” They frequently use animal metaphors in their conversation about opium: the pet of shisheh, wildly using drugs; tame it, good substance becomes extinct; feral body (transitioning from heroin to opium); the omnivorous user (indulging in every substance); and owls (late-night smokers).

In PSEEZ, opium reigns supreme, its role unrivaled by alcohol or other substances such as shisheh or heroin, deemed inadequate or even detrimental to harnessing the vigor of labor. These substances fail to “enable” long-term productive interaction with the body. Among the laborers, moderate opium use is esteemed, allowing for calculated peaks of indulgence during the sweltering months. However, as the air temperature drops, a corresponding decline in usage inevitably follows. This delicate balance of ebb and flow is carefully managed, ensuring that the benefits of opium are harnessed while maintaining the well-being of the workers throughout the changing seasons.

Cognizant of the looming departure from their comrade, opium, the notion of laboring without its potent influence appeared inconceivable to these laborers. Yet, as time passed, various paths unfolded. Some managed to traverse the plateau for years, others veered into the realm of alternative substances, and a few bid farewell to opium altogether. The future of these individuals remains uncharted, lacking precise documentation.

In later updates, I discovered that Kamal, who had taken on a mentoring role after five years of opium companionship, made a significant decision in 2021. He chose to end his association with opium and start a new phase of life. Afterward, he got married and opened a fruit shop in his hometown.

The nomadic politics of domesticated opium

Although the domestication of opium is neither officially endorsed nor explicitly prohibited, it is widely tolerated and effectively ignored by state authorities, industry managers, and medical institutions. Rather than being regulated or institutionalized, the practice exists in a grey zone—visible yet unaddressed. Within this ambiguous space, workers develop and transmit knowledge about opium use informally. It is learned peer-to-peer, passed along through social networks, and refined through direct, on-site observation. This tacit knowledge circulates among laborers not through formal instruction but through shared experience, improvisation, and the bodily demands of strenuous work in harsh environments. This domestication of opium forms a shadow infrastructure of survival and endurance, functioning just outside the reach of institutional systems while remaining deeply embedded in the rhythms of everyday labor. To identify which strata of the working class are most deeply involved in the process of “domesticating” opium, I analyzed my interviews with experts and laborers alongside data from various qualitative and quantitative studies in the field. This investigation yielded a key preliminary insight: within the framework of the four-sector economy, the practice of opium domestication is most prevalent in the primary sector. As we move across the economic landscape—from the extraction of raw resources to information- and knowledge-based work—there is a noticeable decline in this practice. It appears that the closer a laborer is tied to the land, the more likely they are to be involved in the domestication of opium.

The domestication process does not originate in laboratories or textbooks, nor is it a product of state-sanctioned institutions. It emerges in a symbiotic relationship with the body and opium, sensitive to a range of materialities such as climate, job requirements, personal mood, body chemistry, diet, opium quality, consumption duration, and environmental pollution. These materialities merge to form a time-bound assemblage, a dynamic interplay of forces that shape and transform the practice of domestication. Rather than being a formalized science, the knowledge of how to use opium productively is built through hands-on experimentation and embodied trial-and-error. This practical, adaptive process is not taught in classrooms but emerges directly from workers’ interactions with their environment, their tools, and their bodily limits. It is neither a science focused on universal principles, nor one that seeks to understand the specific by mastering the general. Instead, it resembles the craft of blacksmithing, in which each encounter brings forth a different iron and a different hammer, demanding flexibility and constant adaptation.

Domestication science emerges “outside” formal institutions, lacking systematic transmission and embracing wild mutation. Unlike state-oriented addiction science such as psychology, criminology, and medicine, domestication resists linear accumulation. It favors palpation, tactile interaction, and tangible experience with matter over repeatability, accumulation, and systematic knowledge. According to this science, workers do not treat their bodies or opium as fixed entities. Instead, they understand both as flexible and responsive to different work conditions, opium quality, and environmental factors. Altering one element can result in changes to the entire assemblage’s characteristics. In contrast to Michel Foucault’s concept of the “medical gaze,” in which physicians shape a patient’s narrative to fit a biomedical framework by filtering out perceived irrelevant details,Footnote 83 domestication defies linearity; what is irrelevant now can become significant tomorrow. Domestication remains adaptable and responsive to fluctuations in the material agency of opium, the body, and the environment. It recognizes their interconnections and the potential for constant transformation that channels the opium energy toward productivity. Drawing from Deleuze and Guattari, it is a “nomad science”—a rhizomatic practice that eludes conventional classification and traces an elusive, nonlinear history.Footnote 84

In PSEEZ, where workers from diverse regions converge in pursuit of harsh and high-paid jobs, the domestication of opium gives rise to a unique form of social organization. Unbound by traditional unions or preexisting structures, and dislocated from their families, these workers forge connections through their shared engagement with the substance. This leads to the formation of a production-oriented organization, a “collective” of human and nonhuman actors, one that defies the traditional state apparatus, offering a glimpse into the potential for alternative, emergent forms of social organization.Footnote 85 Unlike “addiction discourse” marked by law, police, medicalization, rehabilitation centers, and so forth, domestication happens in a non-delimited and nonpartitioned space resembling a “hydraulic model, … inseparable from flows, and flux is reality itself.”Footnote 86

This dynamic interplay between the substance and the body unfolds beyond the confines of the state apparatus, giving rise to new bodies and a reconfigured opium: a testament to the transformative power of the domestication process. Driven by the need to extract productivity from a substance typically deemed unproductive, the workers embark on a transformative journey that reshapes their multifaceted web of relationships.

Nevertheless, this is no romantic ideal. Domestication operates within a neoliberal, deregulated labor landscape, wrestling with what Latour calls “the reactions of the terraqueous globe.”Footnote 87 External to state law, it aligns with capitalism’s imperatives, sustaining wage relations and capital circulation. On a macro scale, it hastens labor deregulation: whereas activists seek protective laws, domesticated opium enables workers to endure without them. Far from fostering collective ideals, it hinges on radical individuality—each laborer’s solitary pursuit of resilience.Footnote 88 In PSEEZ, this nomadic narco-science embodies Latour’s “wicked universality”: the universal erosion of ecological stability, labor protections, unions, and bodily autonomy outside capitalist logic.Footnote 89 Opium’s domestication, while empowering survival, reinforces the very systems it navigates.

Junkie infrastructures

Opium is “enacted” to enhance the body’s capacity to navigate challenges, with laborers serving as a linchpin in the facilitation of petroinfrastructure production. Domesticated opium itself transforms into an infrastructure, a “matter that enables the movement of other matters”;Footnote 90 domesticating narco-science is an energy-dispatching science. The energy generated by the mediation of opium in laborers’ bodies must be dispatched to infrastructure building.

Here, opium is no longer viewed as a “social plight.” Instead, it emerges as a tolerated and even encouraged vice that generates value by turning the laboring body into a hyperproductive force. The intersection of opium and production sparks profound questions about the political economy of labor and value. Kamal’s story echoes this sentiment: without opium, he might weld twenty pipes a day, a specific surplus value claimed by the employer. Yet, with opium in the equation, the welder’s output jumps to thirty pipes, generating an additional, unpaid surplus value. This raises intricate queries about “socially necessary labor time,” “surplus value,” and the “organic composition of capital.”Footnote 91 These inquiries gain complexity when contemplating the potential diminishment of a laborer’s active work years because of opium consumption or medical expenses needed to restore physical well-being.

The laborers’ “domestication” of opium, in essence, translates opium energy into infrastructure. As Iranian officials proudly promote one of the world’s largest gas networks, spanning 480,000 kilometers and serving 30 million subscribers, do they also recognize the significant role opium has played in the development of gas excavation and refinery infrastructures? Do they acknowledge the embodied energy of opium in this achievement?Footnote 92 What about the end users of PSEEZ’s products? And those overseas benefiting from petrochemical innovations? The confident answer seems to be “No.”

The prevailing rhetoric surrounding opium, shaped by the “translation” of the unproductive body and strengthened by the discourse on addiction, hinders the representation of opium-induced laborers. This limitation is not solely because laborers contribute to capital production but is exacerbated by the geographical distance of their work from urban areas, rendering them somewhat invisible to the “medical gaze” and societal eyes. The bodies of laborers, drivers, miners, and farmers can easily be rendered “invisible” or simply depicted as a “damaged body” without acknowledging how the energy of opium transforms into infrastructure. It implies a concealed history in the opiated labor relationship, overshadowed by the prevailing discourse on addiction.

Exploring the narrative of the assemblage of opium, labor, and infrastructure in PSEEZ unveils a story that invites us to examine infrastructures and objects in contemporary history through the lens of opium energy. It prompts us to question the degree to which opium is “congealed” within them. Does the assertion, aligning with Marx’s perspective that “capital is dead labor,” prompt an inquiry into the extent to which various forms of capital embody the energy of opium? To what extent does capitalism rely on narco-capitalism and narcotic labor?

Conclusion

This study has explored the collaboration between opium, nonproductiveness, and the formation of modern capitalism. By diverging from the mainstream Foucauldian scholar who typically examines how concepts such as “drug” or “addiction”Footnote 93 have been historically fabricated through relations of power, I have questioned the fundamental material claim that links opium to nonproductiveness and labor. This approach brings opium itself to the forefront, fostering a more nuanced understanding of its multifaceted history.

Serving as a preliminary effort to bridge Marxian materialism and the new materialist turn in social science, this study transcends the traditional focus of political economists on “opium’s money.”Footnote 94 Instead, it illuminates how the material flow of opium has contributed to infrastructure development, creating new avenues for inquiry into established concepts of political economy. Incorporating the material agencies of various actors into the concepts that emerge from traditional materialism is an unexplored path that warrants further comprehensive research.

Furthermore, this perspective challenges the notion that opium’s history can be reduced to a reflection of state regulatory policies or framed as a linear progression from criminalization to medicalization. By identifying spaces and experiences that elude discursive reach and representation, this study reveals the existence of liminal zones where alternative histories and potential transformations can emerge. In this context, the landscape of opium use is not merely a passive backdrop but a significant actor in the opium assemblage.

The transition of opium’s perception from a “flower of evil” to a “comrade” is not a straightforward shift between historical periods but rather reflects different modes of collaboration between opium, the landscape, the economy, and the human body. These modes coexist across various spaces, highlighting the multifaceted, unfinished nature of opium’s history. As Keith McMahon argues, opium has been relegated to the “banished other” of modern capitalism, hiding as the “obscene underside” of the polished exterior of capital.Footnote 95 This divide is particularly evident in urban settings, Western societies, and the service sector, where opium is often associated with nonproductiveness. However, in the hidden underbelly of capitalism, opium’s energy—not just its monetary value—has played a significant role in shaping the capitalist system.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deepest respect and gratitude to Mohammad Binazadeh for generously sharing his extensive knowledge, acquired over two decades of dedicated commitment to assisting industrial laborers and homeless women dealing with substance use. His unwavering dedication has profoundly impacted me, and our insightful conversations over the years were indispensable in inspiring the content of this paper. I also extend my deep gratitude to Fatemeh Kazemi for providing materials that enhanced my understanding of psychiatrists’ perspectives on opium.

Amir Khorasani is a Ph.D. researcher at the University of Bremen, where he studies the entanglements of ecology, infrastructure, and labor in Iran. His work combines ethnography and historical analysis to trace how industrial development and environmental transformation shape everyday life, particularly under the pressures of sanctions and global energy politics.

Footnotes

1 Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 151.

2 Cocteau, Opium, 36.

3 Browne, Year amongst the Persians, 476.

4 In this paper, I adopt a broad perspective on Marx’s labor theory of value, which asserts that the value of a commodity is intrinsically linked to the socially necessary labor time invested in its production. Marx postulated that labor is the sole generator of new value and contended that capitalists exploit workers by compensating them at a rate lower than the full value of their output. The resulting discrepancy, referred to as surplus value, is appropriated as profit by the capitalists, a dynamic that forms the foundation of Marx’s critique of the capitalist mode of production. See Marx, Capital, ch. 1.

5 Madani Qahfarrokhi, E’tiyād Dar Iran.

6 Christensen, Drugs, Deviancy. and Ghiabi, Drugs Politics.

7 Rahimipour Anaraki, Life on Drugs.

8 Ghiabi, “Spirit and Being.”

9 Ghiabi, “Drogues Illégales.”

10 Ghiabi, “Ontological Journeys.”

11 Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory.

12 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.

13 Latour, Reassembling the Social; Latour, “Materialism”; Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus; Ghiabi, “Ontological Journeys.”

14 For a recent exploration on Iran’s contemporary history, which is inspired by Latour’s new materialism, See Sefat, Revolution of Things: The Islamism and Post-Islamism of Objects in Tehran.

15 The term “opium” is somewhat deceptive, suggesting that it is composed of a solitary molecular component, when in fact it is an elaborate concoction incorporating sugars, proteins, ammonia, latex, gums, plant wax, lipids, sulfuric and lactic acids, moisture, meconic acid, and a vast selection of alkaloids including morphine, codeine, thebaine, papaverine, and noscapine; Booth, Opium, 4.

16 For more on this approach to substance use see Mol, Body Multiple; Dwyer and Moore, “Multiple Methamphetamines”; Duff, “Assemblages, Territories, Contexts”; Bush, “Opioid Ontopolitics”; Rhodes et al., “Becoming‐Methadone‐Body”; and Ghiabi, “Ontological Journeys.”

17 “Āyeney-e Ebrat,” IRIB TV1, 1988. The character Ā-Taqi was portrayed by the Iranian actor Javād Golpayegani.

18 According to the Anti-Narcotics Law of 1988.

19 Faror Island, an uninhabited isle in the Persian Gulf, was chosen as the destination to alleviate overcrowded prisons by establishing infrastructure aimed at educating, empowering, and rehabilitating opium addicts. However, this decision was short-lived due to expert criticism and was abandoned after only 1,500 narcotics offenders were sent there. Madani Qahfarrokhi, E’tiyād Dar Iran, 364–66. Despite its brief existence, the concept of exiling addicts to a remote island left a lasting impression on public opinion. Even as recently as 2014, while I was researching the social impact of drop-in centers (DICs) in a southern Tehran neighborhood amid the government’s extensive harm reduction program implementation, the notion of exile to a remote island continued to surface in conversations with families and officials alike. For many, this long-abandoned project remained a tantalizing “final solution” to the persistent issue of rampant addiction.

20 Narcotics Anonymous.

21 See Mintz, Sweetness and Power.

22 Jacques Derrida famously explored this point theoretically, building on the perspectives of Adorno and Horkheimer. However, a rich body of scholarship historically examines the role of Orientalism in shaping discourse on opium within the Western colonial imagination. See Derrida, “The Rhetoric of Drugs,” 250.

23 See McDonagh and Wickes, “Nineteenth-century Opium Complex.”

24 For further discussion, see Yuan, Alimentary Orientalism; Leask, British Romantic Writers; and McMahon, “Opium Smoking.”

25 For a discussion of the influence of Western ideals and values on the modernists of this era see Ādamiyat, Andishey-e Taraghi Va Hokumat-e Qanun.

26 For a detailed discussion on how the opium pipe entered Iran, see Matthee, Pursuit of Pleasure. For an in-depth study of the opium trade and plantations from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, see Regavim, “Most Sovereign.”

27 Ghiabi, Drugs Politics, 39.

28 Azarkhosh, Āfat-e Zendegi.

29 Schayegh, Who Is Knowledgeable, 186.

30 Marāghe’i, Sīyāhat Nāmeh-Ī Ebrāhīm-Ī Beg.

31 Adib al-Hukamā, Suhbat-e Sang o Sabu, 18–19.

32 Mirza, “Jihād-e Akbar.”

33 Kuhi Kermāni, Tāriykh-e Tariyāk va Taryāki dar Iran, 12, 85.

34 Kamm, “They Shoot Opium Smugglers.”

35 McLaughlin, “The Poppy.”

36 Schayegh, Who Is Knowledgeable, 78.

37 Ibid., 176.

38 Givi Khalkhāli, “In Karname-ye Man va in Qazavat-e Mellat.”

39 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam, 428.

40 Ghiabi, “Drogues Illégales,” 140.

41 See Madani Qahfarrokhi, E’tiyād Dar Iran; and Ghiabi, Drugs Politics.

42 Deleuze, “On Spinoza.”

43 De Quincey, Confessions of an English Opium-Eater.

44 Leask, British Romantic Writers and The East: Anxieties of Empire.

45 Mukherjee, “To Write Like a Dream: Nineteenth-Century Legacies.”

46 Mohaghegh, “Smoke, Drug, Poison.”

47 Browne, Year amongst the Persians, 634.

48 Regavim, “Most Sovereign”; Matthee, Pursuit of Pleasure. and Matthee, The Pursuit of Pleasure: Drugs and Stimulants in Iranian History, 1500-1900.

49 Regavim, “Most Sovereign”; Matthee, Pursuit of Pleasure.

50 Courtwright, Forces of Habit, 33–135.

51 Westermeyer, Poppies, Pipes, and People, 78.

52 Ball and Lau, “Chinese Narcotic Addict,” 72.

53 A consecutive series of rapid assessment studies commissioned by the Drug Control Headquarters and conducted by various researchers over different periods since 2001.

54 Rafiʿi et al., “Rapid Situation Assessment.” See also Alemi and Naraghi, “Iceberg of Opium Addiction; Chakoshian, “Alarming Rise”; and Behdad, “Recreational Void.”

55 Agahi and Spencer, “Drug Abuse,” 39.

56 The South Pars/North Field, spanning 9,700 square kilometers, is the world’s largest nonassociated gas field and a pivotal global energy resource. It holds immense significance, constituting 36 percent of Iran’s gas reserves and 5.6 percent of global reserves. In Qatari waters, the North Field represents 99 percent of Qatar’s reserves and 14 percent globally, with a distribution of 3,700 square kilometers in Iranian waters (South Pars) and 6,000 square kilometers in Qatari waters (North Field). “Factbox,” Reuters; Mohammadi, “Role of South Pars Gas Field.”

57 Amininejad, “Taḥlil va Barresi,” 105. Namdar Zangeneh, Minister of Petroleum from 2013 to 2021, lauded the PSEEZ in a 2019 interview and highlighted it as Iran’s first concerted effort to build downstream industries, like gas refineries and petrochemical complexes, coupled with extractive infrastructure; Namdar Zangeneh, “Zangeneh on Asaluyeh.”

58 Ashtiani Iraqi, Asaluyeh.

59 Khamenei, “Speech among People.”

60 Hetherington, “Waiting for the Surveyor,” 196.

61 The involvement of foreign corporations in PSEEZ varied with US sanctions on Iran. They withdrew during sanctions and returned when sanctions eased, demonstrating the dynamic and responsive nature of their engagement in the project.

62 Talebian et al.,“Tahlil-e Tasir,” 63.

63 Ehsani, “Social History of Labor.”

64 Azam Khatam, “Asaluyeh dar Āyine-ye Abadan,” 74–75.

65 Saberi Zafarqandi et al., “Vaz’eiat-e Masraf-e Mavad,” 64.

66 For the United States, see Roberts and Fallon, “Administrative Issues”; and for India, see Dash, “Combating the Impact.”

67 In an environment marked by inadequate infrastructure, including poorly lit streets, accident-prone dusty roads, limited medical facilities, housing shortages, and districts without piped water, coupled with heightened environmental toxicity, residents faced numerous challenges. They held suspicions about the laborers, attributing to them questionable intentions toward female residents and blaming them for the surge in crime rates. A human resource manager from a petrochemical complex expressed concerns to social researchers, stating, “Bringing in more than fifty thousand workers to a place is bound to cause issues like security, hygiene, psychological challenges, and such … it’s just common sense… . The real problem here is that investors are ready to invest billions in facilities and infrastructure but neglect basic urban infrastructure and public services essential for people’s living conditions”; Talebian et al., “Tahlil-e Tʾaseer,” 68.

68 “Phatic labor,” a term defined by anthropologist Julia Elyachar, refers to the work involved in maintaining social connections and communication that may not seem immediately productive or transactional but is crucial for creating networks, relationships, and a sense of social cohesion. It is derived from phatic communication, which is a language used for social or relational purposes rather than for exchanging substantive information (e.g., small talk).

In her work, Elyachar applies the concept to informal economies, particularly in Cairo, to show how seemingly mundane acts of communication—greetings, small talk, and maintaining social bonds—play a significant role in building social infrastructure and enabling economic activities. Phatic labor is, therefore, the often invisible work of cultivating relationships and networks that underpin broader social and economic systems. Elyachar, “Phatic Labor.”

69 Behdad and Nomani, “What a Revolution!”

70 Nomani and Behdad, “Labor Rights,” 220. In economics, the concentration ratio is a key metric for assessing the degree of market control exercised by the most prominent firms within a given industry. By indicating the combined market share of the leading firms, this ratio enables an evaluation of the level of competition present in a market. Although a decrease in the concentration ratio typically signals a more competitive landscape, it is essential to consider the broader context and potential implications of such a shift. When a decline in the concentration ratio is accompanied by labor deregulation, as observed in Iran, it can lead to a significant erosion of workers’ bargaining power. As markets become more fragmented and competitive, the dispersion of labor across numerous firms can render workers more susceptible to supervision and manipulation. Furthermore, the prevalence of short-term contracts and the absence of reliable, long-term employment arrangements can exacerbate the vulnerability of workers, undermining their ability to negotiate for better wages, working conditions, and benefits.

71 Maljoo, “Labor and Class in Iran”; Valadbaygi, “Hybrid Neoliberalism.”

72 Kierkegaard, Either/Or. Kierkegaard views boredom as a pervasive form of nothingness that seeps into every aspect of existence, an emptiness that infiltrates reality itself. He terms this phenomenon “demonic pantheism”—demonic due to its emptiness, and pantheistic because of its all-encompassing nature.

73 Merrer et al., “Reward Processing,” 1383.

74 Mirin et al., “Opiate Use.”

75 Bahadori, “Rezhe bar Khak-e Pook.”

76 Kashmiri et al., “Barresi-ye Āludgei-ha-ye Zist Mohiti.”

77 Balali et al., “Economic Sanctions.” See also Haidar, “Sanctions and Export Deflection.”

78 Murphy, “Alterlife.” Michelle Murphy, a scholar in technoscience, environmental studies, and feminist theory, conceptualizes “alterlife” as a form of life fundamentally and irreversibly transformed by the chemical violence of capitalism and colonialism. Alterlife encapsulates the lasting impacts of toxic exposures and environmental degradation on both present and future generations, as well as on the broader ecological systems in which they exist.

79 Wigal, Opium.

80 Saberi Zafarqandi et al., “Vaz’eiat-e Masraf-e Mawad,” 61.

81 The workers, in a rhythmic cadence of Persian, say tā nakeshe, nemikeshe, meaning, “my body cannot function without a smoke.” “Midnight oil”—age-old slang synonymous with opium—serves as a translation for this colloquial Persian expression.

82 The plateau or steady state refers to the phenomenon in which, after a certain period of continuous drug administration, the effects of the drug reach a steady state or plateau. This state is achieved when the rate of drug administration becomes equivalent to the rate of drug elimination, resulting in consistent plasma concentrations and predictable, stable therapeutic effects. Consequently, the efficiency of the drug is maintained within a stable range, enhancing the predictability of treatment outcomes and facilitating the management of the drug.

83 Misselbrook, “Foucault.”

84 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 361.

85 Latour favors the concept of the “collective” over “society.” Although society generally includes only human beings, collectives embrace human and nonhuman actors. Soil, molecules, opium, pipes, heat, humidity, inflation, smokers, and more all function as actors, sharing the same ontological status and possessing the capacity to exert influence and agency. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 4; Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 145.

86 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 361.

87 Latour, Down to Earth, 66.

88 Here, I align with Lundy’s interpretation, in which he illustrates that the nomad is not inherently absolute and irreconcilable with the state. The real nomad is redirected toward state space, influencing and transforming the state and returning to a nomadic state once more, just as the state can undergo “deterritorialization.” Lundy, “Who Are Our Nomads Today?”

89 Latour, Down to Earth, 54.

90 Larkin, “Politics and Poetics,” 329.

91 Marx, Capital, chs. 1-3, ch. 25.

92 Mazloum Farsibaf, “Iran’s Gas Network.”

93 See Seddon, “Inventing Drugs”; and Aurin, “Chasing the Dragon.”

94 See Trocki, “Opium.” For a definitive Iranian example, see Raisdana and Gharavi Nakhjavani, “Drug Market in Iran.”

95 Keith McMahon, “Opium Smoking,” 165.

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