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RELATIVE-SAMENESS COUNTERPART THEORY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2008

DELIA GRAFF FARA
DELIA GRAFF FARA*
Affiliation:
Princeton University
*
*PHILOSOPHY DEPT 212 1879 HALL PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRINCETON, NJ 08544 USA Email: graff@princeton.edu
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Extract

Just as set theory can be divorced from Ernst Zermelo's original axiomatization of it, counterpart theory can be divorced from the eight postulates that were originally stipulated by David Lewis (1968, p. 114) to constitute it. These were postulates governing some of the properties and relations holding among possible worlds and their inhabitants. In particular, counterpart theory can be divorced from Lewis's postulate P2, the stipulation that individuals are ‘world bound’—that none exists in more than one possible world

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Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 1 , Special Issue 2: Mathematical Methods in Philosophy , August 2008 , pp. 167 - 189
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2008

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References

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