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A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Herbert A. Simon
Herbert A. Simon*
Affiliation:
Carnegie Institute of Technology
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Abstract

It is shown that Estes' formula for the asymptotic behavior of a subject under conditions of partial reinforcement can be derived from the assumption that the subject is behaving rationally in a certain game-theoretic sense and attempting to minimax his regret. This result illustrates the need for specifying the frame of reference or set of the subject when using the assumption of rationality to predict his behavior.

Keywords

Public PolicyAsymptotic BehaviorGame TheoryStatistical TheoryLearning Theory

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Psychometrika , Volume 21 , Issue 3 , September 1956 , pp. 267 - 272
Copyright
Copyright © 1956 The Psychometric Society

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References

Thrall, R. M., Coombs, C. H., Davis, R. L.. Decision processes, New York: Wiley, 1954Google Scholar
Estes, W. K. Individual behavior in uncertain situations: an interpretation in terms of statistical association theory. In (1), chap. 9.Google Scholar
Flood, M. W. Game-learning theory and some decision-making experiments. In (1), chap. 10.Google Scholar
Flood, M. W. Environmental non-stationarity in a sequential decision-making experiment. In (1), chap. 18.Google Scholar
Simon, H. A.. A behavioral model of rational choice. Quart. J. Econ., 1955, 69, 99–118CrossRefGoogle Scholar