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‘Ought-lmplies-Can’ and Hume's Rule

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

D. G. Collingridge
D. G. Collingridge
Affiliation:
University of Aston
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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 52 , Issue 201 , July 1977 , pp. 348 - 351
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1977

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References

1 See, for example, Hare, R. M., Freedom and Reason (Oxford, 1963), 59–60Google Scholar, and Hampshire, S., ‘Freedom of the Will’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 25 (1951), 161–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Nowell-Smith, P., Ethics (Pelican, 1954), 80–81.Google Scholar

3 Cooper, N., ‘Presuppositions of Moral Judgements’, Mind, 75 (1966), 46.Google Scholar See also Hampshire, S., op. cit.Google Scholar

4 Hampshire, S., op. cit., 164.Google Scholar

5 Hare, R. M., op. cit., 84.Google Scholar