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What Scientific Theories Could Not Be

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Hans Halvorson
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Abstract

According to the semantic view of scientific theories, theories are classes of models. I show that this view—if taken literally—leads to absurdities. In particular, this view equates theories that are distinct, and it distinguishes theories that are equivalent. Furthermore, the semantic view lacks the resources to explicate interesting theoretical relations, such as embeddability of one theory into another. The untenability of the semantic view—as currently formulated—threatens to undermine scientific structuralism.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 79 , Issue 2 , April 2012 , pp. 183 - 206
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

The final version of this article was improved by comments from Jeremy Butterfield, Bas van Fraassen, Gideon Rosen, Jim Weatherall, and an anonymous referee for Philosophy of Science.

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