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The Structure, the Whole Structure, and Nothing but the Structure?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Stathis Psillos
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Abstract

This paper is structured around the three elements of the title. Section 2 claims that (a) structures need objects and (b) scientific structuralism should focus on in re structures. Therefore, pure structuralism is undermined. Section 3 discusses whether the world has ‘excess structure’ over the structure of appearances. The main point is that the claim that only structure can be known is false. Finally, Section 4 argues directly against ontic structural realism that it lacks the resources to accommodate causation within its structuralist slogan.

Information

Type
The Semantic View of Theories, Scientific Structuralism, and Structural Realism
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. Edited by Miriam Solomon , December 2006 , pp. 560 - 570
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I wish to thank Theodore Arabatzis, Anjan Chakravartty, Steven French, Elaine Landry, and Bas van Fraassen for valuable comments. Research for this paper was funded by the framework EPEAEK II in the program Pythagoras II.

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