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Representation: The Problem for Structuralism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Bas C. van Fraassen
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Abstract

What does it mean to embed the phenomena in an abstract structure? Or to represent them by doing so? The semantic view of theories runs into a severe problem if these notions are construed either naively, in a metaphysical way, or too closely on the pattern of the earlier syntactic view. Constructive empiricism and structural realism will then share those difficulties. The problem will be posed as in Reichenbach's The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, and realist reactions will be examined, but they will be argued to dissolve upon scrutiny.

Information

Type
The Semantic View of Theories, Scientific Structuralism, and Structural Realism
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. Edited by Miriam Solomon , December 2006 , pp. 536 - 547
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I wish to thank especially Anja Jauernig, Stathis Psillos, and Paul Teller for valuable comments.

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