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Random Boolean Networks and Evolutionary Game Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

J. McKenzie Alexander
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Abstract

Recent years have seen increased interest in the question of whether it is possible to provide an evolutionary game-theoretic explanation for certain kinds of social norms. I sketch a proof of a general representation theorem for a large class of evolutionary game-theoretic models played on a social network, in hope that this will contribute to a greater understanding of the long-term evolutionary dynamics of such models, and hence the evolution of social norms.

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Type
Evolutionary Theory
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2003 , pp. 1289 - 1304
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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