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Machine Models for Cognitive Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

R. J. Nelson
R. J. Nelson*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Case Western Reserve University
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Extract

Introduction. During the past two decades philosophers of psychology have considered a large variety of computational models for philosophy of mind and more recently for cognitive science. Among the suggested models are computer programs, Turing machines, pushdown automata, linear bounded automata, finite state automata and sequential machines. Many philosophers have found finite state automata models to be the most appealing, for various reasons, although there has been no shortage of defenders of programs and Turing machines. A paper by Arthur Burks (1973) convinced me long ago that “all natural human functions” are, or can be fruitfully modeled to be, finite state automata with output. Further work in the field has reinforced this conviction. There is room, however, for the use of any of the above models in philosophy of mind and in the ongoing development of cognitive science.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 54 , Issue 3 , September 1987 , pp. 391 - 408
Copyright
Copyright © 1987 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I wish to thank Christopher Hill, Zenon Pylyshyn, and the referees for helpful critical comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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