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Logical Foundations of Evidential Support

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Branden Fitelson
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Abstract

Carnap's inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an “increase in firmness” (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap's main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of “logical probability.” The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap's epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carnap's goal of bridging confirmation and credence, in favor of bridging confirmation and evidential support.

Information

Type
Confirmation and Inductive Logic
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. Edited by Miriam Solomon , December 2006 , pp. 500 - 512
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank audiences at the University of California, Berkeley; the University of Michigan; the University of Oklahoma; and the PSA 2004 symposium at which the paper on which this article was based was presented for useful comments and discussion (there are too many members of these audiences who have made valuable suggestions to name each one individually).

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