Hostname: page-component-7f64f4797f-kg7gq Total loading time: 0.001 Render date: 2025-11-04T13:49:16.913Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Depragmatized Dutch Book Arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Patrick Maher
Patrick Maher*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 105 Gregory Hall, 810 South Wright St., Urbana, IL 61801.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Recently a number of authors have tried to avoid the failures of traditional Dutch book arguments by separating them from pragmatic concerns of avoiding a sure loss. In this paper I examine defenses of this kind by Howson and Urbach, Hellman, and Christensen. I construct rigorous explications of their arguments and show that they are not cogent. I advocate abandoning Dutch book arguments in favor of a representation theorem.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 2 , June 1997 , pp. 291 - 305
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Christensen, David (1996), “Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers”, Journal of Philosophy 93: 450–479.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hellman, Geoffrey (1997), “Bayes and Beyond”, Philosophy of Science. 64: 191–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Howson, Colin and Urbach, Peter (1993), Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach. Second edition, Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
Lakatos, Imre (1970), “The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press, pp. 91–196.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maher, Patrick (1993), Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maher, Patrick and Kashima, Yoshihisa (1997), “Preference Reversal in Ellsberg Problems”, Philosophical Studies. 88: 187–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar