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Sufficient Conditions for Causality to Be Transitive

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Joseph Y. Halpern
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Abstract

Natural conditions are provided that are sufficient to ensure that causality as defined by approaches that use counterfactual dependence and structural equations will be transitive.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 83 , Issue 2 , April 2016 , pp. 213 - 226
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I thank Chris Hitchcock and the anonymous reviewers of the article for perceptive comments that greatly influenced the structure and story of the article. Work supported in part by National Science Foundation grants IIS-0812045, IIS-0911036, and CCF-1214844, by Air Force Office of Scientific Research grants FA9550-08-1-0438, FA9550-09-1-0266, and FA9550-12-1-0040, and by Army Research Office grant W911NF-09-1-0281.

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