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Scientific Realism and the ‘Pessimistic Induction’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Stathis Psillos
Stathis Psillos*
Affiliation:
London School of Economics
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Abstract

Over the last two decades, the debate over scientific realism has been dominated by two arguments that pull in contrary directions: the ‘no miracle’ argument and the ‘pessimistic induction’. The latter suggests that the historical record destroys the realist’s belief in an explanatory connection between truthlikeness and genuine empirical success. This paper analyzes the structure of the ‘pessimistic induction’, presents a move—the divide et impera move—that neutralizes it, and motivates a substantive yet realistic version of scientific realism. This move is also compared with Worrall’s and Kitcher’s recent reactions to the ‘pessimistic induction’.

Information

Type
Realism and Anti-Realism
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue S3 , 1996 , pp. S306 - S314
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

Many thanks to Robert Almeder, Chris Daly, Peter Lipton, David Papineau and John Worrall for valuable comments on earlier drafts. The research for this piece has been supported by a British Academy Postdoctoral fellowship.

‡

Department of Philosophy, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE.

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