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The Logic of Tests of Significance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Stephen Spielman
Stephen Spielman*
Affiliation:
Lehman College of the City University of New York
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Abstract

In spite of the fact that the Neyman–Pearson theory of testing is the official theory of statistical testing, most research publications in the social sciences use a pattern of inductive reasoning that is characteristic of Fisherian tests of significance. The exact structure and rationale of this pattern of reasoning is widely misunderstood. The goal of the paper is to describe precisely the pattern and its rationale, and to show that while it is far more cogent than Fisher's critics have realized, it does not logically sustain the inferences it sanctions.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 41 , Issue 3 , September 1974 , pp. 211 - 226
Copyright
Copyright © 1974 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

The research for this paper was funded by a grant from the City University Faculty Research Program.

References

REFERENCES

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