Hostname: page-component-54dcc4c588-rz4zl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-09-13T08:43:55.310Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Discussion: Howson and Franklin on Prediction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Patrick Maher
Patrick Maher*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Evidence for a hypothesis typically confirms the hypothesis more if the evidence was predicted than if it was accommodated. Or so I argued in previous papers, where I also developed an analysis of why this should be so. But this was all a mistake if Howson and Franklin (1991) are to be believed. In this paper, I show why they are not to be believed. I also identify a grain of truth that may have been dimly grasped by those Bayesians who deny the confirmatory value of prediction.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , June 1993 , pp. 329 - 340
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1993

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

†

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 105 Gregory Hall, 810 South Wright Street, Urbana, IL 61801, USA.

References

Horwich, P. (1982), Probability and Evidence. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Howson, C. and Franklin, A. (1991), “Maher, Mendeleev and Bayesianism”, Philosophy of Science 58: 574–585.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keynes, J. M. (1921), A Treatise on Probability. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Maher, P. (1988), “Prediction, Accommodation, and the Logic of Discovery”, in Fine, A. and Leplin, J. (eds.), PSA 1988, vol. 1. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 273–285.Google Scholar
Maher, P. (1990), “How Prediction Enhances Confirmation”, in Dunn, J. M. and Gupta, A., (eds.), J. M. Dunn and A. Gupta, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 327–343.Google Scholar