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Concept Attribution in Nonhuman Animals: Theoretical and Methodological Problems in Ascribing Complex Mental Processes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Colin Allen  and
Marc D. Hauser
Colin Allen
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University
Marc D. Hauser
Affiliation:
Department of Zoology, University of California, Davis
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Abstract

The demise of behaviorism has made ethologists more willing to ascribe mental states to animals. However, a methodology that can avoid the charge of excessive anthropomorphism is needed. We describe a series of experiments that could help determine whether the behavior of nonhuman animals towards dead conspecifics is concept mediated. These experiments form the basis of a general point. The behavior of some animals is clearly guided by complex mental processes. The techniques developed by comparative psychologists and behavioral ecologists are able to provide us with the tools to critically evaluate hypotheses concerning the continuity between human minds and animal minds.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 58 , Issue 2 , June 1991 , pp. 221 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

We wish to thank Tyler Burge, Philip Clark, Lisa Hauser, Alan Nelson, anonymous reviewers for this journal, and, especially, Georges Rey and Keith Donnellan for criticism of earlier drafts of this paper.

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