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Computational Models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Paul Humphreys
Paul Humphreys*
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
*
Send requests for reprints to the author, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, 512 Cabell Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904; pwh2a@virginia.edu.
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Abstract

A different way of thinking about how the sciences are organized is suggested by the use of cross-disciplinary computational methods as the organizing unit of science, here called computational templates. The structure of computational models is articulated using the concepts of construction assumptions and correction sets. The existence of these features indicates that certain conventionalist views are incorrect, in particular it suggests that computational models come with an interpretation that cannot be removed as well as a prior justification. A form of selective realism is described which denies that one can simply read the ontological commitments from the theory itself.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 69 , Issue S3 , September 2002 , pp. S1 - S11
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

My thinking about modelling has been influenced by the work of a number of people, especially Bill Wimsatt, David Freedman, and Stephan Hartmann, to all of whom thanks are due for many illuminating conversations. Support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. A more detailed account of the ideas in this paper can be found in Humphreys (2003].

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