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The Friedman-Sheard programme in intuitionistic logic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Graham E. Leigh  and
Michael Rathjen
Graham E. Leigh
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 4JJ, UK, E-mail: graham.leigh@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Michael Rathjen
Affiliation:
School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK, E-mail: rathjen@maths.leeds.ac.uk
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Abstract

This paper compares the roles classical and intuitionistic logic play in restricting the free use of truth principles in arithmetic. We consider fifteen of the most commonly used axiomatic principles of truth and classify every subset of them as either consistent or inconsistent over a weak purely intuitionistic theory of truth.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Symbolic Logic , Volume 77 , Issue 3 , September 2012 , pp. 777 - 806
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2012

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References

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