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Continuous stochastic games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

Matthew J. Sobel
Matthew J. Sobel*
Affiliation:
Yale University
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Abstract

Nonzero-sum N-person stochastic games are a generalization of Shapley's two-person zero-sum terminating stochastic game. Rogers and Sobel showed that an equilibrium point exists when the sets of states, actions, and players are finite. The present paper treats discounted stochastic games when the sets of states and actions are given by metric spaces and the set of players is arbitrary. The existence of an equilibrium point is proven under assumptions of continuity and compactness.

Keywords

NONCOOPERATIVE STOCHASTIC GAMEDISCOUNTED MARKOVIAN DECISION PROCESSEQUILIBRIUM POINTDYNAMIC PROGRAMMING

Information

Type
Research Papers
Information
Journal of Applied Probability , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , September 1973 , pp. 597 - 604
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 1973 

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Footnotes

Research partially supported by N.S.F. Grant GK-13757.

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