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The limits of reputation on compliance1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2009

Rachel Brewster
Rachel Brewster*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
*
E-mail: rbrewster@law.harvard.edu
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Abstract

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Information

Type
Symposium on Andrew Guzman's How International Law Works
Information
International Theory , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , July 2009 , pp. 323 - 333
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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Footnotes

1

This essay draws on a separate article, ‘Unpacking the state’s reputation’, Harvard International Law Journal (in press).

References

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