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OUR RELIABILITY IS IN PRINCIPLE EXPLAINABLE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2016

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Abstract

Non-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non-causal truths are committed to a correlation between their beliefs and non-causal, mind-independent facts. Hartry Field and others have argued that if realists cannot explain this striking correlation, that is a strong reason to reject their theory. Some consider this argument, known as the Benacerraf–Field argument, as the strongest challenge to robust realism about mathematics (Field 1989, 2001), normativity (Enoch 2011), and even logic (Schechter 2010). In this article I offer two closely related accounts for the type of explanation needed in order to address Field's challenge. I then argue that both accounts imply that the striking correlation to which robust realists are committed is explainable, thereby discharging Field's challenge. Finally, I respond to some objections and end with a few unresolved worries.

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Episteme , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , June 2017 , pp. 197 - 211
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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