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Concepts are a functional kind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Elisabetta Lalumera
Elisabetta Lalumera
Affiliation:
Dipartimento di Psicologia, Università di Milano-Bicocca, 20126 Milano, Italy, and Cogito Research Centre in Philosophy, Università di Bologna, 40100 Bologna, Italy. elisabetta.lalumera@unimib.it http://sites.google.com/site/elisabettalalumera/
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Abstract

This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that “concept” ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 2-3 , June 2010 , pp. 217 - 218
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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