Element contents
Series: Elements in Philosophy of Law
Law’s Language
Meaning and Normativity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 November 2025
Summary
The language of law includes normative or prescriptive terms such as 'obligation' and 'permission'. How do we explain the meaning of prescriptive legal language? This has long been regarded as a problem for positivists, since at first glance their view suggests we can derive an ought – a legal obligation or right or permission – from descriptive social facts alone. This Element outlines what we should want from a semantics of prescriptive legal language, critically evaluates four leading semantic accounts, and argues that legal prescriptivity is not, in the end, a problem for positivists.
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- Series: Elements in Philosophy of LawOnline ISBN: 9781009122801Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 11 December 2025
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